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Natural scientists warn that global climate change is a risk with potentially 
devastating consequences for human societies and natural ecosystems around the world. 
Meeting this challenge will require a concerted national and international effort to 
dramatically reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. It will also, however, 
require public support for political leaders and government mitigation policies, and 
committed action by individual citizens and consumers. 
This dissertation examined whether the American public perceives global 
warming as a real threat, supports public mitigation policies, or has taken individual 
actions to mitigate climate change. It found that measures of affect, imagery and cultural 
worldviews predict public risk perceptions, policy preferences, and individual behaviors. 
Finally, it used affective image analysis to identify several distinct "interpretive 
communities" within the American public. 
v 
The data comes from three surveys: a national survey of the American public 
completed in February, 2003 (n=673); a statewide survey of the Oregon public completed 
in February, 2001 (n=900); and a survey of student activists at the 2000 World Climate 
Conference (COP6) in The Hague, Netherlands (n=112).  
This research describes an American public with broad concern about global 
warming, strong bipartisan support for international treaties and national mitigation 
policies, and strong opposition to higher energy or gasoline prices to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions.  Relatively few Americans have undertaken individual mitigation 
behaviors.  While global warming does have negative connotations for most Americans, 
the thoughts and images evoked by this term primarily reflect impacts temporally and 
spatially distant from most people’s lives.  Critically, this research also finds that 
Americans do not currently associate global warming with any impacts on human health.  
Overall, these results suggest that American public opinion about global warming is at a 
critical turning point.  Americans are aware and concerned about global climate change 
and predisposed to support political leaders and mitigation policies across party lines.  
Global warming is not a national priority, however, and Americans have yet to confront 
the tradeoffs that will ultimately be required.
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The release of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere by the burning of fossil 
fuels is, conceivably, the most important environmental issue in the world 
today” (Nature 1979). 
 
Natural scientists have described global warming as perhaps the preeminent 
environmental risk confronting the world in the 21st century.  Meanwhile, social scientists 
have found that people respond to hazards based on their perception of the risks.  What 
the public perceives as a risk, why they perceive it that way and how they will 
subsequently behave are thus vital questions for policy makers attempting to address 
global climate change, in which the effects are delayed, have inequitable distributions of 
costs and benefits, and are beyond the control of any one group.  In this situation, public 
support or rejection of proposed climate policies will be greatly influenced by the 
perceived risks of global warming.  Further, “scientists need to know how the public is 
likely to respond to climate impacts or initiatives, because those responses can attenuate 
or amplify the impacts” (Bord, et al. 1998:75).  This dissertation uses survey methods to 
investigate global warming risk perceptions, policy preferences and individual behaviors 
among three populations: the American public, the Oregon public, and student climate 
change activists attending the 2000 World Climate Conference (COP6) at The Hague, 
Netherlands. 
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Global Warming 
 
Global warming, or global climate change, refers to the enhanced greenhouse 
effect resulting from anthropogenic, or human-caused, emissions of greenhouse gases to 
the atmosphere.1  The greenhouse effect is a natural process that traps heat at the Earth’s 
surface.  Short-wave radiation from the sun is absorbed by the Earth’s surface and 
converted into long-wave, infrared radiation (heat).  The Earth in turn radiates this long-
wave energy back towards space.  Some of this energy escapes, but some is trapped by 
greenhouse gases  in the atmosphere (e.g., carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane, nitrous 
oxide, etc.), which act like a thermal blanket to keep the Earth warmer than it would 
otherwise be.   
 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas of concern, despite 
comprising less than .03% of the atmosphere.  For several thousand years prior to the 
industrial revolution, carbon dioxide in the atmosphere averaged around 280 parts per 
million by volume (ppmv) (Houghton 1994:24).  Since the industrial revolution 
concentrations of carbon dioxide have increased approximately 33% to nearly 373 ppmv 
in 2002 (Keeling and Whorf 2003). Carbon dioxide is part of the natural carbon cycle, 
but humans have recently and dramatically increased the amount of CO2 in the 
atmosphere, primarily through the burning of fossil fuels.  Over millions of years, 
                                                 
1 The terms “global climate change” and “global warming” are used interchangeably throughout this 
dissertation.  Global climate change is the term most often used by the scientific community, while global 
warming is the term most often used by the media and the lay public. 
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growing vegetation absorbed atmospheric carbon dioxide and converted it to organic 
material through the process of photosynthesis.  Some of this organic material became 
buried deep underground and fossilized into vast accumulations of coal, oil and natural 
gas through geologic processes, effectively sequestering this carbon from the atmosphere.  
With the advent of the industrial revolution, human beings began burning fossil fuels at 
an exponential rate, and the carbon sequestered by these ancient plants was suddenly 
released back into the atmosphere, thereby leading to an “enhanced” greenhouse effect. 
 
The present atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration is the highest in at least the 
past 420,000 years (Falkowski 2000; Petit, et al. 1999) and probably the past 20 million 
years (Pagani, et al. 1999).  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)2 
projects that by the year 2100, CO2 concentrations may increase by as much as 350% and 
the average global temperature may rise by as much as 11˚ F under business-as-usual 
scenarios (2001:12-13).  By comparison, in the last ice age about 20,000 years ago, 
average global temperatures were only about 9˚ F cooler than present.  At that time, ice 
over 2 miles thick covered present-day Canada, stretching south over the upper Midwest 
and New England.  Human greenhouse gas emissions may increase average global 
temperatures by an equal order of magnitude. 
 
 
2 The IPCC is comprised of over 2,500 of the world’s leading climate scientists, economists and policy experts who 
summarize the state of knowledge on climate change every five years.  Their work is recognized by all the countries of 
the world as the scientific basis for international negotiations.   
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Higher global temperatures are projected to have a wide range of impacts with 
potentially severe consequences for human societies and natural ecosystems, including 
rising sea levels, increased rates of infectious disease, heat waves, droughts, more 
frequent and severe wildfires, floods, extreme weather events, melting polar and glacier 
ice, species extinctions, shifts in species distributions, changing seasonal patterns, etc.  
Many of these anticipated changes are already occurring.  The 1990s were the warmest 
decade on record (IPCC 2001:2).  The five warmest years since 1860, in decreasing order 
were: 1998, 2002, 2001, 1995, and 1997 (WMO 2003:4).  Currently, this year (2003) is 
on track to become the third warmest year ever recorded (NCDC 2003).  Thus, the past 
three years will account for three of the four warmest years on record.  Sea levels have 
risen 4 to 10 inches over the past century and are projected to rise an additional 3.5 to 
34.6 inches by 2100, due primarily to thermal expansion, as well as melting glaciers and 
ice caps, with potentially devastating consequences for small island nations, coastal cities 
and wetland ecosystems around the world.  The Arctic ice cap has decreased in area by 
34,300 km2 (the approximate size of the Netherlands) each year since 1978 (Mastny 
2000) and has thinned over 40% in the past 35 years (IPCC 2001:4).  The geographical 
ranges of infectious disease vectors that transmit malaria, dengue fever, and encephalitis 
are expanding (e.g. mosquitoes, which are highly sensitive to changes in temperature and 
precipitation) (Epstein 2000). Worldwide economic losses due to weather disasters have 
increased from under $4 billion in the 1950s to over $39 billion in the 1990s, adjusted for 
GDP (Munich Re 2000). 
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These initial fingerprints and harbingers of current and future climate change, 
however, are the result of relatively linear, gradual and incremental changes in global 
average temperatures.  Of growing concern is the realization, based on extensive 
paleoclimatic reconstructions, that the Earth’s climate system is inherently non-linear and 
capable of sudden, abrupt changes when a critical threshold is crossed.  For example, 
 
Roughly half the north Atlantic warming since the last ice age was 
achieved in only a decade, and it was accompanied by significant climatic 
changes across the globe.  Similar events, including local warmings as 
large as 16˚ C [30˚ F], occurred repeatedly during the slide into and 
climb out of the last ice age…Thus, greenhouse warming and other human 
alterations of the earth system may increase the possibility of large, 
abrupt, and unwelcome regional or global climatic events (NRC 2001:1). 
 
The projected impacts of relatively linear, incrementally warmer global 
temperatures on human societies and natural ecosystems are already dramatic.  The 
possibility of large, abrupt swings in regional and global climate, however, are potentially 
even more serious.  Confronted with these and many other research findings, many 
scientists have called for immediate, concerted action to reduce global emissions of 
greenhouse gases. 
 
Scientific Warnings 
 
Scientific identification of anthropogenic climate change and assessments of the 
potential consequences date back nearly 200 years.  The warming effect of an enhanced 
greenhouse effect was first recognized in 1827 by French scientist Jean-Baptiste Fourier.  
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In 1896, Svante Arrhenius, a Swedish chemist, first calculated the effect of increasing 
concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and predicted that a doubling of CO2 
would lead to an increase in average global temperatures of 5 to 6˚ C (9 to 11˚ F), a result 
remarkably similar to current projections (Houghton 1994:12).  He estimated, however, 
that it would take another 3,000 years of fossil fuel burning to reach a doubling of CO2.  
He further argued that this would unequivocally be a good thing, especially from the 
perspective of a northern European: 
 
By the influence of the increasing percentage of carbonic acid in the 
atmosphere, we may hope to enjoy ages with more equable and better 
climates, especially as regards the colder regions of the Earth, ages when 
the Earth will bring forth much more abundant crops than at present for 
the benefit of rapidly propagating mankind (quoted in Christianson 
1999:115). 
 
By 1957, however, scientific assessment of the potential consequences of 
anthropogenic climate change began to shift with the publication of a paper by Roger 
Revelle and Hans Suess of the Scripps Institute of Oceanography.  They argued: 
 
Human beings are now carrying out a large-scale geophysical experiment 
of a kind that could not have happened in the past nor be reproduced in 
the future.  Within a few centuries we are returning to the atmospheres 
and oceans the concentrated organic carbon stored in sedimentary rocks 
over hundreds of millions of years (quoted in Christianson 1999:155-156). 
 
In this same year, Charles Keeling began measurements of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide from an observatory on the Mauna Loa volcano in Hawaii.  He soon identified 
what became known as the “Keeling Curve” – a graph that showed atmospheric 
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concentrations of carbon dioxide increasing year by year.  This was a dramatic finding, as 
until this point most scientists believed that the oceans absorbed all the carbon emitted to 
the atmosphere by the human burning of fossil fuels.  Instead, the Keeling Curve proved 
that carbon dioxide was accumulating in the atmosphere faster than the oceans or other 
carbon sinks (e.g., vegetation) could absorb it (Johansen 2002:40).  Thus, human 
emissions of carbon dioxide were substantially enhancing the greenhouse effect. 
 
By 1979, many scientists were growing increasingly concerned and began 
reaching out to the policy community.  A group of leading researchers advised the 
President’s Council on Environmental Quality that: 
 
Man is setting in motion a series of events that seem certain to cause a 
significant warming of world climates unless mitigating steps are taken 
immediately (Pomerance 1989:260). 
 
Also in that year, the British journal Nature editorialized that “The release of carbon 
dioxide to the atmosphere by the burning of fossil fuels is, conceivably, the most 
important environmental issue in the world today” (Nature 1979).   
 
Throughout the early decades of research, many scientists remained cautious 
about whether anthropogenic climate change was in fact occurring.  By the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, however, as convergent evidence from a variety of sources accumulated, 
including direct temperature measurements, historical records, paleoclimatic 
reconstructions, receding glaciers, computer model simulations, etc., a majority of 
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scientists became convinced that global warming was occurring.  By the mid 1990’s only 
a handful of “climate skeptics” remained opposed to the growing scientific consensus.  
As others have documented, these scientists often had direct financial ties to the fossil 
fuel industry, yet had a disproportionate effect on the public debate (Gelbspan 1997; 
Leggett 1999).   
 
In 1988, over 300 scientists and policy makers from around the world gathered at 
the Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere.  They released an ominous 
warning: 
 
Humanity is conducting an unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive 
experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to nuclear 
war.  The earth’s atmosphere is being changed at an unprecedented rate 
by pollutants resulting from human activities, inefficient and wasteful 
fossil fuel use and the effects of rapid population growth in many regions.  
These changes are already having harmful consequences over many parts 
of the globe (quoted in Johansen 2002:1-2). 
 
The conference further called for the establishment of an international legal framework to 
protect the Earth’s atmosphere and specifically recommended a global reduction of CO2 
levels 20% below 1988 levels by 2005.  In 1990, the newly constituted Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its first assessment of global change science.  
They concluded that stabilization of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations would 
require a reduction of global emissions of CO2 by 60-80% below 1990 levels (IPCC 
1990:xviii).  These warnings by the scientific community led eventually to the signing of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change by world leaders at the 
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1992 Rio “Earth Summit.”  The Convention's ultimate objective was the "stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (UNFCC 1999:6). 
 
In 1995, the IPCC completed its Second Assessment and concluded that “the 
balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on the global 
climate” (IPCC 1996:5).  In 1997, over 2,400 scientists signed a letter to President 
Clinton entitled “Scientists Statement on Global Climate Disruption.” This letter warned 
that anthropogenic climate change was already underway and that severe consequences 
would result: 
 
…the further accumulation of greenhouse gases commits the earth 
irreversibly to further global climatic change and consequent ecological, 
economic and social disruption.  The risks associated with such changes 
justify preventive action through reductions in emissions of greenhouse 
gases” (Holdren, et al. 1997). 
 
With the release of the Third Assessment Report in 2001, the IPCC reported that 
“there is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 
years is attributable to human activities” and that atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations continued to increase (IPCC 2001:7).  Most recently, Sir John Houghton, 
former co-chair of the Scientific Assessment Group of the IPCC, likened global climate 
change to the threat from weapons of mass destruction in the wake of the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the American and British 
“preemptive” attack on Iraq: 
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…our long-term security is threatened by a problem at least as dangerous 
as chemical, nuclear or biological weapons, or indeed international 
terrorism: human induced climate change…I have no hesitation in 
describing it as a ‘weapon of mass destruction’…Global warming is 
already upon us (Houghton 2003). 
 
As demonstrated by the conclusions of the IPCC reports and various other 
consensus statements from natural scientists, ecologists, physicians, and economists, 
global climate change is now widely considered a very serious environmental risk by the 
scientific community, with many arguing that global warming now poses “the central 
environmental challenge of our time” (Dean Abrahmson, quoted in Johansen 2002:1). 
 
Risk 
 
…the climate of the future is not a given; it is the product of conscious and 
unconscious decisions by humans, decisions that in turn will be influenced 
by how climate science is interpreted…(Eder 1999:25) 
 
It's harder and harder for a lay person to understand what scientists are 
talking about.  [Yet] the lay person is eventually going to decide our 
policies (James Hansen, quoted in Chang 1998). 
 
 This dissertation contributes to a large and growing literature on the study of risk 
and risk perception.  These terms have become pervasive in the modern world, with some 
scholars claiming that we now live in a “risk society” characterized by threats of an 
unprecedented global scale (Beck 1992; 1995).  Governments, industries and public 
interest groups have spent billions of dollars conducting formal risk analyses and 
---
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assessments to address public demands for safer and healthier food, vehicles, medicines, 
medical procedures, airplanes, nuclear power plants, etc.  The risks associated with 
chemicals, pesticides, food additives, toxic waste, stratospheric ozone depletion, 
genetically modified organisms, weapons of mass destruction, terrorist attacks, etc. can 
capture the attention and drive the policy agendas of entire countries and occasionally the 
world as a whole.   
 
Both “risk” and “risk perception,” however, have had different meanings in 
different times.  Historically, the notion of risk first appeared in the Middle Ages with the 
rise of maritime insurance and referred to the uncontrollable dangers that could beset a 
ship and its crew.  This concept of risk: 
 
…excluded the idea of human fault and responsibility.  Risk was perceived 
to be a natural event such as a storm, flood or epidemic rather than a 
human-made one.  As such, humans could do little but attempt to estimate 
roughly the likelihood of such events happening and take steps to reduce 
their impact (Lupton 1999:5). 
 
Emerging in the seventeenth century Enlightenment and growing with the rise of 
modernity, however, came a belief that through the scientific pursuit of objective 
knowledge, natural and social phenomena could be identified, measured, calculated, and 
accurately predicted (Lupton 1999:6).  The concurrent development of statistics and the 
further expansion of the insurance industry meant that: 
 
Consequences that at first affect only the individual become “risks”, 
systematically caused, statistically describable and in that sense 
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“predictable” types of events, which can therefore also be subjected to 
supra-individual and political rules of recognition, compensation and 
avoidance (Beck 1992:99). 
 
By the twentieth century, the concept of “risk” had expanded to include both 
natural and human-caused events and came to have a precise technical meaning: “the 
probability that an outcome will occur times the consequence, or level of impact” 
(Kamen and Hassenzahl 1999:3).  This technical definition is relatively neutral and 
allows for both gains and losses; thus there are potentially both “good risks” and “bad 
risks.”  By the end of the twentieth century, however, the term “risk” predominantly 
came to mean “danger,” especially among the lay public (Douglas 1992:24).  In everyday 
language, “risk tends to be used to refer almost exclusively to a threat, hazard, danger or 
harm” (Lupton 1999:8).  We now anxiously worry about the risks of unemployment, 
violent crime, bad grades, unsafe products, toxic pollution, unsafe sex, falling in love 
with the wrong person, and even “ring-around-the-collar.”  In response to the myriad 
hazards of modern life: 
 
An apparatus of expert research, knowledge and advice has developed 
around the concept of risk: risk analysis, risk assessment, risk 
communication and risk management are all major fields of research and 
practice, used to measure and control risk in areas as far-ranging as 
medicine and public health, finance, the law and business and industry 
(Lupton 1999:9). 
 
Global climate change is a case in point.  An enormous international effort has 
been made to detail the risks of anthropogenic climate change, drawing on diverse 
disciplines to identify and quantify the causes, consequences and potential solutions.  
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New institutions have been formed to research and manage climate change risks.  For 
example in 1989, the United States initiated the U.S. Global Change Research Program 
(USGCRP) to study the earth's environment. Its 1989 budget was $134 million dollars, 
which quickly rose to $659 million in 1990 (FAS 1996). Today, the USGCRP budget is 
$1.7 billion per year3 and involves nine Federal departments and agencies, including 
research programs of the National Science Foundation (NSF), National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), the United States Geological Survey (USGS), the Departments 
of Agriculture and Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Since 
1990, the USGCRP has invested more than $20 billion in climate change and global 
change research (NCSE 2003).   
 
Legal frameworks to mitigate global warming are beginning to be created from 
the state (e.g., California, Oregon, New York, etc.) to the international levels (e.g., the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change).  A variety of legislative 
policies have been proposed at the national level, including increasing fuel economy 
standards, subsidizing the development of renewable energies, carbon taxes, etc.  New 
financial markets have recently been created, such as the Chicago Climate Exchange, to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the trading of carbon credits – turning carbon 
dioxide emissions into a marketable commodity.  Whole new industries have developed 
 
3 Of this budget only $121 million in the 2003 fiscal year, or roughly 7%, is dedicated to the study of 
human contributions and responses to climate change (USGCRP 2003).  The remainder is split between 
space and surface-based climate observations (natural sciences). 
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in wind, solar, geothermal, biomass and other alternative power generation sources to 
replace the burning of fossil fuels.   
 
Clearly, the risks of global climate change have already motivated a substantial 
institutional effort, across economic sectors and nations, to address this threat.  Yet, 
despite the research of several decades, global greenhouse gas emissions continue to 
spiral upwards.  The United States, with only 4% of the world’s population, is currently 
the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide, alone accounting for nearly 25% of global 
emissions.  Successive U.S. administrations  have been at odds with much of the world 
community regarding the reality, seriousness and need for vigorous action on global 
warming.  In 2001, President George W. Bush renounced a campaign promise to regulate 
carbon dioxide as a pollutant, pulled the United States out of the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations and the international effort to create a legal framework to reduce global 
emissions, and proposed national energy legislation to increase drilling for oil and natural 
gas, mining for coal, and to build over a thousand new fossil-fuel burning power plants 
across the country. 
 
Per capita, Americans emit 5.40 metric tons of carbon each year.  By comparison, 
the average Japanese emits 2.55 tons per year, while the average Chinese emits only 0.60 
and the average Indian only 0.29 tons per year (Marland, et al. 2003).  Americans 
continue to buy record numbers of sport utility vehicles and other cars with very low fuel 
efficiency.  These and many other indicators suggest that global warming is not perceived 
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as a high priority by most Americans, thus there appears to be a large gap between expert 
and lay assessments of global warming risks.  Clearly, the American public will play a 
critical role, both in terms of their direct consumption of fossil fuels and their support for 
political leaders and government policies in the effort to mitigate global climate change.  
They are unlikely, however, to take individual action or strongly support government 
policies until they view global warming as a serious risk. 
 
Risk Perception 
 
Risk perception research has a long tradition of comparing expert vs. lay 
assessments of risk.  Traditionally, researchers directly compared expert vs. lay 
assessments of the probabilities and severity of consequences (typically fatalities) for a 
given risk issue, using the technical definition of risk.  These studies often found great 
discrepancies.  Experts, for example, warned of the high probability, high consequence 
risks of living in flood plains or earthquake zones.  The public, however, continued to 
build homes and live in these areas while remaining relatively unconcerned (Cutter 1993; 
Palm 1998).  Likewise, scientists often despaired to find members of the public extremely 
concerned about low probability risks, such as radiation from nuclear power plants, while 
ignoring higher probability risks like radon exposure in the home.  These and many other 
expert-lay public conflicts over risk led some to decry the apparent “irrationality” of the 
public.  As Paul Slovic describes these critiques: 
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Experts are seen as purveying risk assessments, characterized as 
objective, analytic, wise and rational – based upon the real risks.  In 
contrast, the public is seen to rely upon perceptions of risk that are 
subjective, often hypothetical, emotional, foolish, and irrational (Slovic 
1997:278). 
 
 In the early 1980s, however, researchers using psychometric techniques identified 
a number of social and psychological dimensions of risk that are often more salient for 
the lay public than the relatively narrow analytical dimensions of probability and the 
severity of consequences preferred by technical experts.  For example, these researchers 
identified two dominant factors in public perceptions of risk across 81 different hazards: 
dread risk (including the dimensions of “perceived lack of control, dread, catastrophic 
potential, fatal consequences, and the inequitable distribution of risks and benefits”) and 
unknown risk (including the dimensions of “hazards judged to be unobservable, 
unknown, new, and delayed in their manifestation of harm”) (Slovic 1987:283).  The 
public rated risk items like nuclear power very high on the dread and unknown risk 
factors, while risk items like alcohol were rated very low.  Laypeople subsequently rated 
nuclear power as a much greater risk than alcohol, despite the fact that nuclear accidents 
are low probability events that have killed relatively few people.  By contrast, alcohol 
kills thousands of people each year.   Other studies found that nuclear power was highly 
stigmatized, with the public’s risk perceptions driven by evaluative dimensions such as 
the catastrophic potential of an accident, the potential impact on future generations, and 
the perceived lack of control over and involuntariness of such an event.  Further, in the 
wake of events like Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the public came to deeply distrust 
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the industry and government experts that promoted nuclear power.  As a result, no new 
nuclear power plant has been constructed in the United States since 1979 (Slovic, et al. 
1991; Flynn, et al. 1992; 1998), despite the relatively low number of fatalities from 
nuclear power generation.  Thus, this research suggested that public risk perceptions are 
only “irrational” when considered within the narrow confines of a technical analysis of 
probability and fatalities.  They appear rational, however, when considered within the 
more complex and comprehensive conception of risk used by the public, which includes a 
range of evaluative dimensions (e.g., perceived lack of control, dread, unequal 
distributions of costs and benefits, etc.) not included in technical assessments of 
probabilities and fatalities.  Further, public risk perceptions can have an enormous social 
impact.   
 
More recent research has focused on the broader sociocultural and political 
context of risk perception, including sociodemographic factors like sex, race, income and 
education and cultural factors like trust, social values and worldviews (e.g., Slovic 1997; 
Flynn 1992, 1998; Peters and Slovic 1996; Finucane, et al. 2000).  Thus, researchers are 
increasingly asking not just “What does the public perceive as a risk and why?” but also 
“Who perceives risk and why?”  This dissertation contributes to this emerging research 
agenda by including an in-depth examination of the political and sociocultural 
dimensions of public global warming risk perceptions, policy preferences and individual 
behaviors, using standard analyses of political identification and ideology, as well as 
relatively new approaches based in Cultural Theory, as described below. 
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This dissertation also pioneers the use of affective image analysis to investigate 
the role of connotative meaning in risk perception, decision making and behavior and to 
identify distinct “interpretive communities” among the American public: 
 
Of all the imps that inhabit the nervous system, that little black box in 
psychological theorizing – the one we call meaning – is held by common 
consent to be the most elusive.  Yet again by common consent of social 
scientists, this variable is one of the most important determinants of 
human behavior (Osgood, et al. 1957). 
 
Issues like “global warming,” places like “the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge” 
and “the United States,” and names like “George Bush” and “Osama bin Laden” are 
provocative terms with strong positive or negative connotations for different people in 
different places.  The conflict over meaning often is at the heart of political debate and 
decision making.  Affective image analysis is an innovative, simple, yet powerful 
technique to “map” the range, diversity and distribution of subjective and connotative 
meanings within individuals, groups and populations.  Affective image analysis can also 
quickly identify dominant associations, common misconceptions, and critical gaps in 
public understandings of risks.  This dissertation further develops affective image 
analysis as a new survey methodology and identifies distinct interpretive communities 
within the American public; groups of individuals who share a relatively coherent and 
consistent set of connotative meanings.  Members of interpretive communities also tend 
to interpret risks in a similar way and to share common attitudinal and sociodemographic 
characteristics.  Thus, affective image analysis is an innovative technique with important 
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implications for survey methodology, studies of public opinion, and risk perception and 
communication research. 
 
Overview of the Dissertation 
 
 Chapter 2 provides a literature review, including a summary of public opinion 
research on attitudes towards global warming, previous academic studies on mental 
models and risk perceptions of climate change, affective image analysis as a new 
theoretically-grounded empirical technique, and Cultural Theory as a sociopolitical 
interpretation of risk perception and behavior.  Chapter 3 describes the four broad 
research questions that guided this research: 
 
1. Does the American public perceive global climate change as a real threat?  How 
likely and how severe do they believe the consequences will be?  
 
2. Does the American public support public policies to mitigate climate change? 
 
3. What kinds of individual actions have Americans already taken to mitigate global 
climate change and how common are these behaviors?  
 
4. What affective images do Americans have of global warming?  Which of these 
images are the most salient and can they be used to identify distinct “interpretive 
communities” within the American public? 
 
 
Chapter 3 also describes several analytical hypotheses.  It was hypothesized that 
affective imagery and cultural worldviews would each significantly influence global 
warming risk perceptions, policy preferences and individual behaviors.  It was also 
hypothesized that student climate change activists would produce a broader set of 
 
 
20
 
cognitive images and stronger affective reactions to global warming than either the 
Oregon or American publics.  Finally, in line with the predictions of Cultural Theory, it 
was hypothesized that student climate change activists would be more egalitarian than the 
American public.  Chapter 3 also provides an overview of the data gathering, reduction 
and analysis methodologies implemented in three studies carried out among 1) student 
climate change activists at the 2000 World Climate Summit (COP6) at The Hague, 
Netherlands; 2) the American public; and 3) the Oregon public.   
 
Chapter 4 summarizes the primary research results from the three studies, 
organized around the research questions and analytical hypotheses.  This dissertation 
describes an American public with broad, but shallow concern about global warming, that 
strongly supports international treaties and a number of national policies, but strongly 
opposes higher energy or gasoline prices to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  Relatively 
few Americans have undertaken individual mitigation behaviors.  While global warming 
does have negative connotations for most Americans, the thoughts and images evoked by 
this term primarily reflect impacts temporally and spatially distant from most people’s 
lives.  Critically, this research also finds that Americans do not currently associate global 
warming with any impacts on human health.  Finally, this dissertation finds that affect, 
imagery and cultural worldviews all significantly influence public risk perceptions, 
policy preferences, and individual behaviors. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Global Climate Change Risk Perception 
 
Public Opinion Polls 
 
Despite the scientific warnings of previous decades, global warming did not 
become a national public issue until the summer of 1988 - at that time the hottest year 
since the middle of the nineteenth century.  On June 23, the second day of summer, 
Senator Timothy Wirth of Colorado convened a U.S. Senate Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee hearing on global climate change.  The date of the hearing 
happened to fall during a heat wave that swept over much of the nation and on the day 
temperatures reached a record 101 degrees Fahrenheit in a sweltering Washington, D.C.  
At the hearing, Dr. James E. Hansen, director of the NASA Goddard Institute of Space 
Studies and a leading climate modeler, testified that “the greenhouse effect has been 
detected and it is changing our climate now” (Christianson 1999:196).  Hansen’s 
testimony became front-page news across the country.  As the summer of 1988 
continued, severe drought gripped the Midwest and Southeast.  “Two thousand daily 
temperature records were set that year in the United States.  Widespread heat and drought 
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caused some crop yields in the U.S. Midwest to fall between 30 and 40 percent” 
(Johansen 2002:43).  Nationwide, an estimated 10,000 deaths were linked to heat stress.  
In Los Angeles, 400 electrical transformers blew up on a day in which temperatures 
reached 110 F in September (Christianson 1999:197). 
 
After the events of 1988 and subsequent years, numerous public opinion polls 
found that Americans were increasingly aware of and concerned about global climate 
change and supportive of a wide range of mitigation and adaptation policies.  By 2001, a 
Los Angeles Times national poll found, in response to the question: “Have you heard or 
read anything about the issue of global warming?” that 82% of Americans answered 
“yes,” 14% said “no,” and 4% said “don’t know” (PIPA 2003).  This is similar to the 
levels of awareness found in two surveys conducted as part of this dissertation.  A 
national survey was conducted in 2002-2003 and found that 92% of Americans had heard 
of global warming while 8% had not.  Likewise, a 2000 survey of the Oregon public 
found that 11% lacked any association with the term “global warming.” 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the fossil fuel industry, represented by lobby groups like 
the Global Climate Coalition, spearheaded a massive public relations effort to discredit 
the science and deny the reality of anthropogenic climate change (see Gelbspan 1997; 
Leggett 1999).  This campaign, while achieving several short-term victories, appears to 
have lost the larger war for public opinion.  In 1994, at the height of the industry assault 
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on climate science, a national poll by Cambridge Reports found that only 28% of 
respondents said that “there is a consensus among the great majority of scientists that 
global warming exists and could do significant damage,” while 58% said that scientists 
are divided on the existence of global warming and its impact.  By 1997, a CNN/USA 
Today poll, however, found that 48% thought “most scientists believe that global 
warming is occurring, while 39% thought “most scientists are unsure about whether 
global warming is occurring or not.”  Most recently, a 2001 Gallup poll found that 61% 
of respondents said “most scientists believe that global warming is occurring,” while only 
30% said most scientists are unsure (PIPA 2003).  Thus, a strong majority of Americans 
now believe that there is scientific consensus regarding the reality of global warming.  
Further, virtually all polls taken since 1997 have found that a strong majority of 
Americans believe global warming is real.  Most recently, a Harris Interactive poll 
conducted in September of 2002 found that 74% said they “believe the theory that 
increased carbon dioxide and other gases released into the atmosphere will, if unchecked, 
lead to global warming and an increase in average temperatures” (PIPA 2003). 
 
Public opinion polls also demonstrate high levels of public concern about global 
warming.  In May of 1989, a Gallup survey of American public asked “How much do 
you personally worry about the greenhouse effect or global warming?”  Gallup found that 
35% worried “a great deal,” 28% worried “a fair amount,” 18% worried “only a little,” 
and 12% worried “not at all.”  Thus 63% of Americans were fairly to greatly worried 
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about global warming in 1989.  Gallup found that this level of worry oscillated over the 
subsequent 14 years, with a dip to 50% in 1997, an increase to 72% in 2000, and a 
decrease to 58% in 2002.  The general decline in levels of worry may partly be the result 
of changing media coverage.  During the unusually hot summer of 1988, global warming 
was a front-page story across the country.  A media analysis by the Center for Media and 
Public Affairs found, however, that since 1990, television network coverage of global 
warming declined by 50%, while national newspaper coverage dropped by 25% 
(FrameWorks Institute 2001).  The increase to 72% concern in the year 2000 stands out 
as an anomaly and may be due to the release of the 2000 IPCC report, the 2000 American 
presidential election in which global warming played a limited role because of the 
candidacy of Al Gore (D), or a combination of these and other factors. 
 
Other polling organizations have measured public levels of concern by using 
various permutations of the question, “How serious of a problem/threat is global 
warming?”  In a 1998 Mellman Group national poll, 70% of voters said global warming 
was a “very serious” or “somewhat serious” threat.  By 2001, Time/CNN found that 76% 
thought global warming a “very serious” or “somewhat serious” problem.  Finally, as 
reported in this dissertation, a 2002-2003 national survey found that 70% of Americans 
said they were “somewhat” (45%) to “very concerned” (25%) about global warming.  
Despite the variability indicated by different polling methods, it is clear that public levels 
of concern about global warming have remained consistently high since 1989. 
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Overall, Americans demonstrate a high awareness of global warming, a strong 
belief that it is real, and high levels of concern about the issue.  At the same time, 
however, public opinion polls and academic studies consistently show that Americans 
regard both the environment and climate change as relatively low national priorities 
(Dunlap & Scarce 1991; Bord, et al. 1998:77).  For example, in a 2000 Gallup poll, the 
environment ranked 16th on Americans’ list of most important problems facing the 
country today.  Further, global warming ranked 12th out of 13 environmental issues, just 
below urban sprawl (Dunlap & Saad 2001).   Thus Americans paradoxically seem to be 
highly concerned about global warming as an individual issue, yet view it as less 
important than nearly all other national or environmental issues. 
 
There is convergent evidence for this countervailing, low level of concern in other 
poll results.  For example, in 2000 a survey conducted by the Program on International 
Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland found that although a majority of 
Americans favored action on global warming, they were divided about the need for 
urgency.  The PIPA survey found that 39% of Americans said only “gradual steps” are 
needed, 39% said that immediate action is needed, and 19% said no steps should be 
taken.  Further, global warming does not appear to be a universally decisive electoral 
issue.  A 1998 Mellman Group poll found that 41% of voters would not change their vote 
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for a candidate they agreed with on most issues, if that candidate voted against efforts to 
reduce the threat of global warming, while 38% said they would (PIPA 2003). 
 
While useful, public opinion polls have limited utility for explaining public risk 
perceptions of global warming.  Most public opinion polls use only simple, holistic 
measures of concern (e.g., “how serious of a threat is global warming”), which provide 
little insight into the determinants of public risk perception.  Why do some people believe 
global warming is a serious threat and others do not?  Why do some see global warming 
as an urgent, immediate threat, while others view it as a gradual, incremental problem, or 
not a problem at all?  What specifically does the public know about the causes, 
consequences and solutions to anthropogenic climate change?  How severe and how 
likely do they think the impacts will be?  And crucially, how do they feel about the threat 
of global warming?  For initial answers to these deeper questions we must turn to the few 
academic studies that have been conducted. 
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Mental Model Studies 
 
Much of the academic research on public understanding of climate change has 
attempted to describe and analyze the public's accurate and inaccurate mental models of 
climate change (e.g., Bostrom et al. 1994; Kempton et al. 1995; Read et al. 1994).  In 
brief, mental models are: 
 
…hypothesized knowledge structures embodying people’s assumptions, 
beliefs, ‘facts,’ and misconceptions about the world.  These assumptions 
and beliefs, in turn, provide a framework for interpreting new information 
and for determining appropriate responses to new situations (Kearney 
and Kaplan 1997). 
 
 For example, Kempton et al. found that Americans assimilated information on 
global climate change into pre-existing mental models of ozone depletion (1995:67).  The 
ozone hole became a public issue several years before global warming was widely 
reported in the media.  Since individuals tend to assimilate new information into already 
existing mental models (Kempton 1995:68; Levy 1997:136-145), this has led to several 
important misconceptions and confusions between the two environmental issues.  Many 
people mistakenly believe that ozone depletion is a cause of climate change.  Many 
reason that if there is a "hole" in the ozone layer and a global "greenhouse" effect, then 
there must be a "hole" in the "greenhouse."  This "hole" either allows more solar 
radiation into the biosphere -- warming the planet, or alternatively, the "hole" is allowing 
heat to escape -- cooling the planet.  This metaphorical reasoning is logical, but incorrect.  
It is also a valuable demonstration of how people make inferences based on what they 
already believe.  In this case, many members of the public already have a mental model 
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about the ozone hole, which they combine with a mental model of the greenhouse effect, 
and use to reason about climate change. 
 
 These mental model approaches, however, are primarily cognitive.  They focus 
on the role of scientific information and factual knowledge in the formation of the 
American public's environmental beliefs and attitudes.  Risk perception researchers, 
however, have demonstrated that increased knowledge and elaborated mental models, 
while important, are not sufficient to explain public concern for some risks and not 
others.  Likewise, risk communicators (e.g., doctors, toxicologists, government agencies, 
etc.) are increasingly aware that providing more detailed and accurate scientific 
information, while important, is not sufficient to generate “appropriate” public concern 
for some risks or to allay public fears about others (Sjoberg 1996; Slovic and Peters 
1998; Nature 2003).  Mental model researchers have analyzed how people cognitively 
reason about climate change, but not how risk perception and behavior are guided by 
emotion and affect.  Dake (1991:62) further argues that, 
 
…an understanding of who fears what and why requires serious attention 
to the political, historical, and social context in which risks are framed 
and debated...mental models of risk are not solely matters of individual 
cognition, but also correspond to worldviews entailing deeply held beliefs 
and values regarding society, its functioning, and its potential fate. 
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Risk Perception Studies 
 
Few in-depth studies on risk perceptions of global climate change have been 
conducted.  A notable exception is the work of Robert O’Connor, Richard Bord and Ann 
Fisher of Penn State University, who in 1997 conducted a national mail-out, mail-back 
survey (n=1225) on American risk perceptions, knowledge, and behavioral intentions.  
One of the primary goals of their research was to examine the relationship of knowledge, 
operationalized as the identification of correct and bogus causes of climate change, to 
risk perceptions and behavioral intentions (including both voluntary behaviors and 
support for government policies). 
 
Previous risk perception research had found only weak relationships between 
knowledge and risk perception or knowlege and behavior across a variety of 
environmental issues.  As O’Connor et al. summarized this research: 
 
Sjoberg concludes, ‘…there is no or little correlation between actual 
knowledge and perceived risk’ (1996, p. 224).  Similarly, research has not 
found strong relationships between environmental knowledge and 
environmentally responsible behavior (Schahn and Holzer, 1990, p. 772).  
Hines et al. (1986/87) report correlations around 0.30 between 
environmental knowledge and behavior in their meta-analysis of 17 
studies (O’Connor 1998:146). 
  
Consistent with this previous research on other environmental risks, O’Connor et 
al., found that knowledge of climate change causes, while remaining a statistically 
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significant, independent variable in multiple regression models, explained 5% to 16% of 
the variance in risk perceptions and 6% to 21% of the variance in behavior (O’Connor 
1998).  They also found that individuals who correctly identified real causes of 
anthropogenic climate change (e.g., emissions from business and industry, people driving 
their cars, etc.) were somewhat more likely to have higher risk perceptions and more 
willing to sacrifice (accept costly government initiatives to mitigate climate change).  By 
comparison, they found that individuals who identified bogus causes as contributors to 
climate change (e.g., nuclear power generation, ozone depletion, chemical pesticides, 
etc.) were more likely to have higher risk perceptions, but were not more willing to 
sacrifice.  They concluded that accurate knowledge may not be a primary driver of risk 
perception, but may be important for public support for government mitigation efforts. 
 
A second objective of their research was to test the ability of risk perceptions to 
predict behavioral intentions.  Within the risk perception literature, most research has 
focused on “the nature of environmental risk perceptions, measurement considerations, 
and correlates with attitudinal and personal characteristics” (O’Connor 1999: 461).  Most 
of this previous research has assumed that increased risk perception leads automatically 
to an increased likelihood of individuals taking voluntary actions and supporting 
government initiatives to deal with a particular environmental risk.  This assumption, 
however, has rarely been tested, especially for long-term, uncertain risks like climate 
change. 
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By contrast, much of the research on general environmental beliefs and attitudes 
(e.g., the New Environmental Paradigm, Dunlap and Van Liere 1978) has examined the 
link between general beliefs and behavioral intentions, generally finding statistically 
significant correlations.  Yet, 
 
…many studies report that general environmental beliefs predict 
behavioral intentions, but few include specific risk perceptions as 
independent variables.  The presumption is that risk perceptions and 
actions correlate, but little focused research has been done (O’Connor 
1999:462-3). 
 
 
O’Connor et al. examined risk perceptions and behavioral intentions (willingness 
to take voluntary actions or support government initiatives to mitigate climate change) 
and found that risk perceptions remained a statistically significant, independent variable 
in multiple regression models that included general environmental beliefs, and explained 
a moderate amount of the variance in behavior (voluntary actions 11%; support for 
government actions 19%).  Thus: 
 
Our primary conclusion is that risk perceptions matter in predicting 
behavioral intentions.  Risk perceptions are not a surrogate for general 
environmental beliefs, but have their own power to account for behavioral 
intentions...the success of the risk perception variables in accounting for 
behavioral intentions should encourage greater attention to risk 
perceptions as independent variables…[past psychometric] work has 
taught us much about how people conceptualize risks, but rarely looked at 
the consequences of these perceptions for behavioral intentions or actual 
behavior (O’Connor 1999: 469-470). 
 
A final objective of their research was to construct full multiple regression 
models incorporating knowledge (real and bogus causes), risk perception (likelihood of 
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severe consequences of climate change), general environmental belief (NEP), and 
sociodemographic variables (gender, age and education) to predict voluntary behaviors 
and support for government initiatives to mitigate global climate change.  They found 
that each of these independent variables retained statistical significance and explanatory 
power in the full model, demonstrating that each remained an important predictor even in 
the presence of the others.  The full model, however, explained 17% of the variance in 
voluntary behaviors and 33% of the variance in support for government action.  Clearly, 
much of the variance in behavioral intentions remains unexplained.  This dissertation 
considers several additional potential factors, including affect, imagery and cultural 
worldviews (Cultural Theory), in an attempt to explain voluntary behavior, support for 
government action and risk perception. 
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Affective Image Analysis 
 
What each man does is based not on direct and certain knowledge, but on 
pictures made by himself or given to him. . . . [T]he way in which the 
world is imagined determines in any particular moment what men will do 
(Lippmann 1922). 
 
As previously described, much research to date has contrasted expert vs. public 
knowledge and mental models of climate change and found that Americans generally 
lack detailed conceptual understandings of this environmental risk.  Further, mental 
model researchers have found that Americans inappropriately apply concepts from other 
environmental issues, such as ozone depletion. (e.g., Bostrom, et al. 1994; Kempton, et 
al. 1995; Read, et al. 1994). 
 
Risk perception researchers, however, have demonstrated that knowledge about 
risks, while important, is not sufficient to explain risk perceptions and behavior (e.g., 
Finucane 2000; Slovic 1997, 1998, 2001; Epstein 1994; Wildavsky 1991).  This 
dissertation uses affective image analysis to examine public risk perceptions of climate 
change along both cognitive and affective dimensions. 
 
Affective Imagery 
 
Affect refers to the specific quality of “goodness” or “badness” experienced as a 
feeling state (with or without conscious awareness) or the positive or negative quality of 
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a stimulus.  Affect is distinguished from emotion, which generally refers to specific 
states, such as anger, fear or happiness.  Affect is also distinct from mood, which 
generally refers to transitory, low-intensity feelings, which are undirected and lack 
specific cognitive content.  By contrast, affect refers to a person’s positive or negative 
evaluation of specific cognitive contents or images.  It is also “an orienting mechanism 
that direct fundamental psychological processes such as attention, memory, and 
information processing” (Slovic 1997:292). 
 
Imagery refers to all forms of mental representation or cognitive content.  Images 
include both perceptual representations (pictures, sounds, smells) and symbolic 
representations (words, numbers, symbols) (Damasio 1999:317-21).  Affective images are 
thus “broadly construed to include sights, sounds, smells, ideas, and words, to which 
positive and negative affect or feeling states have become attached through learning and 
experience” (Slovic, et al. 1998:3).  
 
Affective images are evaluative feelings of good/positive or bad/negative 
associated with particular concepts or stimuli; e.g., “cancer” evokes negative images for 
most people, while “sushi” evokes either positive or negative images.  Affective images 
occur rapidly and automatically; note how quickly you sensed your positive or negative 
feelings associated with the stimulus words cancer or sushi.  Affective images also guide 
decision-making; seeing “sushi” on a dinner menu causes some people to react with 
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disgust, while others salivate in anticipation, guiding their subsequent decision-making 
and behavior (what to order for dinner).  Further, affective images are part of an "affect 
heuristic;" a natural and efficient process for evaluating risk situations and making 
decisions (Finucane, et al. 2000; Slovic, et al. 2000). 
 
Affective Image Analysis 
 
 
Words are like empty balloons, inviting us to fill them up with 
associations. As they fill they begin to gain intrinsic force and at last to 
shape our perceptions and expectations (Worster 1994:191). 
 
… associations are simply a remarkably easy and efficient way of 
determining the contents of human minds without having those contents 
expressed in the full discursive structure of language (Szalay & Deese 
1978:9). 
 
Cognitive scientists, psycholinguists, and social psychologists demonstrate that 
affective images link to one another in complex networks of association (e.g., Anderson 
& Bower 1973; Deese 1965; Kess 1992; LeDoux 1996; Sadoski & Paivio 2001; Sloman 
1996; Slovic 1991, 1998).  As Kess describes: 
 
The system is like a spider web, with words in the mental network related 
to other words via associative links of varying strengths (Kess 1992:213). 
 
 
Psychologists have long used word association techniques (Galton 1880; Wundt 
1883; Freud 1924).  A wide range of fields currently use word association methods in the 
study of memory and cognition (e.g., Nelson & McEvoy 2000; Zeelenberg, et al. 1999; 
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Altarriba, et al. 1999); the structure of thought systems (McGuire & McGuire 1991, 
2001); and psychotherapy (MacMillan 2001).  Affective image analysis employs a 
particularly structured and systematic form of word association.  Researchers have 
implemented affective image analysis in many different research domains.  Szalay 
(1999), for example, used affective image analysis of word associations to examine 
substance abuse for the National Institute on Drug Abuse, to develop cross-cultural 
communication guides for the U.S. Department of Education, and to improve minority 
training for the National Institute of Mental Health and Office of Naval Research.  Risk 
perception researchers have used affective image analysis of word associations to 
examine nuclear power (Slovic, et al. 1996), an underground nuclear waste repository 
(Slovic, et al. 1991); and smoking (Benthin, et al. 1995).  Others have used it to predict 
vacation preferences and behavior (Slovic, et al. 1998), and investors’ evaluations of 
initial public offerings on the stock market (MacGregor, et al. 2000). 
 
In gathering word associations for affective image analysis, researchers typically 
present subjects with a key word or concept and ask them to provide the “first word or 
image” that comes to mind.  Some instruments gather multiple images in addition to 
subjects’ first answers.  Example questions include: 
 
Q1: “What is the first word or image that comes to mind when you think 
of nuclear energy?” 
 
Q2: “What is the second word or image that comes to mind when you 
think of nuclear energy?” 
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Affective image analysis involves content analysis of respondents’ open-ended answers 
to the stimulus words.  The results enable researchers to describe the range, structure and 
salience of respondent associations with the stimulus term.  This methodology is 
described in greater detail below. 
 
Besides images, some instruments also gather subjects’ directional, affective 
evaluations of both the key stimulus term and respondents’ images of the stimulus.  An 
example question measuring affective evaluation of a stimulus term is: 
 
Q3: “When you think of nuclear energy, is your impression very negative, 
somewhat negative, somewhat positive, or very positive?” 
 
 
Likewise, if a survey respondent provided “cancer” as an association to “nuclear energy,” 
an example follow-up question to obtain an affective evaluation of the image might be: 
 
Q4: “When you think of cancer, is your impression very negative, 
somewhat negative, somewhat positive, or very positive?” 
 
 
 
Unique Strengths of Affective Image Analysis 
 
Affective image analysis minimizes researcher bias that can occur in closed-
ended questionnaires.  Researchers often construct closed-ended questionnaires based on 
a particular theory or set of academic or scientific categories.  This process risks using 
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terms, concepts, and categories unfamiliar to, or unused by, the general public.  As Cox 
explains, 
 
The categories supplied by the investigator may have quite different 
meanings to different individuals in the sample. Likewise the responses 
supplied by the investigator on the assumption that they may be exhaustive 
may be far from so. As a consequence, one may learn more about the 
behaviour of the sample in responding to a set of categories the 
investigator attempts to impose on them, than about the behaviour under 
investigation itself (quoted in Robinson 1998:389). 
 
Affective image analysis, however, uses an open-ended method of free 
association, with no imposition of researcher concepts or categories, with the exception 
of the stimulus term itself.  This feature makes affective image analysis a particularly 
useful tool for examining public risk perception, as scientific analysis of risks often uses 
a highly technical lexicon, which members of the public may not understand or be 
comfortable with. 
 
A second unique strength of this technique is that subjects’ free associations are 
relatively unfiltered, context-free, and spontaneous. In this way, they represent a 
powerful way to study sensitive topics.  Because they are immediate and spontaneous, 
they tend to bypass self-censorship or social desirability bias, which can occur in the 
fully articulated assertions required by standard survey questions.  As Szalay and Deese 
explain: 
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…the association method reveals the content of minds in a way that 
propositional language does not. We can and do reveal ourselves in 
associations in ways that we might find difficult [or unpleasant] … if we 
were required to spell out the full propositions behind our associations 
(Szalay & Deese 1978:9). 
 
 
Third, affective image analysis provides a rich dataset.  This technique efficiently 
collects a wide range and diversity of respondent interpretations of a stimulus, thus 
allowing researchers to map the distribution and saliency of subjective meanings held by 
a population.  Further, this technique allows investigators to identify, compare and 
contrast interpretive communities – groups of individuals who share a relatively coherent 
and consistent set of meanings, while often differing greatly from one another. 
 
Fourth, affective image analysis provides a less costly method for researchers to 
acquire some of the data richness of qualitative approaches.  The time, labor, and 
resource costs of in-depth interviews, participant observation, and ethnography, for 
example, greatly exceed the relatively simple, quick and inexpensive collection of 
affective images.  Fifth, as part of a representative survey sample, affective image results 
are generalizable to entire populations and can be quantitatively correlated to other 
behavior, attitude, opinion, and sociodemographic variables measured by the survey 
instrument. 
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Affective image analysis thus combines the strengths of qualitative and 
quantitative methods – providing some of the richness of qualitative methods with the 
generalizability of quantitative approaches.  Word associations elicit short, open-ended 
responses (without imposing researcher categories), from a representative sample using 
standard survey methods.  The qualitative meanings can then be coded into empirically 
determined categories, and subsequently correlated with other survey measures (e.g., 
sociodemographics). 
 
Affective Imagery in Risk Perception, Decision-Making and Behavior 
 
Most current theories of decision-making about risk are “cognitive and 
consequentialist” (Loewenstein, et al. 2001).  They are based on the assumption that 
individuals assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes, then rationally 
calculate or weigh the pros and cons of these expected outcomes to arrive at a decision.  
This assumption also underlies the expected-utility model that informs much of economic 
and psychological theory.  Thus, past research has attempted to model how people make 
logical, rational choices.  Affect and emotions are typically ignored in these models, or 
viewed as epiphenomena of the decision-making process.  Thus, many theorists have 
assumed that decision-making about risk is essentially a cognitive activity. 
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In a critique of this predominantly cognitive paradigm, Zajonc (1980) argued that 
affective reactions to stimuli occur automatically and guide subsequent information 
processing and judgment.  Affect typically arises prior to cognition and plays a crucial 
role in subsequent rational thought.  A large and growing literature in cognitive science, 
social psychology and neurology has confirmed affect’s key role in cognition, decision-
making and behavior (e.g., Alhakami & Slovic 1994; Epstein 1994; Isen 1993; Johnson 
& Tversky 1983; Janis & Mann 1977; Kahneman & Snell 1990; Loewenstein 1996; 
Loewenstein et al. 2001; Mellers et al. 1996; Peters & Slovic 1996; Rozin, et al. 1993; 
Slovic, et. al. 1991; Slovic, et al. 1998; Slovic, et al. 2000; and Wilson, et al. 1993). 
 
For example, cognitive neuroscientists’ recent discoveries of a direct link between 
affect and cognition illustrate affective imagery’s importance for risk perception and 
decision-making research.  Damasio (1994, 1999) found that patients with brain damage 
(specifically, the ventromedial frontal cortices) retain their intelligence, memory and 
logic, but lose their ability to feel, including the ability to associate feelings with their 
actions’ anticipated consequences.  Through several experiments, Damasio found that 
such emotional deficits dramatically impaired decision-making processes and seriously 
compromised decision quality.  Based on these and other studies, Damasio concluded 
that human thought largely consists of images, broadly construed to include ideas, words, 
sounds, smells, and real or imagined visual impressions.  Through life experience these 
images become “marked” by positive or negative feelings and linked directly or 
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indirectly to somatic (bodily) states.  A negative image sounds an alarm; a positive image 
becomes a beacon of incentive.  Damasio argued that these positive and negative 
“somatic markers” greatly improve decision-making efficiency and accuracy, and guide 
both slow, deliberative choices and quick, intuitive responses. 
 
Parallel to cognitive neuroscience’s efforts to trace the neural pathways between 
cognition and affect, social psychologists have examined the role of affect and imagery 
in risk perception and behavior.  For example, Slovic et al. (1991) reported four surveys 
conducted at the national, regional, state, and local levels to examine public risk 
perceptions of the proposed national nuclear waste storage facility underneath Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada.  The surveys collected 10,000 affective images from 3,334 
respondents to the stimulus “underground nuclear waste repository.”  Respondents’ 
associations coalesced around images like “death,” “cancer,” “mushroom cloud,” and 
“nuclear war.”  Respondents evaluated these images extremely negatively, with positive 
imagery almost entirely absent.  Slovic, et al. concluded that, “What these responses 
reveal are pervasive qualities of dread, revulsion and anger – the raw materials of 
stigmatization and political opposition” (1991:1604).  Further, the researchers found that 
these affective images predicted public risk perceptions of nuclear energy, and correlated 
strongly with intended voting behavior and non-support for new nuclear power plant 
construction (Slovic, et al. 1991; Peters & Slovic 1996). 
 
 
 
43
 
Building on these earlier studies, this dissertation further develops affective image 
analysis to describe and analyze the cognitive images and affect associated with global 
warming by the American public and climate change activists.  It tests both affect and 
imagery as independent variables to predict risk perception, policy preferences and 
behavior regarding climate change.  Finally, it uses affective image analysis to identify, 
compare and contrast different “interpretive communities” within the Oregon and 
American publics. 
 
Cultural Theory 
 
…an understanding of who fears what and why requires serious attention 
to the political, historical, and social context in which risks are framed 
and debated...mental models of risk are not solely matters of individual 
cognition, but also correspond to worldviews entailing deeply held beliefs 
and values regarding society, its functioning, and its potential fate (Dake 
1991:62). 
 
Cultural Theory has recently emerged as a cross-disciplinary approach used by 
anthropologists, geographers, political scientists, social psychologists and sociologists.  It 
has found wide applicability and continues to evolve, both theoretically and empirically.  
In the context of social scientific contributions to the study of global climate change, it 
has become "almost an orthodoxy of sorts in human dimensions research, perhaps due to 
its relative clarity and ease of linking with quantitative models, which has made it useful 
in integrated assessment analyses" (Proctor 1998: 236). 
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What is Cultural Theory? 
 
Originating in the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas (Douglas 1966; Douglas 
1970; Douglas 1998; Douglas & Wildavsky 1982), cultural theory focuses on the social 
construction of meaning -- how different individuals and groups interpret the world in 
different, yet patterned ways.  It "explores the different perceptual screens through which 
people interpret or make sense of their world and the social relations that make particular 
visions of reality seem more or less plausible" (Thompson 1990: xiii). 
 
Much cultural theory research has focused on environmental risk perception -- for 
example, why do some people fear nuclear energy, while others do not (Slovic 1998; 
Peters 1996)?  Why does deforestation drive some to the brink of despair, while leaving 
others unmoved (Thompson 1990: xiii)?  Rather than seeking purely psychological 
explanations (e.g. risk-accepting vs. risk-avoiding personality types), cultural theory 
argues that risk perception is socially constructed. 
 
 Cultural theory makes a distinction between social relations (patterns of 
interpersonal relations) and worldviews (shared values and beliefs).  Social relations refer 
to the patterns of social interaction between individuals, or social organization.  "Social 
relations are defined...as a small number of distinctive patterns of interpersonal relations -
- hierarchical, egalitarian, or individualist" (Wildavsky 1990: 43-44).  Worldviews (often 
termed 'cultural bias') refer to the shared mental representations, values and general 
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social, cultural and political attitudes held by a group of individuals.  Worldviews serve 
as 'orienting dispositions' that guide people's responses in complex and uncertain 
situations (Slovic 1998: 165). 
 
While Douglas argued that social relations determine worldviews (strong social 
constructivism), most subsequent scholars argue instead that the two are dialectically 
related.  "No causal priority is given to cultural biases or social relations; they are always 
found together interacting in a mutually reinforcing manner" (Wildavsky 1990: 44).  
Thus, cultural theory is usually viewed as a moderate form of social constructivism, in 
which particular forms of social organization influence particular interpretations of 
reality and vice versa. 
 
Cultural theory identifies four distinct types of social organization, based on two 
dimensions: group and grid.  Group represents the degree to which an individual 
identifies with and is incorporated into a bounded group.  "The further one moves along 
the group dimension, the tighter the control over admission into the group and the higher 
the boundaries separating members from nonmembers" (Thompson 1990: 5-6).  Grid 
represents the degree to which an individual's life is circumscribed by externally imposed 
prescriptions and proscriptions (Thompson 1990: 5-6; Pendergraft 1998).  The two axes 
of this schema produce four types of social organization -- hierarchy, individualism, 
egalitarianism, and fatalism (see Fig. 1).  Cultural theory posits that individuals and 
groups tend to fall into one or another of these 4 types.  Importantly, however, these are 
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only ideal types -- "This typology is a heuristic device; few individuals should be 
expected to hold to these extreme positions consistently" (Jaeger 1998: 191). 
 
Fatalism Hierarchism
EgalitarianismIndividualism
(grid)
(group)
+
+
-
-
 
Fig.1  The Four Types of Social Organization 
 
Worldviews are mediated by these social relations; an individual is either more 
group-oriented or individual-oriented.  Likewise, an individual believes that many 
socially stratified rules are needed to control behavior, or that few rules are necessary.  
"In a 2 x 2 matrix of social relations by level of prescription, four basic worldviews 
emerge: hierarchical, fatalistic, individualistic, and egalitarian" (Peters & Slovic 
1996:1430). 
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Hierarchism is characterized by strong group boundaries and binding 
prescriptions. Individuals strongly identify with the group, yet "are subject to both the 
control of other members in the group and the demands of socially imposed roles" (e.g. 
an officer in the military) (Thompson, et al. 1990:6).  Hierarchists expect resources, 
opportunities, and respect to be “distributed on the basis of explicit public social 
classifications, such as sex, color, position in a hierarchy, holding a bureaucratic office, 
descent in a senior clan or lineage, or point of progression through an age-grade system” 
(Rayner, 1992). 
 
 Individualism, however, is characterized by weak group boundaries and few 
binding prescriptions: 
 
The stereotypical individualist is a self-made person, free from control by 
others, who strives to impose order on his or her environment...[they] 
oppose 'top-down' interventions by the state, preferring instead personal 
responsibility (O'Riordan & Jordan 1999:86-87). 
 
Egalitarianism is characterized by strong group boundaries and few binding 
prescriptions.  It is "communitarian, holding that every member should have input into 
the decision-making process" (e.g. a commune) (Pendergraft 1998).  Fatalism is 
characterized by individuals with weak group boundaries, yet subject to binding 
prescriptions. 
 
Fatalists are controlled from without...their sphere of individual autonomy 
is restricted. They may have little choice about how they spend their time, 
with whom they associate, where they live and work...fatalists are 
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excluded from membership in the group responsible for making the 
decisions that rule their life (Thompson, et al. 1990:7). 
 
Most cultural theorists focus their attention on hierarchists, individualists and 
egalitarians as these groups actively engage and contest with one another in broader 
social policy-making.  Fatalists are typically apolitical. 
 
Cultural Theory and Risk Perception 
 
 Cultural theorists argue that risk perception is socially constructed -- "an 
understanding of who fears what and why requires serious attention to the political, 
historical, and social context in which risks are framed and debated" (Dake 1991: 62).  
Thus, hierarchists, individualists, egalitarians and fatalists each identify and define 
different risks -- those which threaten their preferred way of life (Milton 1996; Douglas 
1982; Wildavsky 1990; Pendergraft 1998; Slovic 1998).  "When environmentalists blame 
'the system' for environmental damage, or when corporations proclaim a cornucopian 
view of nature and call for market controls on risk, or when bureaucratic organizations 
call for a top-down management of technological hazards, these behaviors...justify and 
maintain the pattern of social relations [and worldviews] from which they arise" (Dake 
1992: 27-28). 
 
Empirical research has shown that each worldview represents a different 
'rationality;’ a set of presuppositions about the nature of society and nature which leads 
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each group to perceive different risks and prefer different policy responses (Steg 2000; 
Slovic 1998; Peters 1996; O'Riordan 1999; Pendergraft 1998; Dake 1990; Dake 1991; 
Dake 1992; Wildavsky 1990).  Prototypical hierarchists most fear social deviance, which 
threatens the structure of status quo.  They call for the active management of risk by 
'experts,' in whom they place great trust. 
 
Prototypical individualists most fear restrictions on their autonomy, such as 
government regulation.  They promote market-based strategies, which maintain their 
autonomy and provide opportunities for personal gain, believing that the 'invisible hand' 
— of self-interested actors seeking to maximize their own personal gain — leads to 
optimal social results.  Both hierarchists and individualists tend to embrace technology, 
which is viewed instrumentally as providing either more social control (if sanctioned by 
the 'experts') or more individual efficacy, respectively.  Prototypical egalitarians, 
however, are most concerned about injustice in the maldistribution of risk costs and 
benefits, tolerate or celebrate social deviance and diversity, and view technology with 
suspicion.  They often promote participatory, democratic, and consensus-based decision-
making that includes all affected parties as equals (Dake & Wildavsky 1990; Dake 1991; 
Dake 1992; Milton 1996; Pendergraft 1998; Slovic & Peters 1998; O'Riordan & Jordan 
1999; Steg & Sievers 2000). 
 
 
 
50
 
Myths of Nature 
 
Research has further demonstrated that each group is associated with a particular 
myth or model of nature -- nature as benign, capricious, ephemeral or perverse/tolerant.  
These myths are symbolized schematically by a ball in a landscape (see Fig. 2).   
 
 
Figure 2. Myths of Nature 
 
"The landscape symbolizes the vulnerability of nature; the ball symbolizes environment-
risky behavior" (Steg 2000: 253).  Egalitarians typically view nature as ephemeral, 
worrying "that even the slightest additional burden placed on the environment might push 
it over the edge into inevitable decline" (Milton 1996: 92).  Thus, even a slight 
42. People disagree about how the balance., or equilibrium, of nature works. The four 
pictures below illustrate four different perspectives. Each picture shows a ball 
balanced on a line, yet e.ach one has a different ability to withstand d is turbances. 
A. Nature shows a delicate b.1.lanoe. 
Small disturbances may have 
catastrophic results. 
C. Nature is stable witl1in certain limits. 
If disturlxu1ccs a.re small. na ture 
will rctum to equilibrium. 
8 . Nature is very stable . 
Nature will return 10 equilibrium 
even after la,sc disturbances . 
• D. Nature is rtu1dom and unprcdiciable. We do not know what will happen. 
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perturbation to the ball can disrupt the precarious 'balance of nature.'  Individualists 
typically view nature as benign, or cornucopian.  They believe that whatever they do, the 
environment will recover (Milton 1996: 92).  Thus, the ball always returns to a stable 
equilibrium.  Hierarchists, however, typically view nature as perverse/tolerant.  They 
believe that the environment will tolerate a certain amount of abuse, but no more -- thus 
they urge caution and central control.  For example, "sustainable development is the 
rational environmental strategy in a hierarchical culture because this policy takes 
advantage of the perceived resilience of nature, but respects the 'known' limits" (Dake 
1992: 29).  The ball is stable, but only within expert-defined parameters.  Finally, 
fatalists view nature as capricious.  Nature is unpredictable and uncontrollable; thus they 
merely try to cope or adapt to the inevitable vagaries of nature.  In this model, the ball 
can move in any direction at any time. 
 
Recent research also demonstrates that cultural biases or worldviews are 
associated with different patterns of environmental concern.  In general, "egalitarianism 
is positively correlated with environmentalism, whereas individualism is negatively 
correlated" (Steg & Sievers 2000:252).  As one example, research on public reactions to 
nuclear power showed that, 
 
…worldviews...are highly predictive of perceptions of risk from nuclear 
power and support for that technology...as belief in an egalitarian 
worldview increased, support for nuclear power decreased. As...belief in a 
hierarchist or individualist worldview increased, support for nuclear 
power increased (Peters & Slovic 1996:1427, 1449; Slovic & Peters 
1998). 
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Cultural Theory and Climate Change 
 
According to cultural theory, hierarchists should tend to trust climate scientists 
and those in authority and welcome 'technofixes' as long as they are sanctioned by 
experts.  They should support legal rules, regulations and state interventions, as long as 
they are appropriately legitimized by established governmental structures.  Individualists 
should be most concerned about the imposition of constraining regulations (e.g. carbon 
quotas, efficiency standards, etc.) and prefer market-based policies (e.g. emissions 
trading), which maximize their autonomy.  Egalitarians should often distrust the 'experts' 
and be deeply concerned about the threat of climate change — especially its disparate 
causes and impacts on peoples and ecosystems around the world.  Strongly represented in 
non-governmental organizations, they should often call for radical changes in behavior 
and society, including drastically reduced consumption of fossil fuels, development of 
renewable energies, Third World debt relief, etc.  Jaeger, et al. argue that,  
 
…the climate change issue provides ample evidence that there are abiding 
and sometimes contradictory views of nature and philosophies of risk 
management — in short, plural rationalities (Jaeger, et al. 1998:191). 
 
 
These claims, if borne out by empirical research, could have important implications for 
global warming policymaking and risk communication.  First, to the extent that risk 
perceptions and subsequent actions are influenced by worldviews: 
 
…we can appreciate why communication of technical information about 
risk often has little effect on public attitudes. Our attitudes...are part of 
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'who we are'. We cannot easily change these attitudes without changing 
some part of our social worldviews (Slovic & Peters 1998:170). 
 
 
Thus, merely providing more technical information about climate change is unlikely to 
influence public concern. Second,  
 
…policy measures aimed at reducing environmental problems should take 
the different...cultural biases, into account. For example, risk 
communication should be in line with the cultural biases of the target 
group. People tend to have more trust in risk communication if the 
message is in line with their cultural biases (Steg & Sievers 2000:264). 
 
 
“One-size-fits-all” policies and appeals, which assume that all people are the same (e.g. 
all self-maximizing individualists) will fail, and in fact will create further political 
dissension.  
 
Cultural theory, however, is “sometimes criticized because it lacks empirical 
testing via organized case studies and recognised social science techniques” (O’Riordan 
& Jordan 1999:88).  This dissertation operationalizes cultural theory as an independent 
set of variables to test the theorized relationship between cultural worldviews and risk 
perceptions of global climate change.  It includes a comparison and contrast of two study 
groups: student climate activists participating in the 2000 World Climate Summit in The 
Hague, Netherlands (n=112) and a representative national survey of the American public 
(n=673). 
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Summary 
 
 Public opinion polls have found, paradoxically, that Americans are highly 
concerned about global warming as an individual issue, yet view it as less important than 
nearly all other national or environmental issues.  Academic research to date has found 
that Americans often use inaccurate knowledge and flawed mental models to reason 
about climate change causes and solutions.  For example, many Americans confuse or 
conflate climate change with stratospheric ozone depletion, leading them to advocate 
spurious solutions like a ban on aerosol spray cans, which continue to be associated with 
ozone depletion.  Risk perception researchers, however, have found that accurate 
knowledge of  global warming causes is not a primary driver of either risk perceptions or 
support for government mitigation policies.  Meanwhile, other research in the cognitive 
sciences and social psychology has demonstrated that emotion and affect are essential 
components of risk perception, decision making and behavior.  Likewise, Cultural 
Theorists argue that risk perceptions are socially constructed and mediated by cultural 
worldviews; thus egalitarians, individualists, and hierarchists will each emphasize those 
risks that they perceive to threaten their preferred social structure and associated values.  
This dissertation builds on the findings of these disparate fields to investigate the roles of 
affect, imagery and worldviews in public global warming risk perceptions, policy 
preferences and behaviors. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
This research was designed to answer several broad questions: 
 
1. Does the American public perceive global climate change as a significant 
threat?  How likely and how severe do they believe the consequences will be? 
 
2. Does the American public support public policies to mitigate climate change? 
 
3. What kinds of individual actions have Americans already taken to mitigate 
global climate change and how common are these behaviors? 
 
4. What affective images do Americans have of global warming?  Which of 
these images are the most salient and can they be used to identify distinct 
“interpretive communities” within the American public? 
 
This research also tests the following analytical hypotheses: 
 
1. Affective images of global warming influence a) global warming risk 
perceptions, b) individual support for climate policies, and c) individual 
behaviors to mitigate global warming. 
 
2. Worldviews have a separate, but related influence on a) global warming risk 
perceptions, b) individual support for climate policies, and c) individual 
behaviors to mitigate global warming. 
 
3. Climate change activists will provide a more diverse set of cognitive images 
and stronger affective reactions to global warming than either the Oregon or 
American publics. 
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4. Climate change activists will be significantly more egalitarian than the 
American public. 
 
 
Instruments and Collected Data Sets 
 
The Hague (2000) 
 
In November 2000, I traveled to The Hague, Netherlands as part of an American 
student delegation to the 2000 World Climate Summit (COP6).  I was credentialed with 
observer status inside the conference, which included access to all public negotiation 
sessions among national delegations, side-events sponsored by academic, industry and 
environmental groups, informal contacts with various national delegations, and closed-
door strategy sessions of the Climate Action Network, a coalition of environmental non-
governmental organizations. 
 
In preparation for the conference, I constructed a survey instrument (see outline 
below) designed to measure climate change risk perceptions, hypothesized predictors, 
and behaviors among delegates and climate activists.  The survey instrument: 
 
1. Measured perceived risk of climate change using 6 different definitions: i) general 
concern about global warming; ii) human fatalities; iii) human injuries; iv) harm 
to natural ecosystems; v) present vs. future risks, and; vi) likelihood of starvation, 
disease and decreased living standards, both globally and locally (adapting 
likelihood measures used by O’Connor, et al. 1998). 
 
   
 
57
   
2. Measured several hypothesized predictors of risk perception, including: 
 
a) Knowledge about climate change causes and solutions [e.g., “Which of the 
following is a direct cause of global warming?”: i) nuclear power plants; ii) 
damage to the ozone layer; iii) the burning of fossil fuels; iv) aerosol spray 
cans; etc.] 
 
b) Affective imagery: Each respondent provided up to three images in response 
to the stimulus "global warming," using the method of continued associations 
(Szalay & Deese 1978; Slovic, et al. 1991; Peters & Slovic 1996). 
Respondents rated each image they provided on a Likert scale of extremely 
positive (+5) to extremely negative (-5). 
 
c) Cultural worldviews: Operationalized using a set of 15 questions selected in 
part from scales used by Dake (1991, 1992) and Peters and Slovic (1996). 
 
d) General environmental beliefs: A set of questions derived from scales used by 
Dake (1991, 1992) and Peters and Slovic (1996) to measure how strongly 
each respondent agreed with four “myths of nature” (e.g., nature as fragile vs. 
nature as inexhaustible, etc.). 
 
e) Trust: Respondents indicated how often they trust various groups to tell them 
the truth about global warming risks (e.g., scientists, the national government, 
corporations, the media, environmental groups, etc.). 
 
f) Religiosity: Operationalized with three questions on whether a respondent 
considered themselves personally religious or spiritual; were actively involved 
in a religious or spiritual organization; and how important religious faith was 
in their life. 
 
g) Sociodemographics: Respondents were asked to indicate their sex, age, 
national citizenship, education, income, employment, marital status, parental 
status, political ideology, and membership in environmental groups. 
 
h) Measured individual climate change behaviors. Behaviors included: using 
energy-efficiency as a selection criterion when buying a light bulb, household 
appliance, or motor vehicle; weatherizing one's home, purchasing alternative 
energy, lobbying policymakers, etc. 
 
The survey questionnaire was pre-tested with 20 undergraduate volunteers 
recruited from a geography course at the University of Oregon (Environmental 
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Alteration).  Volunteers were informed that the results of the pretest would be used only 
to edit and improve the questionnaire for final distribution at the 2000 World Climate 
Summit.  Students were also informed that their participation in the pretest was 
completely voluntary and anonymous, and would not affect their grade or standing in the 
class.  Human subjects approval for the pretest was obtained from the University of 
Oregon Human Subjects Compliance Committee.  Each question was pre-tested for 
clarity, accuracy, validity and variability of response.  The full instrument was pre-tested 
for flow, length, comprehensiveness, and respondent cooperation and attention.  The 
results of the pretest were then used to revise the survey instrument. 
 
The cover of the questionnaire informed respondents that results from the survey 
would be used as part of a research project to understand the range of beliefs and attitudes 
various people have regarding global warming.  Respondents were informed that their 
answers were completely anonymous and voluntary, and that research results would be 
released as summaries in which no individual’s answers could be identified.  Human 
subjects approval for the final survey questionnaire was obtained from the University of 
Oregon Human Subjects Compliance Committee.  Four hundred copies of the survey 
questionnaire were printed and transported to The Hague. 
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Sampling and Data Collection 
 
The survey was conducted using a sample of convenience
1
.  Survey 
questionnaires were distributed to student climate change activists gathered for a strategy 
session, hosted by Greenpeace International.  A brief presentation outlined the purpose of 
the study and informed respondents that participation was anonymous and voluntary, and 
that research results would be released as summaries in which no individual’s answers 
could be identified.  Survey questionnaires were passed out to those in attendance 
(approximately 150).  Most respondents completed the survey at this time, while a few 
others completed it later and placed it in a drop-box in a central location.  A total of 112 
surveys were collected.  A majority of respondents were female (59%) and represented 
climate change activists from campuses across the country and internationally.  The 
majority (87%) were from the United States, with the remainder representing countries 
including Australia, Canada, Fiji, Mexico, the Netherlands, Senegal, and Sweden.  Most 
were 24 years old or younger (84%) and were current undergraduate students (62%) or 
had a Bachelor’s degree (24%).  A smaller proportion had a Masters degree (7%) or a 
Ph.D. or other professional degree (3%). 
 
                                                 
1 In a convenience sample, the selection of units from the population is based on easy availability or accessibility.  
Thus, a sample of convenience is unlikely to truly represent a larger population (e.g., all climate activists), yet can be 
useful for exploratory research. 
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National Survey (2002-03) 
 
In December 2002 through January 2003, I conducted a national survey of 
American global warming risk perceptions, policy preferences and behaviors.  The 
national survey instrument built upon the structure of the questionnaire constructed for 
the study of student climate change activists at The Hague.  Like the activist survey, the 
national survey instrument: 
 
1. Measured perceived risk of climate change 
 
2. Measured several hypothesized predictors of risk perception, including: 
 
a) Knowledge about climate change causes and solutions 
b) Affective imagery 
c) Cultural worldviews 
d) Trust 
e) Religiosity 
f) Sociodemographics (sex, age, education, income, etc.). 
 
3. Individual climate change behaviors 
 
In addition to the core questions from the Hague instrument, the national instrument 
also measured: 
 
1. Scale of Concern: Respondents indicated whether they were most concerned 
about the impacts of global warming on a) you and your local family; b) your 
local community; c) the United States as a whole; d) people all over the world; e) 
non-human nature; f) not at all concerned. 
 
---
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2. Policy Preferences: Respondents were asked to indicate their level of support or 
opposition to ten different climate change policy proposals.2 
 
a) Do you think the United States should reduce its emissions of the greenhouse 
gases (carbon dioxide, methane, etc.) that are said to cause global warming? 
[Likert scale ranging from (1) Definitely yes to (4) Definitely no] 
 
b) In 1997, the United States and other developing countries made an agreement 
called the Kyoto Protocol to collectively reduce their emissions of 
greenhouse gases.  The United States agreed to reduce its emissions by 7% 
by the year 2010.  How much do you favor or oppose this agreement? 
 
c) The United States currently emits about 20% of the world’s total greenhouse 
gases.  People disagree whether the U.S. should reduce greenhouse gases on 
its own, or make reductions only if other countries do too.  Which of the 
following statements comes closest to your own point of view?  The United 
States should reduce its emissions…i) regardless of what other countries do; 
ii) only if all other industrialized countries reduce their emissions; iii) only if 
all other industrialized and all less-developed countries reduce their 
emissions; iv) the United States should not reduce its emissions; v) don’t 
know. 
 
d) One controversial proposal to solve global warming is to create an 
international market in greenhouse gases.  In this system, all countries agree 
to a global cap on emissions.  Each country then gets the right to emit a 
portion of this global amount.  If a country emits more than its portion, it 
must buy more emission rights from other countries or else pay stiff fines.  In 
principle, how much do you support or oppose an international market that 
allows countries to buy and sell greenhouse gases? 
 
e) Carbon dioxide is the primary greenhouse gas said to be causing global 
warming and is produced by electric power plants and motor vehicles (e.g., 
cars, trucks and sport utility vehicles).  Currently, carbon dioxide is not 
regulated as a pollutant.  How much do you support or oppose the regulation 
of carbon dioxide as a pollutant? 
 
 
2 Questions (a) and (b) were adapted from a national survey conducted in 1999 by the Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change (1999).  Question (c) was adapted from a national survey conducted in 1998 by the 
Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland.  Questions (f) through (i) were 
adapted from a national survey conducted in 1997 by O’Connor, Bord and Fisher (1999).  Questions (d), 
(e) and (j) are original questions.  All questions except (a) and (c) were answered using a Likert scale 
ranging from (1) Strongly support to (4) Strongly oppose.  Most included a “Don’t know” response. 
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f) The average new motor vehicle gets 29 miles per gallon of gas.  Some people 
say we should increase average fuel efficiency to 33 miles per gallon, to help 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions.  This would increase new motor vehicle 
prices by about $1,000.  How much do you support or oppose this idea? 
 
g) How much do you support or oppose a 60-cent per gallon gasoline tax, over 
and above existing gas taxes, to encourage people to drive less and thus 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions? 
 
h) In order to encourage people to use more fuel-efficient vehicles, some people 
have proposed a 5 percent “gas guzzler” tax on cars, trucks and sport utility 
vehicles that get less than 25 miles per gallon.  This would add approximately 
$1,000 to the price of a $20,000 car.  How much do you support or oppose 
this proposal? 
 
i) To encourage industry to be more fuel efficient, some people have proposed a 
business energy tax.  This tax would raise the average price of most things 
you buy, including food and clothing, by 3 percent, or approximately $380 
per person per year.  How much do you support or oppose this proposal? 
 
j) The United States government provides approximately $5 billion a year3 in 
subsidies to the fossil fuel industry (coal, oil, natural gas).  Some people have 
proposed transferring these subsidies to the renewable energy industry (wind, 
solar, biomass, etc.) to develop cleaner forms of energy.  This would make 
fossil fuels more expensive and renewable energy less expensive.  How much 
do you support or oppose this proposal? 
 
3. A “Volatility Index”: A set of four questions based upon and adapted from the 
research of Daniel Yankelovich (1991, 2002).  The index measures whether 
current public opinion on global warming is relatively solid and stable or still 
volatile.  Questions included: 
 
a) How much do you care about the issue of global warming?  [Likert scale 
ranging from (1) “Don’t care” to (6) “Care deeply”] 
 
b) On some issues people feel that they have all the information they need in 
order to form a strong opinion, while on other issues they would like to get 
more information before making up their mind.  For global warming, where 
would you place yourself?  [Likert scale ranging from (1) “Do not need any 
more info” to (6) “Need a lot more info”] 
 
 
3 Estimate from Tax Payers for Common Sense (2002) www.taxpayer.net/TCS/fuelsubfact.htm 
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c) How often do you discuss global warming with your family and friends? 
[Likert scale ranging from (1) “Rarely discuss” to (6) “Often discuss”] 
 
d) People have told us that on some issues they may take a position, but know 
that they could change their mind pretty easily.  On other issues, however, 
they come to a position and they stick with it, no matter what.  For the issue 
of global warming, where would you place yourself?  [Likert scale ranging 
from (1) “Could change my mind easily” to (6) “Stick with my position”] 
 
4. General Environmental Attitudes.  Three questions from OASIS 2000 were added 
to the national survey for comparison between the Oregon and national studies: 
 
a) Do you believe it is possible for pollution levels to get so high that the 
environment cannot recover? 
 
b) What do you think is more important – protecting the environment, even if it 
costs jobs, or economic growth, even if it leads to environmental problems? 
 
c) When you buy things at the store, do you usually think of the impact the 
things you buy have on the environment? 
 
5. New Environmental Paradigm.  A set of 9 questions adapted from previous 
research by Dunlap and Van Liere (1978) and La Trobe and Acott (2000), which 
measure whether respondents hold relatively anthropocentric vs. ecocentric 
environmental attitudes. 
 
6. Balance of Nature (“Myths of Nature”).  Respondents were provided with the 
following illustration (Figure 3) and asked: “Which one of the four pictures best 
represents your understanding of how the balance of nature works?” 
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Figure 3. Myths of Nature 
 
The national survey questionnaire went through several rounds of pre-tests.  After 
question development in consultation with the Oregon Survey Research Laboratory 
(OSRL), the draft questionnaire was pre-tested first by staff members at OSRL, then by 
graduate students enrolled in Geography 608: Workshop on Thesis Writing, and finally 
by students enrolled in Sociology 311: Introduction to Social Research.  Each question 
was pre-tested for clarity, accuracy, validity and variability of response.  The full 
instrument was pre-tested for flow, length, comprehensiveness, and respondent 
cooperation and attention.  The results of the pre-tests were then used to finalize the 
survey instrument. Human subjects approval for the final survey questionnaire was 
obtained from the University of Oregon Human Subjects Compliance Committee. 
 
42. People disagree about how the ba lance., or equilibrium, of natu re works. T he four 
pictures below illustrate four different perspectives. Each picture shows a ball 
balanced on a line, yet e.ach one has a different ability to withstand d is turbances. 
A. Nature shows a delicate balance. 
Small disturbances may have 
catastrophic results. 
C. Nttturc is stable witl1in certain limits. 
If dis1urlxu1t."'CS a.re small. na ture 
will rctum to equilibrium. 
8 . Nature is ve,)' stable . 
Nature will return 10 equilibrium 
even after large disturlxtnces . 
• D. Nature is riu1dom and unprcdiciable. We do not know what will happen. 
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Sampling and Data Collection 
 
 The national study was implemented with a mail-out, mail-back survey of a 
representative sample (n = 1600) of the American public, using the Dillman (2000) 
tailored design method.  The sample mailing list was purchased from Survey Sampling, 
Inc. which owns a national database of residential addresses from all 50 states,  compiled 
using white page telephone directories and supplemented by other proprietary 
information sources, including school records, voter registrations, driver’s licenses, credit 
reports, and census data.  Household addresses were systematically nth-selected after the 
database had been stratified by county, ZIP code, area code and telephone exchange.  The 
unit of analysis for the study was individual adults, aged 18 or older.  Individual 
respondents were selected by use of the most recent birthday method (Dillman 2000). 
 
Respondents received an initial notification that they would soon receive a survey 
entitled “American Opinions on Global Warming.”  This initial contact was sent on 
October 25th, 2002 and explained what the study was about, why it was being conducted 
and thanked them for their time and consideration.  The second contact was sent on 
October 29th and included a cover letter to respondents that explained the purpose of the 
study, why they were selected, and that all answers were completely anonymous, 
confidential, and voluntary.   Respondents were given the following instruction to obtain 
individual-level data: 
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In order for the results of this survey to accurately represent all adults in 
the United States, it is important that the questionnaire be completed by 
the adult (18 years or older) living in your household who most recently 
had a birthday. 
 
The second contact also included a copy of the questionnaire and a $1 bill as a 
token of appreciation and incentive to return the survey.  The third contact, a follow-up 
postcard thanking those who had already responded and encouraging non-respondents to 
send their survey back, was sent on November 5th.  The fourth contact was sent on 
November 30th and included a second copy of the survey instrument, along with a cover 
letter which reminded respondents of the importance and confidentiality of the survey 
and again requested that they return the completed questionnaire. 
 
In January 2003, OSRL was contracted to conduct an experimental follow-up 
“nudge” telephone call to survey non-respondents.  The purpose of the experiment was to 
contact non-respondents via a different mode, i.e. by telephone rather than by mail, as a 
means to encourage them to complete and return the survey instrument.  In collaboration 
with OSRL, an interview script was constructed, programmed into OSRL’s CATI system, 
and three staff interviewers trained.  Human subjects approval for the experiment was 
obtained from the University of Oregon Human Subjects Compliance Committee. 
 
“Nudge” calls were placed over a two-week period to 773 non-respondents.  Of 
these, 81 said they would complete the survey and send it back.  By the end of the data 
collection phase, 31 or 38% of these non-respondents did in fact return their 
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questionnaires.  An additional 162 non-respondents were identified as ineligible because 
of wrong, disconnected, non-working, non-residential, duplicate or fax/modem numbers, 
language barriers, and death or illness.  A total of 673 completed surveys were returned 
for an overall CASRO response rate of 55.4% and a refusal rate of 11.2%.  Compared to 
population distributions from the 2000 U.S. Census, the sample over-represented males 
(65%) and persons 55 and older (47%).  The results were weighted by sex and age to 
bring them in line with actual population proportions. 
 
Oregon Annual Social Indicators Survey (2000)
4
 
 
An affective image question on global warming was included in the 2000 Oregon 
Annual Social Indicators Survey (OASIS), conducted by the Oregon Survey Research 
Laboratory (OSRL) November, 2000 through February, 2001.  The goal of this annual 
survey is to “obtain statistically valid and reliable information on a variety of social, 
economic and public policy topics required by clients.  The omnibus survey format 
allows organizations who cannot afford, or do not need, an entire survey to purchase 
question modules on a collective instrument with a standard methodology and high 
quality procedures” (Gwartney 1999).  OASIS 2000 was sponsored by Oregon State 
Parks, the Oregon Department of Transportation, the Oregon Lottery, the Oregon 
Research Institute, and ECO Northwest.  OSRL completed 901 random-digit-dial (RDD) 
 
4 This section is adapted from the OSRL report “OASIS 1998: Summary of Survey Methodology” by Patricia A. 
Gwartney, January 1999. 
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interviews with Oregon residents.  As an omnibus survey with diverse sponsorship, the 
survey instrument addressed a diverse set of subject areas: 
 
1. attitudes toward Oregon, local communities, Oregon state government, Oregon 
State Parks, the Oregon Lottery, and individual state agencies; 
 
2. transportation issues in Oregon; 
 
3. camping attitudes and behavior; 
 
4. household smoking behavior; 
 
5. casino and WWW gambling attitudes and behavior; 
 
6. knowledge and attitudes about local watershed councils; 
 
7. environmental attitudes and behavior; 
 
8. affective imagery of global warming; 
 
9. news media credibility; 
 
10. voting behavior; 
 
11. attitudes towards telephone surveys and polls; 
 
12. socio-demographics. 
 
The survey instrument was pre-tested by OSRL’s Questionnaire Review 
Committee, which is comprised of survey experts from their staff and university-wide 
advisory committee, by potential members of the survey population, and by survey 
sponsors.  Each question was pre-tested for clarity, accuracy, validity and variability of 
response.  The full instrument was pre-tested for flow, length, comprehensiveness, and 
   
 
69
   
respondent cooperation and attention.  Based on these pretests, the survey instrument was 
revised several times. 
 
The survey was then programmed into OSRL’s computer-aided telephone 
interviewing system (CATI) and further pre-tested.  OSRL obtained human subject 
approval for OASIS 2000 from the University of Oregon Committee for the Protection of 
Human Subjects.  Respondents were informed that their answers were completely 
anonymous and voluntary. 
 
Sampling and Data Collection 
 
OSRL uses a random-digit-dial (RDD) methodology that generates a strict, 
single-stage, equal-probability-of-selection-method (EPSEM) sample of residential 
telephone numbers.  For this survey, every residential telephone number in the state of 
Oregon had an equal probability of selection, including newly-assigned and unlisted 
residential numbers.  All households in Oregon had an equal chance of being selected, 
except those without telephones (4.5% according to the 1990 U.S. Census). 
 
The survey was conducted using OSRL’s computer-aided telephone interviewing 
(CATI) system.  Interviewing was conducted at all times of the day and all days of the 
week November, 2000 through February, 2001 until the target sample size was achieved.  
A total of 18,631 calls were made to complete 901 interviews with adults age 18 and 
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older.  Among the original 4,979 telephone numbers, 2,491 (50%) were unusable because 
the number was wrong, disconnected, non-working, non-residential, or a fax/modem.  An 
additional 85 were ineligible due to language barriers, respondents deceased or too ill to 
complete the survey, or other.  The overall CASRO response rate was 55.9%, and the 
refusal rate was 9.9%. 
   
Survey sampling errors are calculated to assist data users in assessing 
how much confidence to place in a particular survey result.  Large 
random samples, as in this study, reduce sampling error.  Results for 
survey items in which there is low variability also have less sampling 
error.  For example, a variable with a 50/50 proportional split has wider 
confidence intervals than a variable with a 5/95 proportional split 
(Gwartney 1999). 
 
For this study, the margin of error for a variable from the entire sample (n = 901) 
with a 50-50 proportional split is 3 percentage points, at the 95% confidence level.  This 
means that readers of the data can be 95% sure that the true measure for this variable is 
between 47% and 53% (i.e., 50% + 3 percentage points).  For a variable with a 95-5 
proportional split, the margin of error is 1 percentage point, at the 95% confidence level. 
 
-
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Data Reduction 
 
Affective Imagery 
 
All three surveys incorporated an affective imagery component.  Respondents 
were asked to provide the first (second, third) thought or image that came to mind when 
they heard the term “global warming.”  This produced a rich dataset of respondent 
associations that often took the form of either single word responses (e.g., “disaster”) or 
short narrative statements.  This dataset was reduced by the following procedures: 
 
1. respondents’ images were compiled into a computer database; 
 
2. a content analysis was performed with two independent coders; and  
 
3. respondents’ images were coded into categories or themes that represented shared 
meanings.  
 
Affective image code categories were derived in the grounded theory tradition, in 
which respondents’ images are inductively categorized to reveal dominant themes, rather 
than imposing a priori categories derived from theory.  Idiosyncratic responses (n = 1) 
were deleted from the analysis (Szalay & Deese 1978). 
 
The affective image code categories below come from the 2000 Oregon Annual 
Social Indicators Survey (OASIS), which included an affective image question on global 
warming.  These categories were also used for both the Hague and National surveys.   
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The categories appear in the order of most frequent use in OASIS 2000, i.e. DISASTER 
was the dominant category, followed by SKEPTICS, then OZONE, etc.  These categories 
are not always mutually exclusive.  Thus, a respondent who said, “Ice melting in Alaska” 
was coded as both ICEMELT and PLACES.  A respondent who said, “The destruction of 
the environment” was coded as both DISASTER and NATURE.  Finally, the last few 
categories are composite categories. 
 
DISASTER: This category refers to a range of responses that explicitly stated 
negative evaluations of global climate change itself.  This range included responses such 
as the following: “Disaster.”  "I think it is a very serious threat."  "The destruction of the 
environment."  "Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation."  "Heat waves, 
it's gonna kill the world."  "Death of the planet." 
 
SKEPTICS: This category includes all responses that indicated a disbelief that 
climate change is happening or that it is a threat.  Skeptics include: 
 
1. flat denials of the problem ("It doesn't exist");  
 
2. belief that global warming is natural ("Natural phenomenon, we can't control it 
ourselves"); 
 
3. doubting the science ("Bad science, I don't believe the data can support the 
hypothesis that the environment is warming");  
 
4. doubt based on personal experience ("I think it's a myth.  I don't think we are 
having global warming.  Summers are getting shorter and winters seem to be 
getting damper and cooler.  It seems to be going the other way"); and  
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5. conspiracy theorizing ("Fraud.  Scientists making up some statistics for their job 
security"  "A lot of propaganda on it…I think they try to scare us."). 
 
OZONE: This category includes all responses that associated global warming 
with stratospheric ozone depletion and the ozone hole.  For example: "Ozone layer."  "A 
hole in the sky."  "Temperatures rising because of the hole in the ozone."  "The ozone 
layer has a lot to do with the majority of the global warming."  "I don't like it…hair spray 
is part of it."  “Cancer from UV.” 
 
DON’T KNOW: This category includes any responses like "Global warming -- 
what is that?" or "I've never heard of that."  It is important to note that this category does 
not include responses such as the following example: "Umm…I don't know…ozone 
layer."  This response and others like it were coded as specific images; in this example as 
"Ozone."  The phrase, "I don't know" is often used by respondents to indicate momentary 
hesitation, before providing an actual response.  Thus, the "Don't Know" category only 
includes those respondents who truly had no associated image or explicitly said they had 
never heard the term 'global warming' before. 
 
HEAT: This category includes all references to rising temperatures. For example: 
“Becoming hotter.”  “Temperature is going to increase.”  “Warmer weather.” 
 
NATURE: This category includes all references to non-human nature, including 
general references to the environment, the world, and more specific references to flora, 
   
 
74
   
fauna or specific species.  For example: “The end of the world.”  “Sick fish.”  “Death of 
the planet.”  “Environmental degradation.”  “Penguins in Brazil.”  “Extinction of some 
species.”  “Mosquitoes.” 
 
ICEMELT: This category includes all references to melting snow and ice.  For 
example: “Melting of the ice cap.”  “Melting iceberg.”  “Glacier ice melting.”  “The 
Arctic melting.” 
 
PLACES: This category includes all references to specific geographic locations. 
For example: “Ice in Alaska.”  “Brazil cutting all its trees.”  “Sunny Florida.”  “Tropics.”  
“Antarctica.”  “Los Angeles.” 
 
POLLUTION: This category includes all references to pollution.  For example: 
“Pollution.”  “Air pollution from autos.”  “Carbon monoxide.”  “Exhaust from cars.”  
“Manufacturing places, spewing particulates up into the air.” 
 
NEED ACTION: This category includes all references to the need for action. For 
example: “We need to do something about it.”  “I think we’ve got to stop using the stuff 
that causes global warming.”  “We’d have to change our way of living.”  “Not enough 
gets done about it.”  “What can we do to help?”  “They ought to monitor these big 
companies a little more.”  “We need to replant our trees.” 
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EMOTION: This category includes any reference to an emotion felt by the 
respondent.  This does not include negative evaluations of global warming itself, e.g., 
"Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation."  Instead this category only 
includes direct expressions of emotion.  For example: “I worry about it.”  “It’s kind of 
scary.”  “It makes me afraid.”  “I’m worried about that.”  “Frightening.”  “It’s a concern.” 
 
WEATHER: This category includes all references to weather or changes in the 
weather.  For example: “Bad weather increasing.”  “Severe weather.”  “Violent storms.”  
“Tornadoes.”  “No snow.”  “Changing weather patterns.” 
 
FLOOD/SEA LEVEL: This category includes all references to either flooding or 
sea level rise.  For example: “Ice melting causing floods.”  “High waters.”  “Rising ocean 
levels.”  “The danger for cities near the water.” 
 
HAPPENING: This category includes all assessments that global warming is real 
and happening.  For example: “”It’s true.”  “It’s going to occur.”  “It is happening.”  “I 
realize there is global warming.”  “I think that it is coming.” 
 
CHG. CLIMATE: This category includes any references to changing seasons or 
climate.  For example: “Changes in climates.”  “A lot drier climate.”  “The seasons 
changing.”  “Mild winters.”  “Summer all year.”  “El Niño.” 
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AUTOS: This category includes all reference to automobiles.  For example: 
“Motor vehicles.”  “Automobile exhaust.”  “Large cars and SUV’s.” 
 
FORESTS: This category includes all references to trees and forests.  For 
example: “Brazil cutting all its trees.”  “Deforestation.”  “Rainforests.”  “Not enough 
trees.” 
 
POLITICS: This category includes all references to politics or political figures.  
For example: “Al Gore.”  “George W. Bush.”  “Environmental policy.”  “Liberals.”  
“Political scaring.”  “It’s a smoke screen for the politicians to do what they damn well 
please.” 
 
DRY/DESERT: This category includes all references to drought or a drier 
climate. For example: “Loss of water supply.”  “Shortage of water.”  “Desertification.”  
“Deserts.”  “More arid systems.”  
 
INFO SOURCES: This category includes all references to sources of information 
about climate change. For example: “I heard about that on the TV.”  “School.”  “The 
regular nightly news.”  “My college class where I learned about it.”  “Like the bible says 
we are supposed to burn up and maybe that is what is happening.” 
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GREENHOUSE: This category includes all references to the greenhouse effect.  
For example: “The greenhouse effect.”  “CO2.”  “greenhouse gases.” 
 
INDUSTRY: This category includes all references to industry, business or the 
economy.  For example: “Smoke out of factories.”  “Greedy corporations.”  “Industrial 
pollution.”  “Economic growth and expansion.” 
 
RELIGION: This category includes all religious references. For example: “The 
Lord will take over before it gets too bad.”  “Changes according to the scriptures.”  “Like 
the bible says we are supposed to burn up and maybe that is what is happening.” 
 
FOSSIL FUELS: This category includes all references to fossil fuels.  For 
example: “Oil refineries.”  “fumes of gasoline.”  “We need to stop using gasoline.”  “Too 
much fossil fuels.”  “Big oil companies.” 
 
FOOD: This category includes all references to food and agriculture. For 
example: “It’s affecting crops.”  “Inability to grow crops.”  “People falling like 
flies…scrounging for food.”  “The dry out of crops and farming…loss of food.” 
 
POSITIVE: This category includes all responses that evaluate climate change as a 
good thing.  For example: “I kind of like it.”  “Good, just that it’s good.”  “Bring it 
on…it’s cold, it’s winter.” 
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CHG. TEMPERATURE: This category includes references to general changes in 
temperature.  Note that this is not the same as the category HEAT.  HEAT responses 
indicate a direction (warming) to changes in temperature.  This category does not indicate 
a direction. For example: “Changes in the temperature.”  “The temperature.”  
“Temperature changes.” 
 
FUTURE GENERATIONS: This category includes all references to the 
consequences of global warming for future generations. For example: “My son and what 
it will be like for him to handle.”  “That my grandchildren will not have the world like I 
want it.” 
 
HUMAN HEALTH: This category includes all references to the impacts of global 
warming on human health.  OASIS respondents provided none, but examples would be 
“Malaria increase.”  “Deaths to heatstroke.” 
 
OTHER: This category includes any responses that don’t fit the other categories. 
 
CAUSES: This is a composite category comprised of the following categories: 
 
• POLLUTION 
• AUTOS 
• GREENHOUSE EFFECT 
• INDUSTRY 
• FOSSIL FUEL 
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IMPACTS: This is a composite category comprised of the following categories: 
 
• HEAT 
• NATURE 
• ICEMELT 
• FLOOD/SEA LEVEL 
• WEATHER 
• CHG. CLIMATE 
• FORESTS 
• DRY/DESERT 
• FOOD 
• CHG. TEMPERATURE 
 
 
SOLUTIONS: This is a composite category comprised of the following 
categories:  
 
• NEED ACTION 
• FOSSIL FUEL (e.g., responses calling for a shift from oil to renewable 
energy) 
• FORESTRY (e.g., responses calling for tree planting, or halting deforestation) 
• INDUSTRY (e.g., responses calling for regulation of business) 
 
Each category represents a single nominal variable that was imported into a 
database of all quantitative survey answers.  Statistical analyses using chi-square 
goodness-of-fit tests, odds ratios, linear and multiple regressions were performed, looking 
for correlations between the dominant affective images and climate change risk 
perceptions, policy preferences and behaviors (dependent variables). 
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Previous research on affective images has derived the following types of 
measures for analysis: 
 
Meaningfulness measures the number of different word associations to a 
particular stimulus word.  More meaningful stimuli elicit more associations; an unknown 
word or concept elicits few or none.  Dominance measures images’ relative importance, 
centrality, or salience to a respondent group.  It is measured as a function of how many 
people give a particular response and with what subjective weight.  Dominance is 
calculated by summing images’ scores and then comparing results across images.  For 
example, in response to the stimulus “nuclear waste repository,” Slovic, et al. (1991) 
found the image “cancer” much more dominant than the image “safe.”  
 
Affinity measures the degree of similarity between subjects’ word associations 
with two different stimuli, e.g., “alcohol” and “entertainment.”  Affinity can be measured 
as the correlation of two stimuli, or by constructing an Index of Inter-word Affinity 
(Szalay, et al. 1999).  For example, Szalay (1999) found that substance users had higher 
affinity scores than nonusers for “alcohol” with “friends,” “fun,” and “party.” 
 
Affectivity measures the degree to which subjects evaluate stimuli and images as 
positive or negative, from scored Likert scales.  For example, a scale range from +3 
(strongly positive) to –3 (strongly negative) allows a mean affective score calculation for 
each stimulus and associated image. 
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Indexes 
 
Indexes are efficient data reduction devices which summarize a respondent’s 
answers to different questions measuring different dimensions of the same complex 
concept in a single score (Babbie 1990).  “The advantages of using multiple indicators 
are: greater coverage of the conceptual domain; increased precision of measurement; and, 
most importantly, the ratio of ‘signal’ to ‘noise’ increases with more indicators of the 
same construct” (Sturgis 2002). 
 
For the Hague survey (2000) of climate change activists, several indexes were 
constructed for further analysis: 
 
An “Activist Risk Perception Index” (α = 0.75)5 was constructed by summing 16 
different variables measuring: holistic concern; holistic threat perception today and in the 
future; harmfulness of global warming to the natural environment currently and in the 
future; and likelihood measures of worldwide and local impacts of global warming on 
standards of living, food shortages and disease (Table 1). 
 
 
5 Cronbach alpha (α) is a measure of the internal consistency of an index, i.e., whether all the items within the index 
measure the same construct.  Values range from 0 to 1.  The internal consistency of the index increases as a value 
approaches 1.  A rule of thumb is that an α > .9 is excellent; α > .8 is good; α > .7 is acceptable; α > .6 is questionable; 
α > .5 is poor; and, α < .5 is unacceptable (George and Mallory, 2001). 
TABLE  1.  Activist Risk Perception Index 
 Mean Std Dev Alpha if Alpha
      item deleted   
Hague Risk Perception Index 43.37 3.78 0.75
How concerned are you about global warming? 3.99 0.10 0.76
Generally, how much of a risk is global warming to the world? 3.93 0.36 0.75
How serious of a threat is global warming today? 3.70 0.50 0.74
How serious of a threat will global warming be in the future? 4.00 0.00  
How harmful is global warming to the natural environment currently? 3.61 0.55 0.74
How harmful is global warming to the natural environment 30 years from now? 3.94 0.28 0.76
Suppose annual average temperature increases by 3 degrees Fahrenheit (1.7 Celsius) over the next 30 years.     
Do you think it is very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely or very unlikely that each of the following will occur?    
Globally, many people's standard of living will decrease. 3.69 0.66 0.73
Global food shortages and starvation will occur. 3.69 0.62 0.71
Global rates of serious disease will increase. 3.88 0.41 0.73
My standard of living will decrease. 3.11 0.90 0.68
Food shortages and starvation will occur where I live. 2.59 1.08 0.72  
My chances of suffering from a serious disease will increase. 3.22 0.86 0.69   
n = 98.  Scales range from 1 (none) to 4 (very).     
 
 
 
TABLE 2.  Activist Image Affect Index 
 Mean Std Dev Alpha if Alpha
      item deleted   
Activist Image Affect Index -10.71 6.53 0.69
How strong are your negative or positive feelings about (thought or image 1)? -3.90 2.37 0.71
How strong are your negative or positive feelings about (thought or image 2)? -3.61 2.78 0.54
How strong are your negative or positive feelings about (thought or image 3)? -3.19 3.12 0.48  
n = 103.  Scales range from –5 (very negative feelings) to +5 (very positive feelings).     
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Affect was operationalized in two different ways.  First, holistic affect was 
measured by asking, “Do you have any negative (positive) feelings about global 
warming?”  If respondents answered yes, they then used a unipolar 5-point Likert scale to 
evaluate, “How strong are your negative (positive) feelings?”  Second, an “Activist 
Image Affect Index” (α = 0.69) was created which summed three affective image 
variables (Table 2).  After providing the holistic affective responses, respondents were 
asked to provide three thoughts or images that came to mind when they heard the words 
“global warming.”  Each self-reported image was then evaluated by the respondent on a 
Likert affect scale ranging from –5 (very negative) to +5 (very positive).   
 
Worldviews (Cultural Theory) were operationalized using a set of 15 questions 
derived from previous scales used by Dake (1991, 1992) and Peters and Slovic (1996).  
Two worldview indexes were successfully constructed.  First, an “Activist Egalitarian 
Index” (α = 0.68) summed respondents’ answers to a series of items measuring 
egalitarian attitudes towards society (Table 3).  Second, an “Activist Individualism 
Index” (α = 0.69) summed respondents’ answers to a series of items measuring 
individualist attitudes towards society (Table 4).  Indexes were attempted for both 
Hierarchism and Fatalism measures (5 statements each), but each failed to achieve a 
satisfactory Cronbach alpha (0.44 for Hierarchism and 0.38 for Fatalism), therefore each 
Hierarchism and Fatalism variable was individually correlated with the dependent 
variables in an attempt to identify theoretically relevant predictor variables. 
 
TABLE  3.  Activist Egalitarian Index 
 Mean Std Dev Alpha if Alpha
      item deleted   
Activist Egalitarian Index 20.51 2.63 0.68
If people were treated more equally we would have fewer problems. 3.64 0.64 0.62
The world would be a more peaceful place if its wealth were divided more equally among nations. 3.54 0.70 0.62
I support government efforts to get rid of poverty. 3.59 0.73 0.71
What this world needs is a more equal distribution of wealth. 3.57 0.70 0.55
If I had to choose between freedom and equality, I'd take equality. 2.35 0.91 0.67
We have gone too far in pushing equal rights (reverse coded). 3.82 0.47 0.65   
n = 92.  Scales range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE  4.  Activist Individualism Index 
 Mean Std Dev Alpha if Alpha
      item deleted   
Activist  Individualism Index 7.78 2.49 0.69
In a fair system people with more ability should earn more. 2.25 0.90 0.61
Making money is the main reason for hard work. 1.46 0.76 0.72
It is just as well that life tends to sort out those who try harder from those who don't. 1.77 0.84 0.60
If a person has the get-up-and-go to acquire wealth, that person should have the right to enjoy it. 2.30 0.94 0.56  
n = 92.  Scales range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).     
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Finally, an “Activist Individual Action Index” (α = 0.62) summed the number of  
respondent actions regarding climate change, including consumer, homeowner, 
transportation, volunteer and political action behaviors (Table 5).  
 
TABLE 5.  Activist Individual Actions Index 
 Mean Std Dev Alpha if Alpha
      item deleted   
Hague Individual Actions Index 6.09 1.62 0.62
Used energy-efficiency as a selection criterion when buying  0.74 0.44 0.58  
a light bulb, a household appliance, or a motor vehicle.     
Installed insulation or weatherized your home or apartment. 0.24 0.43 0.60  
Purchased energy from an alternative source 0.22 0.41 0.60  
(wind, solar, geothermal, biomass).     
Used alternative forms of transportation instead of driving. 0.96 0.20 0.58  
Chosen not to buy an aerosol spray can. 0.55 0.50 0.56  
Planted a tree. 0.48 0.50 0.57  
Joined, donated money to, or volunteered with an organization  0.96 0.20 0.60  
working on issues related to global warming.     
Made your views on global warming clear to politicians. 0.97 0.17 0.61  
Talked to family, friends, or colleagues about ways that  0.98 0.14 0.60  
individuals could help solve the problem of global warming.         
n = 102, (Yes = 1, No = 0)     
     
 
For the National survey (2003), several indexes were constructed for further 
analysis.  First, a “National Risk Perception Index” (α = 0.94) very similar to the Activist 
Risk Perception Index was constructed by combining nine different variables: holistic 
concern; likelihood measures of worldwide and local impacts of global warming on 
standards of living, water shortages and disease; the seriousness of global warming for 
non-human nature; and the seriousness of the current impacts of global warming around 
the world (Table 6).   
 
TABLE 6.  National Risk Perception Index 
 Mean Std Dev Alpha if Alpha
      item deleted   
National Risk Perception Index 23.63 7.34 0.94
How concerned are you about global warming? 2.89 0.89 0.94
How likely do you think it is that each of the following will occur during the next 50 years due to global warming?    
Worldwide, many people's standard of living will decrease. 2.59 1.01 0.93
Worldwide water shortages will occur. 2.77 1.05 0.93  
Increased rates of serious disease worldwide. 2.65 1.01 0.93  
My standard of living will decrease. 2.27 1.05 0.93  
Water shortages will occur where I live. 2.42 1.06 0.94  
My chance of getting a serious disease will increase. 2.34 1.02 0.93  
How serious of a threat do you believe global warming is to non-human nature? 3.06 0.93 0.94  
How serious are the current impacts of global warming around the world? 2.64 0.89 0.94   
n = 590     
 
 
 
 
TABLE  7.  National Image Affect Index 
 Mean Std Dev Alpha if Alpha
      item deleted   
National Image Affect Index -7.12 6.88 0.87
How strong are your negative or positive feelings about (thought or image 1)? -2.40 2.49 0.81  
How strong are your negative or positive feelings about (thought or image 2)? -2.42 2.50 0.79  
How strong are your negative or positive feelings about (thought or image 3)? -2.30 2.75 0.84   
n = 514.  Scales range from –5 (very negative feelings) to +5 (very positive feelings).      
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Affect was operationalized using the same methods as the Hague survey and 
includes both measures of holistic affect and a “National Image Affect Index” (α = 0.87) 
(Table 7).  A small proportion of respondents consistently misinterpreted the scales (e.g., 
evaluating a self-reported thought or image like “cancer” as +5: “very positive feelings,” 
instead of –5: “very negative feelings”).  These respondents were identified in the data 
entry phase and their responses reverse coded to reflect the appropriate valence. 
 
Worldviews (Cultural Theory) were also operationalized in the National survey.  
The National survey used an expanded set of 25 questions, including duplicate questions 
from the Hague survey, questions derived from Rippl (2002) and several new questions.  
Two worldview indexes were successfully constructed.  First, a “National Egalitarianism 
Index” (α = 0.77) nearly identical to the Activist Egalitarianism Index was created (Table 
8).  Second, a “National Fatalism Index” (α = 0.71) measured fatalist attitudes towards 
society (Table 9).  Indexes were attempted for both Hierarchism and Individualism 
measures (6 statements each), but each failed to achieve a satisfactory Cronbach alpha 
(0.50 for Hierarchism and 0.52 for Individualism), therefore each Hierarchism and 
Individualism variable was individually correlated with the dependent variables in an 
attempt to identify theoretically relevant predictor variables. 
 
TABLE  8.  National Egalitarian Index 
 Mean Std Dev Alpha if Alpha
      item deleted   
National Egalitarianism Index 17.84 4.22 0.77
We have gone too far in pushing equal rights (reverse coded). 2.58 1.04 0.76  
I support government efforts to get rid of poverty. 2.93 0.91 0.75  
What this world needs is a more equal distribution of wealth. 2.40 0.99 0.71  
Firms and institutions should be organized so everybody can influence important decisions. 2.59 0.87 0.75  
I support affirmative action. 2.45 0.95 0.73  
If people were treated more equally we would have fewer problems. 2.77 0.87 0.73  
The world would be a more peaceful place if its wealth were divided more equally among nations. 2.12 0.92 0.72   
n = 647.  Scales range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).     
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE  9.  National Fatalism Index 
 Mean Std Dev Alpha if Alpha
      item deleted   
National Fatalism Index 11.47 3.33 0.71
The future is too uncertain for a person to make serious plans. 1.91 0.90 0.68  
It doesn't make much difference if people elect one or another political candidate, for nothing will change. 2.23 0.97 0.67  
I feel that life is like a lottery. 2.02 0.88 0.66  
A person is better off if he or she doesn't trust anyone. 1.74 0.85 0.67  
I have very little control over my life. 1.59 0.76 0.70  
It's no use worrying about public affairs; I can't do anything about them anyway. 1.98 0.85 0.62   
n = 647.  Scales range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).     
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Climate change-related behaviors were operationalized in three ways.  First, a 
“National Policy Preferences Index” (α = 0.84) measured respondent support for a wide 
range of potential government responses to climate change, including regulation, 
international treaties, and subsidy policies (Table 10). 
 
TABLE 10.  National Policy Preferences Index 
 Mean Std Dev Alpha if Alpha
      item deleted   
National Policy Preferences Index 19.58 3.68  0.84
Should US reduce GHG emissions? 3.41 0.73 0.80  
Support Kyoto Protocol? 3.33 0.84 0.79  
US act alone or only if other countries act? 3.66 0.75 0.82  
Support regulation of CO2 as pollutant? 3.03 0.90 0.81  
Support increase in fuel economy standards? 3.13 0.90 0.82  
Support subsidy shift to renewable energy? 3.02 0.84 0.82   
n = 609     
 
 
Second, a “National Tax Policy Preferences Index” (α = 0.78) measured 
respondent support for several proposed taxes to mitigate climate change, including a 
gasoline tax, a business energy tax and a tax on “gas guzzlers” (Table 11). 
 
TABLE 11.  National Tax Policy Preferences Index 
 Mean Std Dev Alpha if Alpha
      item deleted   
National Tax Policy Preferences Index 6.53 2.56  0.78
Support tax on gasoline? 1.72 0.95 0.74  
Support tax on "gas guzzlers"? 2.45 1.12 0.69  
Support business energy tax? 2.01 0.99 0.66   
n = 595     
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Third, a “National Individual Action Index” (α = 0.74) nearly identical to the 
Activist Individual Action Index measured respondent behavior regarding climate 
change, including consumer, homeowner, transportation, volunteer, and political action 
behaviors (Table 12).   
 
TABLE 12.  National Individual Actions Index 
 Mean Std Dev Alpha if Alpha
      item deleted   
National Individual Actions Index 2.74 2.17 0.74
Used energy-efficiency as a selection criterion when buying  0.51 0.50 0.68  
a light bulb, a household appliance, or a motor vehicle.     
Installed insulation or weatherized your home or apartment. 0.45 0.50 0.69  
Purchased energy from an alternative source, 0.04 0.20 0.74  
such as wind or solar power.     
Used alternative forms of transportation instead of driving. 0.26 0.44 0.71  
Chosen not to buy an aerosol spray can. 0.46 0.50 0.71  
Planted a tree. 0.49 0.50 0.71  
Joined, donated money to, or volunteered with an organization  0.15 0.36 0.72  
working on issues related to global warming.     
Made your views on global warming clear to politicians. 0.09 0.28 0.73  
Talked to family, friends, or colleagues about how to 0.27 0.45 0.70  
reduce or prevent global warming.         
n = 595, (Yes = 1, No = 0)     
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESULTS 
 
Global Warming Risk Perception 
 
Does the American public perceive global climate change as a significant threat?  How 
likely and how severe do they believe the consequences will be? 
 
To answer these questions, the national survey questionnaire included a series of 
risk perception questions, ranging from holistic measures of concern, to evaluations of 
the likelihood and severity of specific climate change impacts.  The holistic measure of 
concern was a standard poll question: “How concerned are you about global warming?”  
Table 13 provides a summary and breakdown of the results of this question by political 
identification and ideology.1
                                                 
1 Results are rounded to the nearest whole number.  Columns do not always total 100% due to a small 
percentage of respondents who did not answer every question.   
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TABLE 13.  National Holistic Concern 
Political ID Political Ideology 
Total Dem Ind Rep Lib Mod Con 
  % % % % % % % 
Concerned (total) 75 86 80 62 90 79 55 
Very concerned 26 42 28 13 44 21 16 
Somewhat concerned 49 45 51 49 46 58 39 
Not concerned (total) 24 12 20 38 9 20 44 
Not very concerned 18 9 12 29 6 16 31 
Not at all concerned 7 3 7 9 3 4 13 
n = 612        
 
 
A clear majority of Americans (75%) expressed concern about global warming.  
The results of this survey are quite similar to a 2001 survey conducted by Time Magazine 
and CNN, which found that 76% of Americans said they were somewhat to very 
concerned (PIPA 2003).  These results also demonstrate clear partisan differences in 
concern.  Democrats and Independents exhibited much greater concern about global 
warming than Republicans.  Likewise, Liberals and Independents exhibited much greater 
concern than Conservatives.  Global warming has become a highly politicized issue in the 
United States, especially during the 2000 presidential election which pitted former Vice-
President Al Gore (D), a long-term advocate for action on climate change, against George 
W. Bush (R), a former oil company executive with myriad ties to the fossil fuel industry.  
It is important to note, however, that these results demonstrate that even a majority of 
Republicans (62%) and Conservatives (55%) expressed concern about global warming. 
 
Risk perception, however, encompasses more than holistic levels of concern.  It 
also includes evaluations of the likelihood and severity of various consequences.  Thus, 
 
 
93
 
this survey also included a series of more detailed questions relating to risk perceptions of 
global warming (Table 14). 
 
TABLE 14.  National Risk Perceptions 
 Mean Std Dev
How serious of a threat do you believe global warming is to non-human nature? 3.06 0.93
How concerned are you about global warming? 2.89 0.89
How serious are the current impacts of global warming around the world? 2.64 0.89
How likely do you think it is that each of the following will occur    
during the next 50 years due to global warming?   
Worldwide water shortages will occur. 2.77 1.05
Increased rates of serious disease worldwide. 2.65 1.01
Worldwide, many people's standard of living will decrease. 2.59 1.01
Water shortages will occur where I live. 2.42 1.06
My chance of getting a serious disease will increase. 2.34 1.02
My standard of living will decrease. 2.27 1.05
n = 590.  Scales range from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very), with a midpoint of 2.5.   
 
 
Americans as a whole perceived global climate change as a moderate risk.  On a 
scale of 1 (none) to 4 (very), with a midpoint of 2.5, Americans were generally concerned 
about global warming (M = 2.89, SD = 0.89), believed that impacts on worldwide 
standards of living, water shortages and rates of serious disease are likely (M’s = 2.59 to 
2.77, SD’s = 1.01 to 1.06) and that the impacts will be especially pronounced for non-
human nature (M = 3.06, SD = 0.93).  In percentage terms (not reported in the table 
above),  76% of Americans said that global warming is a somewhat serious (37%) or very 
serious (39%) threat to non-human nature. 
 
Importantly, however, they were less likely to be concerned about the impacts of 
global warming on local standards of living, water shortages and rates of serious disease 
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(M’s = 2.27 to 2.42, SD’s 1.02 to 1.06).  In percentage terms, 57% of Americans said that 
their standard of living was somewhat unlikely (26%) or very unlikely (31%) to decrease 
during the next 50 years due to global warming.  Similarly, 53% said that their chance of 
getting a serious disease was somewhat unlikely (26%) or very unlikely (27%).  Thus, the 
public viewed global warming as a risk, but one primarily expected to impact people and 
places in other parts of the world.  This was supported by the results of a separate 
question that asked respondents to indicate which geographic scale of climate change 
impacts was of greatest concern to them.  The question asked, “Which of the following 
are you most concerned about?  The impacts of global warming on…1) you and your 
family; 2) your local community; 3) the U.S. as a whole; 4) people all over the world; 5) 
non-human nature; or, 6) not at all concerned.” 
 
TABLE 15.  Scale of Concern 
Percent Cum. Percent 
You and your family 12 12 
Your local community 1 13 
The U.S. as a whole 9 22 
People all over the world 50 72 
Non-human nature 18 90 
Not at all concerned 10 100 
Total 100  
n = 551   
 
 
A clear majority of respondents (68%) were most concerned about the impacts on 
people around the world and non-human nature (Table 15).  Only 13% were most 
concerned about the impacts on themselves, their family or their local community.  These 
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results may help explain why global climate change remains a relatively low priority in 
issue ranking surveys (e.g., Dunlap and Saad 2001).  Higher-ranking national issues (e.g., 
the economy, education, health care, etc.) and environmental issues (clean air, clean 
water, urban sprawl) are all concerns that are more easily understood as having direct 
local relevance.  “Global” climate change, however, is not yet perceived as a significant 
local threat.   Former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Tip O’Neill once 
famously argued that “all politics are local.”  To the extent that this is true, climate 
change is unlikely to become a high-priority national issue until Americans consider 
themselves or their communities personally at risk. 
 
By contrast, climate change activists demonstrated very strong risk perceptions of 
global warming, with near unanimity on questions of holistic concern, the seriousness of 
global warming today and in the future, impacts on non-human nature, and global 
impacts (Table 16).  For example, 100% of activists were very concerned (99%) to 
somewhat concerned (1%) about global warming.  Likewise, 100% of activists were very 
concerned (95%) to somewhat concerned (5%) about the future impacts of global 
warming on non-human nature.  Activists also perceived the local impacts of climate 
change (my standard of living, food shortages where I live, my chances of serious 
disease) as a much higher risk than the American public as a whole.  For example, 80% 
of activists said it was somewhat likely (40%) to very likely (40%) that their standard of 
living would decrease over the next 50 years due to global warming. 
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TABLE 16.  Activist Risk Perceptions 
 Mean Std Dev
How concerned are you about global warming? 3.99 0.10
Generally, how much of a risk is global warming to the world? 3.93 0.36
How serious of a threat is global warming today? 3.70 0.50
How serious of a threat will global warming be in the future? 4.00 0.00
How harmful is global warming to the natural environment currently? 3.61 0.55
How harmful will global warming be to the natural environment 30 years from now? 3.94 0.28
Suppose annual average temperature increases by 3 degrees Fahrenheit    
(1.7 Celsius) over the next 30 years. Do you think it is very likely, somewhat likely,    
somewhat unlikely or very unlikely that each of the following will occur?   
Globally, many people's standard of living will decrease. 3.69 0.66
Global food shortages and starvation will occur. 3.69 0.62
Global rates of serious disease will increase. 3.88 0.41
My standard of living will decrease. 3.11 0.90
Food shortages and starvation will occur where I live. 2.59 1.08
My chances of suffering from a serious disease will increase. 3.22 0.86
n = 98.  Scales range from 1 (none) to 4 (very).   
 
 
Interestingly, however, the mean scores for local impacts were lower than activist 
evaluations of the risk to global standards of living, food shortages and disease.  The 
majority of the activists were American students, and these results suggest that even these 
activists believed the threat of climate change is greater globally than locally.  This is 
particularly evident in the mean score (M = 2.59, SD = 1.08) of the likelihood of “food 
shortages and starvation where I live.”  American student climate activists, like the 
American public, perceived climate change as a threat that will have greater impacts on 
other people and natural ecosystems around the world.  Nonetheless, these activists also 
demonstrated very high levels of individual action, as discussed in further detail below.  
So, at least for this group of individuals, the risk perception of possible local impacts 
does not appear to be the primary motivator for active engagement with this 
environmental issue. 
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In summary, the American public did perceive global warming as a real threat, 
albeit a moderate one, posing greater danger to people and places far away.  Importantly, 
the potential impacts on nature were perceived as the most serious threat.   By 
comparison, student climate activists perceived global warming as a very serious threat 
across the board.  Yet activists also perceived global warming as posing greater risks 
globally than locally and especially to non-human nature. 
 
Global Warming Policy Preferences 
 
Does the American public support public policies to mitigate climate change?   To 
answer this question, the national survey questionnaire included a series of questions to 
measure public preferences regarding a variety of climate change policy proposals using 
a scale of 1 (strongly oppose) to 4 (strongly support), with a midpoint of 2.5 (Table 17). 
There was strong public support for a number of policies at the national and international 
levels, ranging from the shifting of government subsidies from the fossil fuel industry to 
the renewable energy industry (M = 3.02, SD = 0.85) to U.S. action to reduce its 
emissions of greenhouse gases regardless of what other countries do (M = 3.66, SD = 
.75).
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TABLE 17.  National Policy Preferences 
 Mean Std Dev 
Should US reduce GHG emissions? 3.41 0.73 
Support Kyoto Protocol? 3.33 0.84 
US act alone or only if other countries act? 3.66 0.75 
Support regulation of CO2 as pollutant? 3.03 0.90 
Support increase in fuel economy standards? 3.13 0.91 
Support subsidy shift to renewable energy? 3.02 0.85 
Support 60 cent gas tax? 1.72 0.95 
Support tax on "gas guzzlers"? 2.45 1.12 
Support business energy tax? 2.01 0.99 
Support international emissions trading market? 2.97 1.67 
n ranges from 595 to 626. (1 = Strongly oppose; 4 = Strongly support) 
 
 
In contrast, however, the public opposed three proposed tax policies, ranging from 
a tax on “gas guzzlers” (M = 2.45, SD = 1.45) to a 60-cent per gallon gasoline tax (M = 
1.72, SD = 0.95).  Overall, Americans were strong supporters of government action to 
mitigate climate change, but appeared unwilling to personally sacrifice through higher 
taxes to achieve this goal.  These summary statistics, however, gloss over important 
variations within the results. 
 
 
National Policies2 
 
 
 
Respondents were first asked, “Do you think the United States should reduce its 
emissions of the greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, etc.) that are said to cause 
global warming?”  Over 90% of Americans supported the overarching goal of reducing 
U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases (Table 18). 
                                                 
2 All policy results derive from the subset of Americans who had heard of global warming (92%). 
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TABLE 18.  U.S. Reduce Emissions  
Political ID Political Ideology 
Total Dem Ind Rep Lib Mod Con 
  % % % % % % % 
Yes (total) 90 94 91 87 96 91 84 
Definitely yes 58 71 62 44 75 59 42 
Probably yes 32 23 29 43 21 33 43 
No (total) 7 4 6 12 3 6 14 
Probably no 6 3 5 9 2 6 10 
Definitely no 2 1 1 3 1 1 5 
  N = 554 N = 561 
 
 
Further, overwhelming majorities of Democrats, Independents and Republicans, 
and Liberals, Moderates and Conservatives supported this goal.  Thus, Americans were 
nearly unanimous in their support for action to mitigate global climate change – far more 
so than their elected representatives in Washington, D.C.  The means to achieve this 
overarching goal, however, continue to be the subject of heated debate among policy 
elites. 
 
For example, one of the more controversial measures in recent years has been the 
effort to regulate carbon dioxide (the primary greenhouse gas) as a pollutant.  As a 
candidate for President, George W. Bush pledged to regulate carbon dioxide and three 
other air pollutants (sulfur, nitrous oxide and mercury) produced by fossil-fuel burning 
power plants.  After the election, President Bush reversed course and decided not to 
include regulation of carbon dioxide in his proposed “Clear Skies” legislation, citing 
concerns about rising electricity prices and after intense lobbying from the electrical 
utility and fossil-fuel industries.  This reversal left several moderate Republican Senators 
 
 
100
 
feeling betrayed only days before they were to introduce the legislation.  One, Senator 
Jim Jeffords of Vermont, cited this reversal on carbon dioxide and other environmental 
issues as one of several reasons why he subsequently decided to become an Independent, 
throwing control of the U.S. Senate temporarily into the hand of the Democrats. 
 
In the survey reported here, respondents were asked, “Carbon dioxide is the 
primary greenhouse gas said to be causing global warming and is produced by electric 
power plants and motor vehicles (e.g., cars, trucks and sport utility vehicles).  Currently, 
carbon dioxide is not regulated as a pollutant.  How much do you support or oppose the 
regulation of carbon dioxide as a pollutant?”  A strong majority (77%) supported 
government regulation of carbon dioxide as a pollutant (Table 19). 
 
TABLE 19.  Regulate Carbon Dioxide 
Political ID Political Ideology 
Total Dem Ind Rep Lib Mod Con 
  % % % % % % % 
Support (total) 77 84 81 69 86 84 62 
Strongly support 34 43 43 20 48 36 18 
Somewhat support 43 41 38 49 38 48 44 
Oppose (total) 20 13 16 30 12 14 36 
Somewhat oppose 14 10 12 19 10 11 23 
Strongly oppose 6 3 5 10 2 4 13 
  N = 552 N = 557 
 
 
 Democrats and liberals were stronger supporters of this measure than Republicans 
and conservatives, while Independents favored this proposal at levels very similar to 
Democrats.  Nonetheless, a large majority of Republicans (69%) and conservatives (62%) 
also supported this policy, despite its emphasis on a regulatory approach.  These results 
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demonstrate that there was strong, bipartisan support among the American public for the 
regulation of carbon dioxide as a pollutant. 
 
 Another policy question focused on a proposal to shift subsidies from the fossil-
fuel industry to the renewable-energy industry.  The IPCC estimates that stabilization of 
the Earth’s climate will require a reduction of global greenhouse gases emissions 60-80% 
below 1990 levels (IPCC 2001).  Since the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural 
gas) is the primary source of carbon dioxide emissions (the dominant greenhouse gas), 
many scientists and advocacy groups have urged national governments and industries to 
invest in the development of renewable energy sources like wind, solar, geothermal, 
biomass, etc.  Many argue that there must be a massive effort to shift the energy 
foundations of modern civilization from fossil fuels to non-polluting sources.  For 
example, in a study recently published in Nature, Martin Hoffert et al. concluded that 
stabilizing atmospheric carbon dioxide at current levels will require the production of 10 
terrawatts of non-fossil-fuel energy (roughly equivalent to two-thirds of current global 
energy production) by 2018.  If the production of that much energy is delayed until 2035, 
atmospheric carbon dioxide will double from today’s level (approximately 372 ppm), 
with potentially serious consequences.  Hoffert and his colleagues argued: 
 
…market inefficiencies may preclude timely development of such 
technologies at the required scale…This past century, accelerated 
technology development from wartime and postwar research produced 
commercial aviation, radar, computer chips, lasers and the Internet.  
Researching, developing and commercializing carbon-free primary power 
technologies capable of 10-30 TW by the mid-twenty-first century could 
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require efforts, perhaps international, pursued with the urgency of the 
Manhattan Project or the Apollo space program (Hoffert et al. 1998). 
 
 
This effort would involve not only the development of new or improved 
technologies, but also the establishment of a system of powerful financial incentives for 
the development of renewable sources, while providing disincentives for continued fossil 
fuel use (e.g., carbon taxes, regulation, etc.).  One of the most important levers of 
government policy is direct subsidies to industry, to encourage or reward behaviors 
deemed in the public interest.  As Norman Myers and Jennifer Kent argued in their book 
Perverse Subsidies: 
 
Were the U.S. Congress to fund renewable energy with the same amount 
in tax credits, financial incentives, and other subsidies that it provides for 
coal and oil, renewables would readily become competitive with fossil 
fuels.  In fact, a near-complete transition to a renewable-energy economy 
could be readily achieved for about $25 billion a year over the next 10 
years – a sum to be compared with the $21 billion worth of subsidies now 
supplied annually by the government for fossil fuels and nuclear energy 
(Myers and Kent 2001). 
 
 
 The national survey reported here asked, “The United States government provides 
approximately $5 billion a year3 in subsidies to the fossil-fuel industry (coal, oil, natural 
gas).  Some people have proposed transferring these subsidies to the renewable-energy 
industry (wind, solar, biomass, etc.) to develop cleaner forms of energy.  This would 
make fossil fuels more expensive and renewable energy less expensive.  How much do 
you support or oppose this proposal?”  This question was phrased to make some of the 
 
3 Estimate from Tax Payers for Common Sense (2002) www.taxpayer.net/TCS/fuelsubfact.htm 
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tradeoffs explicit.  Respondents were told that support for this policy would mean that 
coal, oil and natural gas would become more expensive.  Other policy questions (see 
below) also included tangible cost estimates to encourage respondents to consider policy 
costs as well as benefits.  A strong majority of respondents (71%) supported this policy, 
while only 17% opposed it (Table 20)4. 
 
TABLE 20.  Subsidize Renewable Energy 
Political ID Political Ideology Region 
Total Dem Ind Rep Lib Mod Con NE S MW W
  % % % % % % % % % % %
Support (total) 71 82 76 58 82 79 52 72 67 75 73
Strongly support 29 45 31 12 49 27 14 33 29 27 31
Somewhat support 42 37 45 46 33 52 39 39 38 49 42
Oppose (total) 17 12 12 26 12 11 29 11 21 12 22
Somewhat oppose 11 9 7 16 11 7 16 3 15 7 18
Strongly oppose 6 2 5 10 1 4 13 8 6 5 4 
Don't know 9 4 9 13 3 8 15 13 8 9 5 
  N = 555 N = 561 N = 575 
 
 
 Democrats and liberals were more likely to support the shift in subsidies than 
Republicans and conservatives, while Independents and moderates favored this proposal 
at levels very similar to Democrats and liberals.  Nonetheless, clear majorities of 
Republicans (58%) and conservatives (52%) also supported this proposal.  Support was 
strong across all four geographic regions, however, the South was significantly less likely 
to support this policy than the Northeast, Midwest or West.  This may reflect a greater 
concentration of Republicans and conservatives in the South.  Nonetheless, these results 
                                                 
4 Regions are based on the 2000 U.S. Census definitions:  Northeast = ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT, NY, NJ 
and PA.  South = DE, MD, DC, VA, WV, NC, SC, GA, FL, KY, TN, AL, MS, AR, LA, OK, and TX.  
Midwest = OH, IN, IL, MI, WI, MN, IA, MO, ND, SD, NE, and KS.  West = MT, ID, WY, CO, NM, AZ, 
UT, NV, WA, OR, CA, AK, and HI. 
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indicate that there was strong, bipartisan support among the American public for the 
shifting of government subsidies from the fossil-fuel industry to the renewable-energy 
industry. 
 
International Policies 
 
 
 
 One of the most contentious climate change issues in the United States is the 
Kyoto Protocol.  In 1992, then President George H.W. Bush signed the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change at the World Environment Conference in Rio 
de Janiero, which was subsequently ratified by the U.S. Senate.  The European Union and 
the Alliance of Oceanic and Small Island States (AOSIS) had pressed for a global 
commitment to mandatory, legally-binding cuts in greenhouse gas emissions.  The Bush 
administration, citing doubts about the reality and urgency of climate change and concern 
about the potential economic impacts of emissions reductions, successfully lobbied for a 
treaty which called for only voluntary commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
to 1990 levels by the year 2000.  By 1995, however, it was clear that no industrialized 
country, including the United States, was going to meet its voluntary reduction target; in 
fact, most countries’ emissions were continuing to increase.   
 
Recognizing this, and in response to the 1995 IPCC scientific report, which said 
there was indeed “a discernable human influence on the global climate,” world leaders 
met in Kyoto, Japan in 1997 to negotiate a Protocol or amendment to the original 
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Framework Convention that would require mandatory, legally-binding emissions 
reductions.  Just prior to the Kyoto conference, however, the U.S. Senate passed a non-
binding resolution (95-0) co-sponsored by Robert Byrd (D) of West Virginia and Chuck 
Hagel (R) of Nebraska, which urged the Clinton administration to not accept any treaty 
that did not include the “meaningful” participation of all developing as well as 
industrialized countries, arguing that to do so would unfairly put the U.S. at a competitive 
disadvantage.   
 
The Byrd-Hagel resolution, however, contradicted the “common but differential 
responsibilities and respective capabilities” principle of the original Framework 
Convention (UNFCC Article 3), signed in 1992 by President Bush.  The Convention 
stipulates that although all countries of the world share responsibility for reducing 
emissions, the industrialized nations bear a special responsibility because they are the 
world’s largest emitters of greenhouse gases, both historically and currently.  The 
industrialized nations are also expected to lead the emissions reduction process because 
they have much greater technical, scientific and financial resources to solve the problem. 
 
In line with this principle, the Clinton administration (represented by Vice-
President Gore) and other world governments negotiated and agreed to the Kyoto 
Protocol, in which the industrialized countries pledged to collectively reduce global 
emissions 5.2% below 1990 levels by 2008-2012.  As its share of the overall 
commitment, the U.S. pledged to reduce its emissions 7% below 1990 levels. 
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 The Clinton administration, however, decided not to immediately submit the 
treaty to the Senate for ratification, in the hope that with time, majority support could be 
obtained.  Meanwhile, the world continued to negotiate the rules of the Protocol (e.g., 
what activities would count as “reductions” and what penalties would be imposed for 
failure to meet a national target), which remained unsettled.  In November of 2000, as the 
disputed American presidential election unfolded in Florida between rivals George W. 
Bush and Al Gore, the world failed to reach agreement on the rules for the Kyoto 
Protocol at The Hague World Climate Conference (COP6) and the Kyoto Protocol hung 
in limbo, awaiting the still unknown new American administration.  Soon after taking 
office, President Bush unilaterally withdrew the United States from the negotiation 
process, effectively declaring the Protocol dead.  The move sparked intense criticism 
from the world community, which rallied to forge a completed Kyoto Protocol in Bonn, 
Germany in the summer of 2001, without the participation of the world’s largest emitter, 
the United States.  As of this writing, the Protocol awaits ratification only by Russia 
before going into force as international law. 
 
 This survey included two measurements of the American public’s opinion about 
these controversial international treaties.  The first question asked, “In 1997, the United 
States and other developed countries made an agreement called the Kyoto Protocol to 
collectively reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases. The United States agreed to 
reduce its emissions by 7% by the year 2010.  How much do you favor or oppose this 
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agreement?”  A strong majority of Americans (88%) said they favor this agreement, 
while only 10% opposed it (Table 21). 
 
TABLE 21.  Kyoto Protocol 
Political ID Political Ideology Region 
Total Dem Ind Rep Lib Mod Con NE S MW W
  % % % % % % % % % % %
Favor (total) 88 94 88 83 97 92 76 96 83 90 86
Strongly favor 53 62 57 43 71 56 37 62 52 61 33
Somewhat favor 35 32 30 40 26 37 39 34 30 29 53
Oppose (total) 10 4 10 15 2 6 21 4 15 7 11
Somewhat oppose 5 3 6 7 2 4 10 1 9 3 5 
Strongly oppose 5 1 4 9 0 1 12 3 6 4 5 
  N = 554 N = 561 N = 576 
 
 
 This support has grown 9% since a similar question was asked in a 1998 Mellman 
Group poll (PIPA 2003).  Again, although Republican (83%) and conservative support 
(76%) was lower than Democrat (94%) or liberal support (97%), clear majorities 
nonetheless favored the agreement.  Among the geographic regions, the Northeast had the 
strongest support (96%), while the South had the lowest (83%).  These results indicate 
that there was strong, bipartisan support among the American public for the Kyoto 
Protocol, despite the position of the Bush administration. 
 
The second question measured whether the American public agreed with the 
tenets of the 1997 Byrd-Hagel Senate Resolution.  The question asked, “The United 
States currently emits about 20% of the world’s total greenhouse gases.  People disagree 
whether the U.S. should reduce greenhouse gases on its own, or make reductions only if 
other countries do too.  Which of the following statements comes closest to your own 
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point of view?  The United States should reduce its emissions…i) regardless of what 
other countries do; ii) only if all other industrialized countries reduce their emissions; iii) 
only if all other industrialized and all less-developed countries reduce their emissions; iv) 
the United States should not reduce its emissions; v) don’t know.”  Contrary to the 1997 
Byrd-Hagel Senate Resolution, 76% of the American public in 2003 stated that the 
United States should reduce its emissions regardless of what other countries do, by far the 
dominant answer (Table 22).   
 
TABLE 22.  U.S. Act Regardless 
Political ID Political Ideology 
Total Dem Ind Rep Lib Mod Con 
  % % % % % % % 
Regardless of other countries 76 83 84 65 93 80 55 
Only if all industrialized 7 5 3 11 1 6 12 
Only if all other countries 8 4 4 13 1 5 17 
US should not reduce 2 1 1 4 1 1 5 
Don't know 5 4 5 5 2 5 9 
  N = 554 N = 560 
 
 
 This support has grown 10% since a similar question was asked in a 1998 
Mellman Group poll (PIPA 2003).  The strongest support for the Byrd-Hagel argument 
came from Republicans (13%) and conservatives (17%), yet clear majorities of both 
groups nonetheless agreed that the U.S. should reduce its emissions regardless of what 
other countries do (65% and 55% respectively).  Taken together, the American public 
strongly supported international treaties and American action to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
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 Americans do not, however, support all international policies.  Another 
controversial approach to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is the establishment of an 
international market in tradable carbon emissions.  This approach is based on a successful 
regional experiment in the Northeastern United States to reduce sulfur emissions, was 
strongly promoted by the Clinton administration in the climate negotiations, and was 
ultimately adopted into the Kyoto Protocol at the Bonn climate summit.  Its advocates 
claim that harnessing market forces and economic efficiencies will enable countries to 
achieve greenhouse gas emission reductions at lower cost.  Its detractors argue that the 
system will give countries the right to pollute, will be weakly enforced, and will turn 
global warming pollution into a speculative commodity.  More recently, Senators John 
McCain (R) of Arizona and Joe Lieberman (D) of Connecticut have promised to 
introduce legislation in the U.S. Senate in the fall of 2003 to establish a national, market-
based emissions trading system within the United States. 
 
To gauge public support for international carbon trading schemes, the national 
survey reported here asked, “One controversial proposal to solve global warming is to 
create an international market in greenhouse gases.  In this system, all countries agree to 
a global cap on emissions.  Each country then gets the right to emit a portion of this 
global amount.  If a country emits more than its portion, it must buy more emission rights 
from other countries or else pay stiff fines.  In principle, how much do you support or 
oppose an international market that allows countries to buy and sell greenhouse gases?”  
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The results demonstrate that the American public was evenly split, with 40% supporting 
and 40% opposing an international market-based emissions trading system (Table 23). 
 
TABLE 23.  International Emissions Market 
Political ID Political Ideology 
Total Dem Ind Rep Lib Mod Con 
  % % % % % % % 
Support (total) 40 49 33 39 51 41 30 
Strongly support 13 12 16 11 15 15 9 
Somewhat support 27 37 17 27 36 26 21 
Oppose (total) 40 34 44 41 38 37 47 
Somewhat oppose 16 20 20 11 22 17 12 
Strongly oppose 23 14 25 30 16 21 35 
Don't know 18 15 21 19 10 20 23 
  N = 552 N = 559 
 
 
 A plurality of Democrats (49%) and a majority of liberals (51%) supported this 
proposal, while Republicans were nearly evenly split (39% supported, 41% opposed).  
Conservatives were strongly opposed (47%).  Market-based emissions trading may raise 
contradictory feelings in Republicans and conservatives.  On the one hand, they are more 
likely to prefer a market-based, rather than regulatory approach to reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions.  On the other hand, they are also more likely to doubt the reality or 
urgency of global warming, and thus may tend to reject any policy to solve a perceived 
non-existent or inconsequential problem.  Finally, these mixed results, along with the 
high levels of “don’t know” responses, show that the American public is still undecided 
about the market-based approach. 
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Tax Policies 
 
 
 
 Tax policy is another fundamental tool governments use to provide incentives and 
disincentives to promote desired business and consumer behavior.  One proposed 
approach is to use tax policy to encourage consumers to purchase more fuel-efficient 
vehicles.  For example, the federal government currently implements a graduated “gas 
guzzler” tax on all passenger cars that get less than 22.5 miles to the gallon 
(fueleconomy.gov).  This tax, however, only applies to passenger cars.  Over the past 30 
years, sport utility vehicles (SUV’s) have become one of the most popular consumer 
vehicles in America.  Due to a loophole in the 1975 legislation, which established the 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, SUV’s are classified as “light 
trucks” and are thereby exempt.  The average SUV gets only 20 miles per gallon (EPA 
2000) and are an important reason why carbon dioxide emissions from the American 
transportation sector continue to increase. 
 
This survey measured Americans’ willingness to increase the cost of such fuel-
inefficient vehicles.  The question asked, “In order to encourage people to use more fuel-
efficient vehicles, some people have proposed a 5 percent “gas guzzler” tax on cars, 
trucks and sport utility vehicles that get less than 25 miles per gallon.  This would add 
approximately $1,000 to the price of a $20,000 car.  How much do you support or oppose 
this proposal?”  The phrasing included a tangible monetary cost to consumers: a 
substantial increase in the price of these popular vehicles.  A strong majority of 
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Americans (54%) supported a 5% tax increase on “gas guzzlers,” while 40% opposed it 
(Table 24).  These results were very similar to the findings of a 1997 national survey 
which found that 56% of Americans supported this policy while 44% opposed it 
(O’Connor et al. 1998). 
 
TABLE 24.  Gas Guzzler Tax 
Political ID Political Ideology Region 
Total Dem Ind Rep Lib Mod Con NE S MW W
  % % % % % % % % % % %
Support (total) 54 67 56 38 67 60 33 65 50 52 49
Strongly support 23 34 17 15 40 19 15 28 22 18 30
Somewhat support 30 33 39 23 27 42 18 38 28 34 20
Oppose (total) 40 28 36 56 29 33 59 27 42 41 46
Somewhat oppose 14 13 12 17 14 14 16 5 15 19 14
Strongly oppose 26 15 25 39 15 19 43 22 27 23 32
Don't know 3 3 4 3 1 4 5 5 4 4 1 
  N = 553 N = 559 N = 576 
  
 
Breaking these results down by political party and ideology, however, revealed an 
interesting pattern.  Strong majorities of Democrats (67%) and Independents (56%) 
supported this policy, but Republicans strongly opposed it (56%).  Likewise, liberals 
(67%) and moderates (60%) strongly supported this tax, while conservatives strongly 
opposed it (59%).  Assuming that Republicans and conservatives were not significantly 
more likely to own gas-guzzling vehicles, these results may indicate strong ideological 
reaction and resistance to the word “tax” – a word with negative connotations in 
American society generally and very strong negative affect among political 
conservatives, (although the affective imagery associated with this word has never been 
studied).  Another interesting result was the significantly higher support for this policy 
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among Americans living in the Northeast (65%).  Again, it is difficult to determine from 
these data whether this reflects lower ownership of gas guzzlers in this region of the 
country or a higher concentration of liberals who are more likely to support taxes in 
general.  Overall, Americans did support this tax proposal, but were sharply split along 
partisan lines. 
 
Another policy approach is to tax the energy used by business and industry.  As 
the cost of energy increases, companies have a greater incentive to invest in more energy-
efficient manufacturing and distribution systems.  Unlike the “gas guzzler” tax, this tax 
does not affect the consumer directly, but does increase overall consumer spending as 
companies pass on some of the higher production costs to consumers.  This survey 
measured American public opinion on this tax policy by asking, “To encourage industry 
to be more fuel efficient, some people have proposed a business energy tax.  This tax 
would raise the average price of most things you buy, including food and clothing, by 3 
percent, or approximately $380 per person per year.  How much do you support or 
oppose this proposal?”  This question also included a tangible cost to consumers.  A 
strong majority of Americans (60%) opposed this business energy tax, while only 31% 
supported it (Table 25).  
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TABLE 25.  Business Energy Tax 
Political ID Political Ideology Region 
Total Dem Ind Rep Lib Mod Con NE S MW W
  % % % % % % % % % 4 %
Support (total) 31 35 36 25 37 35 23 42 22 25 38
Strongly support 7 11 7 2 13 6 2 9 5 4 11
Somewhat support 25 25 29 23 24 30 21 33 18 25 27
Oppose (total) 60 57 54 67 53 58 68 47 69 61 55
Somewhat oppose 23 29 18 20 30 24 16 16 29 21 22
Strongly oppose 37 28 35 46 24 34 52 31 40 40 33
Don't know 6 5 6 5 7 4 6 7 5 7 4 
  N = 551 N = 562 N = 574 
 
 
 This opposition was consistent across both political identification and ideology, 
although Republicans and conservatives were significantly more likely to strongly oppose 
this policy.  Respondents in the Northeast were also against a business energy tax, but 
were more evenly split with 42% supporting and 47% opposing it.  Of the 42% support, 
however, the great majority (33%) only somewhat supported this tax.  Clearly, there was 
strong, bipartisan opposition to the idea of an increased business energy tax when an 
estimated financial cost to consumers is included. 
 
 A final policy approach is to directly tax fossil fuels themselves.  For most 
Americans, the fossil fuel they most often directly purchase is gasoline at the pump.  
Advocates argue that a significant, direct tax on gasoline will dramatically increase the 
price and thereby decrease overall consumption, increase consumer demand for more 
fuel-efficient vehicles, and encourage more development and use of public transportation.  
This survey measured American opinion on this policy proposal by asking, “How much 
do you support or oppose a 60-cent per gallon gasoline tax, over and above existing gas 
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taxes, to encourage people to drive less and thus reduce carbon dioxide emissions?”  A 
very strong majority of Americans (78%) opposed a 60-cent gasoline tax intended to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions (Table 26).  Further, a majority (53%) strongly opposed 
this policy.   
 
TABLE 26.  Gasoline Tax 
Political ID Political Ideology 
Total Dem Ind Rep Lib Mod Con 
  % % % % % % % 
Support (total) 17 24 16 10 29 14 10 
Strongly support 8 13 7 4 16 5 5 
Somewhat support 9 12 9 7 13 10 5 
Oppose (total) 78 72 76 85 69 80 85 
Somewhat oppose 25 30 25 21 29 32 13 
Strongly oppose 53 43 51 64 40 48 72 
Don't know 2 2 5 1 1 3 2 
  N = 555 N = 559 
 
 
 Opposition was consistent across political identification and ideology, although 
Republicans and conservatives were even stronger in their levels of opposition.  Clearly, 
there was very strong, bipartisan opposition to a substantial increase in gasoline taxes, 
even when respondents were told it would help reduce carbon dioxide emissions. 
 
 This research thus identifies a basic contradiction in American opinions on global 
warming (Figure 4).  On the one hand, Americans expressed high levels of concern about 
the issue, strongly believed that the U.S. should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, 
strongly supported national regulation of carbon dioxide as a pollutant, and strongly 
supported international treaties to reduce emissions, like the Kyoto Protocol.  On the 
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other hand, the public strongly opposed an increase in business energy and gasoline taxes 
– both direct pocketbook issues.  A majority of Americans did support a tax on “gas 
guzzler” vehicles, but they were evenly split regarding an international market in 
emissions trading.  Thus, the public largely supported policy action at the national and 
international levels, but opposed any tax policies that would directly affect them. 
 
Figure 4.  Americans’ Support for National and International Policies 
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Global Warming Behaviors 
 
 
 
What kinds of individual actions have Americans already taken to mitigate global climate 
change and how common are these behaviors? 
 
 Stabilization of the Earth’s climate will require more than large-scale government 
programs.  Greenhouse gases emissions like carbon dioxide are a byproduct of countless 
individual decisions made by Americans every day.  Almost everything we do in modern 
American society involves the burning of fossil fuels, whether directly by driving our 
cars, heating our homes, turning on a light, or indirectly through the products we buy and 
use.  Both the American and activist surveys measured a set of individual behaviors that 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions (see Table 27).  Also included was a bogus behavior 
“chosen not to buy an aerosol spray can” as a further test of respondent confusion with 
the issue of ozone depletion.  Respondents were asked, “Have you done any of the 
following things because you are concerned about global warming? (If you have done any 
of these things for another reason, check the “No” box.)”
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TABLE 27.  Individual Actions: American Public vs. Activists 
 % Americans % Activists % Difference
 (n = 595) (n = 102)  
Used energy-efficiency as a selection criterion when buying  51 74 23 
a light bulb, a household appliance, or a motor vehicle.    
Installed insulation or weatherized your home or apartment. 45 24 -21 
Purchased energy from an alternative source, 4 22 18 
such as wind or solar power.    
Used alternative forms of transportation instead of driving. 26 96 70 
Chosen not to buy an aerosol spray can. 46 55 9 
Planted a tree. 49 48 -1 
Joined, donated money to, or volunteered with an organization  15 96 81 
working on issues related to global warming.    
Made your views on global warming clear to politicians. 9 97 88 
Talked to family, friends, or colleagues about how to reduce 27 98 71 
or prevent global warming.       
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)    
 
 
 Overall, the national survey found that approximately half of Americans said they 
had used energy-efficiency in past consumer choices (51%) or installed insulation or 
weatherized their home (45%).  In addition, 46% said they had chosen not to buy an 
aerosol spray can, which provides further evidence that many Americans continue to 
confuse or conflate global warming with stratospheric ozone depletion.  The second 
highest response was planting a tree (49%), an action that has become perhaps the 
quintessential, symbolic “environmental act.”   
 
 Only a quarter (26%) of the American public had used alternative forms of 
transportation, such as rail, car-pools, walking, bicycling, etc. instead of driving.  Only 
4% of Americans reported purchasing alternative energy, which in part reflects limited 
access to renewable energy sources.  Very few Americans reported political behaviors on 
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global warming.  Only 15% said they had joined, donated money to, or volunteered with 
an organization working on global warming issues and only 9% said they had contacted 
politicians to communicate their concerns about global warming.  Finally, only a quarter 
(27%) of Americans reported talking to family members, friends or colleagues about how 
to reduce or prevent global warming.  A separate question asked, “How often do you 
discuss global warming with your family and friends?”  On a 6-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (rarely discuss) to 6 (often discuss), over 43% of Americans chose the extreme 
value “rarely discuss.”  An additional 25% chose the second-most extreme value (2), thus 
nearly 70% of Americans said they rarely discuss global warming within their immediate 
social networks.  These two results are critical indicators of the depth of American risk 
perceptions and concerns about this issue.  Until global warming becomes a “household 
word” or a topic commonly discussed around the water cooler, it will remain a low-
priority issue for most Americans. 
 
 By contrast, student climate change activists were much more likely to have taken 
political action on global warming: most had joined organizations (96%), communicated 
to politicians (97%), and discussed the issue with friends and family (98%).  They were 
also much more likely to have used alternative forms of transportation (96%) and used 
energy efficiency as a criterion when making consumer choices (74%).  A higher 
percentage (22%) of activists reported the purchase of renewable energy, indicating that 
for those who were motivated, renewable energy is a growing option.  Only 24% of 
activists reported the installation of insulation or weatherization of their home or 
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apartment, but this undoubtedly reflects much lower levels of home ownership among 
student activists than the American public at large.  Surprisingly, 55% of student activists 
reported that they had chosen not to buy an aerosol spray can because of their concern 
about global warming.  This indicates that the confusion of global warming with ozone 
depletion is found even among students highly motivated and committed to action on this 
issue, suggesting a failure by the higher education system to properly distinguish between 
and explain the two environmental issues. 
 
 Overall, however, these results show what one would expect – that climate 
activists are much more likely to engage in political action and other individual behaviors 
to mitigate global warming than the American public as a whole.  They also demonstrate 
that although sizeable proportions of the American public reported a few energy efficient 
behaviors (45 to 51%), the great majority has not engaged the issue either socially or 
politically. 
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Affective Images of Global Warming 
 
 
 
What affective images do Americans have of global warming?  Which of these 
images are the most salient and can they be used to identify distinct “interpretive 
communities” within the American public?  To address these questions, holistic measures 
of affective response to global warming itself were gathered using separate, unipolar 
measures of positive and negative affect, for both the national and activist samples.  
Second, cognitive images were obtained using the technique of discrete association 
described above in Chapter 3.  Third, respondents were subsequently asked to affectively 
evaluate each cognitive image they had provided using a bipolar measure of positive and 
negative affect. 
 
 
Holistic Affective Evaluations 
 
 
 
Neither the American public nor activists exhibited much positive affect regarding 
global warming (Table 28).  As might be expected, activists were less likely to have 
holistic positive affect (only 13%) and were more likely to exhibit holistic negative affect 
(100%) than the American public.
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TABLE 28.  Holistic Affect: American Public vs. Activists 
  American Activist
Do you have any positive feelings about global warming?   
Yes 28% 13%
No 72% 87%
N 596 109
   
Do you have any negative feelings about global warming?   
Yes 76% 100%
No 24% 0%
N 579 108
 
 
 Further, the positive affect intensity reported by the 14 activists who said they did 
have positive feelings about global warming is heavily skewed to the low end (slightly 
positive) of the Likert scale (Table 29). 
 
TABLE 29.  Positive Affect Intensity: American Public vs. Activists 
  American Activist 
How strong are your positive feelings?   
+1 Slightly positive 32% 50% 
+2 21% 14% 
+3 26% 21% 
+4 10% 7% 
+5 Very positive 11% 7% 
Total 100% 100% 
Mean +2.47 +2.07 
N 169 14 
 
 
 By contrast, both the American public (M = -3.31, SD = 1.20) and climate 
activists (M = -4.68, SD = 0.66) had relatively strong negative affect regarding global 
warming (Table 30).  This time the activists were heavily skewed to the extreme values 
(very negative).  Thus, the holistic affect measures demonstrate that both the American 
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public and climate activists predominantly had negative affective responses to global 
warming, while activists exhibited much stronger negative affect than the public at large. 
 
TABLE 30.  Negative Affect Intensity: American Public vs. Activists 
  American Activist 
How strong are your negative feelings?   
-1 Slightly negative 7% 1% 
-2 19% 1% 
-3 31% 2% 
-4 22% 21% 
-5 Very negative 21% 75% 
Total 100% 100% 
Mean -3.31 -4.68 
N 442 103 
 
 
 
Imagery 
 
 
 
 All three surveys (national, Oregon, and activist) implemented a discrete word 
association task.  The results of each are described below, followed by a comparative 
analysis.  The national survey found that American associations to “global warming” fell 
into 24 categories (Table 31).  The number of different categories indicates that “global 
warming” was a richly meaningful term, evoking many different connotations.  Overall, 
the mean image affect for all first associations to “global warming” was –2.40 (SD = 
2.49); further demonstrating that global warming has primarily negative connotations for 
most Americans.
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TABLE 31. Global Warming Image Categories, National 2003 
        
Survey Question: When you hear the words "global warming,"     
what is the first thought or image that comes to mind?     
        
Image Categories # of Images (% of Persons) Cum. % (% of Images) Cum. % Affect 
    (n = 558)   (n = 722)   Mean S.D.
      
IceMelt 117 21 20 16 15 -2.70 1.64
Heat 99 18 38 14 29 -1.95 2.74
Nature 70 13 50 10 38 -2.56 2.77
Ozone 60 11 61 8 47 -2.83 1.67
Disaster 59 11 72 8 55 -3.20 2.17
Flood/Sea Level 56 10 82 8 63 -3.00 1.53
Chg. Climate 51 9 91 7 70 -1.26 2.81
Skeptics 37 7 97 5 75 -1.14 3.55
Weather 33 6 103 5 79 -1.52 2.79
Dry/Desert 27 5 108 4 83 -4.01 1.58
Pollution 20 4 112 3 86 -3.17 2.32
Other 20 4 115 3 89 -0.89 4.14
Places 18 3 119 2 91 -2.23 2.23
Politics 14 3 121 2 93 -3.24 2.61
Greenhouse 11 2 123 2 95 -1.44 2.95
Forests 7 1 124 1 96 -2.17 3.32
Don't Know 5 1 125 1 96 -4.29 0.00
Industry 5 1 126 1 97 -1.89 2.87
Food 4 1 127 1 98 -1.25 2.57
Future Generations 3 1 127 0 98 -2.11 2.62
Autos 2 0 128 0 98 -2.01 0.00
Positive 2 0 128 0 99 3.00 0.00
Religion 1 0 128 0 99 -5.00 0.00
Fossil Fuels 1 0 128 0 99 0.00 0.00
Need Action 0 0 128 0 99 0.00 0.00
Emotion 0 0 128 0 99 0.00 0.00
Happening 0 0 128 0 99 0.00 0.00
InfoSources 0 0 128 0 99 0.00 0.00
Chg. Temperature 0 0 128 0 99 0.00 0.00
Total 722 129 * 100    -2.40  2.49
*Some respondents (28%) provided more than one image.     
Affect scale ranges from very negative (-5) to very positive (+5).    
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Associations to melting glaciers and polar ice (affect M = -2.70, SD = 1.64) were 
the single largest category of responses, indicating that this current and projected impact 
of climate change was the most salient to the American public.  Examples included: 
“Melting polar ice caps.”  “Glaciers melting.”  “Antarctic melting.”  Associations to heat 
and rising temperatures (affect M = -1.95, SD = 2.74) were the second-most dominant 
category.  Examples included: “Increased global heat.”  “Hot.”  “Temperatures 
increasing.”  These heat associations were typically generic and are likely associations to 
the word “warming” in “global warming.” 
 
The third largest category was comprised of impacts on non-human nature, 
including ecosystems and species (affect M = -2.56, SD = 2.77).  Examples included: 
“Rainforest depletion.”  “Damage to the environment.”  “Upset ecological balance.”  
“Animals and their habitats drying up.”   
 
The fourth largest category was a set of associations to the ozone hole or ozone 
depletion (affect M = -2.83, SD = 1.67), providing further validation to earlier mental 
model studies which had found that some Americans continue to confuse or conflate 
these two environmental issues (e.g., Bostrum et al. 1994; Kempton et al. 1995; Read et 
al. 1994).  Examples included: “A hole in the ozone layer.”  “Hole in the atmosphere.”  
“Ozone depletion.”   
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The fifth largest category was a set of associations to disaster, ranging from 
relatively mild depictions of global warming as a problem to extreme visions of 
environmental catastrophe.  Examples included: “Possible problem.”  “Potential 
disaster.”  “Environmental disasters.”  “Death.”  “World devastation.”  “The end of the 
world as we know it.”  “Our earth will become survival of the fittest and devastation to 
mankind.”  Unsurprisingly, the mean affect for the “Disaster” category was one of the 
most negative (affect M = -3.20, SD = 2.17).  The extreme responses indicate individuals 
who interpret climate change within an “environmental apocalypse” frame. 
 
Associations to sea level rise and the flooding of rivers and coastal areas 
comprised the sixth largest category (affect M = -3.00, SD = 1.53).  Examples included: 
“Rising ocean levels.”  “Floods.”  “Flooding of Manhattan.”  “The movie Waterworld.”  
The relatively strong negative affect associated with this category suggests that flooding 
and sea level rise are perceived among the gravest risks of global climate change.  The 
seventh largest category was a set of associations to changes in the climate system as a 
whole or to shifting seasons (affect M = -1.26, SD = 2.81).  Examples included: “A 
change in climate.”  “Climate change.”  “Longer summers and shorter, milder winters.”  
“No more winter.”  The relatively mild negative affect associated with this category 
indicates that changing climate, and in particular warmer winters, was sometimes 
perceived positively.  The subset of respondents who provided associations to warmer 
winters was examined to test this (n = 11).  Of these, 5 provided positive affective 
evaluations of this change, raising the mean affect for this subset to –0.45, only slightly 
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on the negative side.  This is a very small sub-sample and therefore is not necessarily 
representative of all Americans, but it does indicate that scientific projections of warmer 
winters are interpreted by some as a beneficial consequence of global warming. 
 
Finally, the eighth largest category comprised associations indicating skepticism 
or cynicism about the reality of climate change (affect M = -1.14, SD = 3.55).  Skeptics 
included: 1) flat denials of the problem (“A false theory.”  “It will not happen in the near 
future.”  “There is no global warming.”); 2) belief that global warming is natural 
(“Normal earth cycles.”  “It is just the natural course of events.”  “A natural phenomenon 
that has been going on for years.”); 3) doubting the science (“There is no proof it exists.”  
“Around 10 years or so ago it was global cooling.”  “Junk science.”); 4) hype (”It is not 
as bad as the media portrays.”  “The ‘problem’ is overblown.”  “Environmentalist 
hysteria.”); and 5) conspiracy theories (“Hoax.”  “Chicken Little.”  “Panic peddling for 
political reasons.”  “Political lie.”  “Environmentalist propaganda.”).  The diversity of 
these responses indicates that climate change skeptics have many different rationales for 
their disbelief, which ranges from acceptance of the reality of climate change (although 
naturally-caused or overblown) to flat denials and outright conspiracy theories.  There is 
a spectrum of disbelief, from those skeptics still potentially open to the possibility of 
anthropogenic climate change to those at an ideological extreme. 
 
 One of the most important findings was what was missing in these results.  There 
were no associations to the impacts of climate change on human health.  There were no 
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references to temperature-related morbidity and mortality (e.g., heat stroke), health 
effects of extreme weather events (tornadoes, hurricanes or precipitation extremes), air-
pollution health effects (e.g., asthma and allergies), water and food-borne disease (e.g., 
cholera, E-coli, giardia, etc.), or vector and rodent-borne disease (e.g., malaria, West Nile 
Virus, Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome, etc.) all of which are likely consequences of 
global climate change (Patz et al. 2000; Epstein 2000).  There were some associations to 
sunburn or skin cancer, but these represent confusions with the health impacts of ozone 
depletion.   
 
 This finding (or the lack thereof) that Americans do not currently associate global 
warming with impacts on human health is supported by the results of four questions 
which asked respondents to estimate the current and future human health effects of global 
warming.  On average, Americans said that current deaths and injuries due to global 
warming each number in the hundreds, and in the future will number in the thousands.  
By contrast, the activists said that current deaths and injuries each number in the 
thousands, and in the future will number in the millions5 (Table 32).
 
5 A recent study by the World Health Organization and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine estimated that 160,000 people (primarily children in developing countries) currently die every 
year due to the side-effects of global warming.  This number is projected to nearly double by 2020 (Doyle 
2003).  Thus, activist estimates of human health impacts appear to be relatively accurate. 
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TABLE 32.  Human Health Effects: American Public vs. Activists 
 Americans Activists 
 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Worldwide, how many people do you think…     
are currently injured or become ill each year… 2.16 1.09 3.32 0.66
will be injured or become ill 50 (30) years from now… 2.82 1.15 3.90 0.33
currently die each year… 1.93 0.97 2.74 0.71
will die each year 50 (30) years from now… 2.69 1.11 3.76 0.48
...due to global warming?     
N 307 to 330 95 to 103 
scale: 1 = none, 2 = hundreds, 3 = thousands, 4 = millions     
"(30) years from now" from activist questionnaire     
 
 
 Activists clearly perceived a greater risk to human health than the American 
public, yet both groups estimated future impacts as significantly more severe than current 
impacts.  More importantly, however, the distribution of “don’t knows” differed 
substantially between the two samples.  Of the activists, only 5 to 12% selected this 
response option, depending on the question.  Of the American public, however, 38 to 
41% said “don’t know” – by far the dominant response for each of the four questions.  
This is another strong indication that Americans are not currently associating global 
warming with significant human health impacts. 
 
 An affective image analysis was also conducted on both the OASIS 2000 and 
climate activist samples.  The OASIS survey used a different methodology (phone 
interviews) and only collected cognitive images associated with global warming (i.e. no 
explicit affect measures).  The OASIS survey found that Oregonians’ associations to 
“global warming” fell into 29 categories (Table 33).   
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TABLE 33. Global Warming Image Categories, OASIS 2000 
      
Survey Question: What is the first thought or image that comes to your mind  
when you think of "global warming"?    
      
Image Categories # of Images (% of Persons) Cum. % (% of Images) Cum. %
    (n = 899)   (n = 1234)  
   
Disaster 134 15 15 11 11
Skeptics 116 13 28 9 20
Ozone 107 12 40 9 29
Don't Know 95 11 50 8 36
Heat 83 9 60 7 43
Nature 80 9 68 6 49
IceMelt 69 8 76 6 55
Places 62 7 83 5 60
Pollution 50 6 89 4 64
Need Action 47 5 94 4 68
Emotion 42 5 99 3 71
Weather 41 5 103 3 75
Flood/Sea Level 41 5 108 3 78
Happening 36 4 112 3 81
Chg. Climate 33 4 115 3 83
Autos 27 3 118 2 86
Forests 25 3 121 2 88
Politics 23 3 124 2 89
Dry/Desert 18 2 126 1 91
InfoSources 17 2 128 1 92
Greenhouse 17 2 130 1 94
Industry 16 2 131 1 95
Other 12 1 133 1 96
Religion 12 1 134 1 97
Fossil Fuels 11 1 135 1 98
Food 7 1 136 1 98
Positive 7 1 137 1 99
Chg. Temperature 3 0 137 0 99
Future Generations 3 0 137 0 100
Total 1234 137 * 100   
*Some respondents (29%) provided more than one image.   
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The number and diversity of these categories again indicates that “global 
warming” was a highly meaningful term, with many associated images and connotations.  
The diversity of associated images partially reflects the complexity of the problem itself.  
For example, many of the categories referred to potential impacts of climate change, 
including rising temperatures, melting of the polar ice caps, sea level rise, drought, etc.  
Importantly, however, most of these impact categories evoked relatively few responses.  
In addition, these impact responses were often relatively general or abstract, not specific, 
vivid, and/or concrete (e.g., general responses like "heat" vs. more specific responses like 
"melting of the Arctic ice cap").  This finding suggests that the concept of “global 
warming” lacked a clear, central, affective image among the Oregon public. 
 
Approximately half of the sample provided an image in one of the four dominant 
categories: "Disaster," "Skeptics," "Ozone" and "Don't Know."  Here I focus on these 
four categories of images and respondents.  "Disaster" was the single largest category of 
images (11%).  This category refers to a range of responses that explicitly stated negative 
evaluations of global climate change.  This range includes responses such as: "I think it is 
a very serious threat."  "The destruction of the environment."  "Bad…bad…bad…like 
after nuclear war…no vegetation."  "Heat waves, it's gonna kill the world."  "Death of the 
planet."  These images clearly indicated negative affect and a perception that global 
climate change is a serious risk. 
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"Skeptics" was the second largest category of images (9%) and refers to responses 
indicating disbelief that climate change is happening or that it is a threat.  Skeptics 
included: 1) flat denials of the problem ("It doesn't exist"); 2) belief that global warming 
is natural ("Natural phenomenon, we can't control it ourselves"); 3) doubting the science 
("Bad science, I don't believe the data can support the hypothesis that the environment is 
warming"); 4) doubt based on personal experience ("I think it's a myth.  I don't think we 
are having global warming.  Summers are getting shorter and winters seems to be getting 
damper and cooler.  It seems to be going the other way"); and 5) conspiracy theorizing 
("Fraud.  Scientists making up some statistics for their job security" "A lot of propaganda 
on it…I think they try to scare us.").  Many of these responses also indicated negative 
affect, although with a very different ultimate meaning than "Disaster" respondents.  
While "Skeptics" also evaluated the term 'global warming' negatively, the meaning 
associated with their negative response is different -- it indicates a strong emotional 
component to their disbelief. 
 
"Ozone" was the third largest category (9%) and represents associations to 
stratospheric ozone depletion and the ozone hole.  Most of these were straightforward: 
"Ozone layer."  "A hole in the sky."  "Temperatures rising because of the hole in the 
ozone."  "The ozone layer has a lot to do with the majority of the global warming."  "I 
don't like it…hair spray is part of it."  These images again demonstrate that many 
members of the public continued to associate, confuse, and even conflate these two 
different environmental issues.  Many of these responses did not explicitly state positive 
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or negative affect (i.e. we do not know for sure whether someone who says "ozone layer" 
evaluates that positively or negatively), but we can make the reasonable assumption that 
references to the ozone layer (and thus the problem of ozone depletion) indicated 
negative affect and a strong perception of risk.   
 
"Don't Know" was the fourth largest category (8%) and included many responses 
like "Global warming -- what is that?" or "I've never heard of that."  It is important to 
note that this category did not include responses such as the following example: 
"Umm…I don't know…ozone layer."  This and similar responses were coded as specific 
images; in this example as "Ozone."  The phrase "I don't know" is often used by 
respondents to indicate momentary hesitation, before providing an actual response.  Thus, 
the "Don't Know" category only included those respondents who truly had no associated 
image or explicitly said they had never heard the term 'global warming' before.  These 
were people who had no associations with the stimulus 'global warming' and therefore no 
indication of either positive or negative affect. 
 
Thus, three of the top four categories ("Ozone," "Skeptics" and "Don't Know") 
were made up of respondents who misunderstood the issue, didn’t believe it, had no 
association with it, or had never heard of it, accounting for about 35% of all respondents. 
  
The Hague survey of student climate change activists also gathered affective 
images of global warming (Table 34).   
--
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TABLE 34. Global Warming Image Categories, Activists (2000) 
        
Survey Question: When you hear the words "global warming,"     
what is the first thought or image that comes to mind?     
        
Image Categories # of Images (% of Persons) Cum. % (% of Images) Cum. % Affect 
    (n = 112)   (n = 178)   Mean S.D.
      
Disaster 45 40 40 25 25 -4.38 1.99
Nature 27 24 64 15 41 -3.08 3.27
Flood/Sea Level 26 23 88 15 55 -4.67 0.76
Weather 14 13 100 8 63 -3.85 2.27
Heat 13 12 112 7 70 -2.77 3.32
IceMelt 12 11 122 7 77 -4.50 0.80
Dry/Desert 8 7 129 5 82 -4.71 0.49
Chg. Climate 7 6 136 4 85 -4.71 0.49
Places 6 5 141 3 89 -4.40 0.89
Greenhouse 3 3 144 2 91 -3.00 2.00
Chg. Temperature 2 2 146 1 92 -4.00 0.00
Other 2 2 147 1 93 -5.00 0.00
Fossil Fuels 2 2 149 1 94 -4.50 0.71
Food 2 2 151 1 95 -5.00 0.00
Pollution 1 1 152 1 96 -4.00 0.00
Skeptics 1 1 153 1 96 1.00 0.00
Need Action 1 1 154 1 97 5.00 0.00
Emotion 1 1 155 1 97 -5.00 0.00
Autos 1 1 156 1 98 -5.00 0.00
Industry 1 1 156 1 99 -4.00 0.00
Happening 1 1 157 1 99 -5.00 0.00
Future Generations 1 1 158 1 100 -5.00 0.00
Positive 1 1 159 1 100 3.00 0.00
Religion 0 0 159 0 100 0.00 0.00
Don't Know 0 0 159 0 100 0.00 0.00
Politics 0 0 159 0 100 0.00 0.00
InfoSources 0 0 159 0 100 0.00 0.00
Forests 0 0 159 0 100 0.00 0.00
Ozone 0 0 159 0 100 0.00 0.00
Total 178 159 * 100    -3.85  2.43
*Some respondents (47%) provided more than one image.     
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Of the 29 image categories used by the OASIS respondents, only 23 were used by 
the activists.  The mean affect for all associations provided by the activist sample was (M 
= –3.85, SD = 2.43), indicating the connotations of global warming were very negative 
for this sample.  Over 88% of all activists provided images in the top three categories 
("Negative," "Nature" and "Flood/Sea Level").  Relative to the Oregon and American 
publics, student climate change activists shared a core set of affective images about 
global warming. 
 
 “Disaster” was by far the dominant category, with 40% of activists providing a 
disaster-related association to “global warming.”  Examples included: “Difficult living.”  
“Death.”  “Ecological destruction.”  “Ecological catastrophe.”  “The end of civilization.”  
The mean affect for “Disaster” was (M = –4.38, SD = 1.99) on a scale ranging from –5 
(extremely negative) to +5 (extremely positive).  These images clearly demonstrate a 
perception of global climate change as a very serious risk.  The second-largest category 
was “Nature.”  Examples included: “Ecological destruction.”  “Species extinction.”  
“Polar bears.”  “The Earth on a bonfire.”  The mean affect for “Nature” was (M = –3.08, 
SD = 3.27), indicating great concern about the impacts of climate change on natural 
ecosystems and species around the world. 
 
The third-largest category comprised associations to Flooding and Sea Level Rise.  
Examples included: “Rising sea level.”  “Islands going under water.”  “Flooded coasts.”  
“Flooding wiping out a village.”  The mean affect for this category was (M = –4.67, SD = 
 
 
136
 
0.76), indicating that among these activists, the impacts of flooding and sea level rise 
were perceived as one of the greatest risks of climate change. 
 
 
Comparisons (National vs. Oregonian vs. Activist) 
 
 
 
 Comparisons of the top seven categories across all three surveys reveals striking 
differences between the American and Oregon publics and the activists (Figure 5).  
Climate change activists coalesced around three primary images of global warming: 
Disaster, Nature and Flooding/Sea Level Rise.  By comparison, the American and 
Oregon publics were much more evenly distributed across the image categories.  Also, 
unlike the American and Oregon publics, activists provided no “Skeptic” or "Ozone" 
responses. 
 
Figure 5.  Compared Images of Global Warming
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Associations to disaster were significantly higher among activists (40%) than 
either the American public (11%) or the Oregon public (15%).  Disaster was by far the 
largest category among activists.  Climate change activists were also substantially more 
likely to associate global warming with impacts on non-human nature (24%) than either 
the American (13%) or the Oregon publics (9%).  The impacts of climate change on 
individual species and whole ecosystems were highly salient for activists; perhaps 
indicating a more ecocentric than anthropocentric worldview.  Climate change activists 
were also much more likely to associate global warming with "Flooding and Sea Level 
Rise" (23%) than either the American (10%) or Oregon publics (5%).  Again, the high 
response suggests that sea level rise and increased flooding were highly salient impacts of 
climate change for this sample -- more than melting glaciers and polar ice caps, extreme 
weather, rising temperatures, or drought, etc. 
 
A comparison of American vs. activist image affect intensity reveals that even 
when both groups produced the same associations to global warming, activists reacted 
with much stronger negative affect (Figure 6).  Across the board, activists rated each of 
these images as substantially more negative than the American public.  For example, the 
subset of activists who provided images of “Disaster” rated these associations (M = -4.38, 
SD = 1.99) much more negatively than the subset of Americans who also provided 
images of “Disaster” (M = -3.20, SD = 2.17). 
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Figure 6.  Compared Global Warming Image Affect
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The disparity is greatest, however, for the image category “Changing Climate.”  
Americans who provided these associations (n = 51) did not exhibit extreme values of 
negative affect (M = -1.26, SD = 2.81).  The few activists (n = 7) who provided these 
associations, however, did exhibit extreme values of negative affect (M = -4.71, SD = 
0.49).  Further, for these activists the scientific term “climate change” connoted the same 
level of negative affect as the more popular term “global warming” (M = -4.68, SD = 
0.66).  This indicates, within the limitations of the very small sample of activists, that 
both terms were highly stigmatized.  For the public, however, the terms “climate change” 
or “changing climate” did not apparently carry such intensely negative connotations.   
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National Interpretive Communities 
 
 
 
 Finally, an exploratory analysis was performed to identify distinct “interpretive 
communities” within the American public, using affective imagery analysis.  An 
interpretive community is loosely defined as a group of individuals who share a relatively 
coherent and consistent set of associative and connotative meanings regarding a 
particular risk (in this case “global warming”).  For example, those individuals who 
provided a “Skeptic” association to global warming were hypothesized to interpret this 
issue in a common manner.  Members of such communities tend to share a common 
worldview and interpret risks in a similar way.  I further hypothesized that these 
individuals will share a common set of other attitudinal, behavioral and 
sociodemographic characteristics.   
 
 To test this hypothesis, several affective image categories were correlated against 
a range of covariates.  The first covariate was risk perception, operationalized with the 
Index of Risk Perception described in Chapter 3.  A second set of covariates were two 
different measures of affect, including holistic negative evaluations of global warming 
and specific affective evaluations of the cognitive images provided by the respondents.   
The third covariate was worldview (Cultural Theory), operationalized with the 
Egalitarianism and Fatalism Indexes described in Chapter 3.  Environmentalism was used 
as a fourth covariate and operationalized with a set of questions measuring environmental 
attitudes and behaviors: 
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1. “Do you believe it is possible for pollution levels to get so high that the 
environment cannot recover?”  
 
2. “What do you think is more important – protecting the environment, even if it 
costs jobs, or economic growth, even if it leads to environmental problems? 
 
3. “When you buy things at the store, do you usually think of the impact the things 
you buy have on the environment?” 
 
4. “Do you or a member of your household donate money or belong to any 
environmental or conservation organizations (e.g., Sierra Club, Audubon, Nature 
Conservancy, Greenpeace, local groups, etc.)? 
 
 
The response categories were Yes or No.  In part, these questions were selected for 
consistency and comparability with the earlier OASIS survey of the Oregon public. 
 
 Global warming behavior, the fifth covariate, was operationalized with the 
Individual Action Index, the General Policy Preferences Index, and Tax Policy 
Preferences Index described in Chapter 3.  A sixth covariate was the Main Source of 
News.  All respondents were asked to identify their main source of news (all news, not 
just about global warming) from a list that included newspapers, news magazines, 
television, radio, the world-wide-web, or friends and relatives.  The analysis found that 
only television and radio were significantly correlated with any of the interpretive 
communities, so only these have been included in the table below.   
 
Each interpretive community was correlated with a set of standard demographic 
variables, including sex, age, education level, income, political identification (Democrat, 
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Independent, Republican), political ideology (liberal, moderate, conservative), and 
registered voter status.  A geographic region variable was also constructed using U.S. 
census definitions for the Northeast, Midwest, South and West. 
 
 Each interpretive community (affective image category) was converted to a 
dummy variable with a 1 indicating a respondent who provided an image in that category.  
Correlations were obtained using two different methods.  For all covariates with ordinal 
or ratio-level data (e.g., education, age, etc.), linear regressions were run with the 
interpretive communities as the independent variables.  The standardized regression 
coefficients (β)6 and p values7 are reported in the table below.  For all covariates with 
nominal-level data (e.g., sex, media source, etc.), chi-square goodness-of-fit tests8 and 
odds ratios9 were calculated to determine the significance, strength and direction of the 
correlations. 
 
 
6 Beta (β) is a standardized score, which allows for direct comparison of the relative strengths of 
relationships between variables.  β varies between +/- 1.0; a Beta weight of 0 represents no relationship 
between variables, while a score of +/- 1.0 represents a perfect linear correlation (i.e., as variable x 
increases by 1, variable y increases by 1).  In a multiple regression, Beta is a partial correlation, in which 
the influence of all other variables in the equation has been partialed out.  Thus Beta is the unique 
contribution of one variable to explain another variable. (George and Mallory 2001) 
7 p  is a standard measure of statistical significance and identifies the likelihood that a particular outcome 
may have occurred by chance.  A p value less than .05 is generally considered statistically significant, i.e. 
when there is less than a 1 in 20 probability that a certain outcome occurred by chance.  A smaller p value 
increases the confidence that the findings are valid. (George and Mallory 2001) 
8 A Chi-square (χ2) goodness-of-fit test determines whether observed values differ significantly from 
expected values. 
9 Odds ratios (OR) are a measure of effect direction and strength.  An odds ratio of 1 shows no direction or 
strength of an effect.  The higher an odds ratio, the greater the strength, e.g., an odds ratio of 5.36 indicates 
a much stronger effect than an odds ratio of 1.25.  For a 2  x 2 table of (women / men) by (yes / no): 
OR = odds for women / odds for men = (women yes / women no) / (men yes / men no) 
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 This analysis demonstrated that affective imagery can be used to identify several 
distinct interpretive communities (Table 35).  Disaster, Skeptics and Believers each 
correlated strongly with a wide range of covariates.  Global warming skeptics tended to 
have lower risk perceptions of global warming (β = 0.39, p < .001) and were less likely to 
be egalitarian (β = 0.37, p < .001).  They tended to disagree that pollution levels can get 
too high for environmental recovery (OR = 4.44, p <.001) and very strongly preferred 
protection of economic growth over the environment (OR = 12.19, p < .001).  For general 
environmental behaviors, Skeptics tended not to consider the environmental impacts of 
their purchases (OR = 4.24, p < .001) or contribute to environmental organizations (OR = 
2.92, p < .05).  For specific global warming-related behaviors, Skeptics tended not to 
have taken individual actions to mitigate global warming (β = 0.28, p < .001), and 
strongly opposed both general climate policies (β = 0.48, p < .001) and increased taxes 
on gasoline, business energy use or gas guzzlers (β = 0.24, p < .001).  Finally, Skeptics 
were more likely to be male (OR = 2.73, p < .001), were slightly more likely to have a 
higher level of education (β = 0.12, p < .01), tended to get their news from radio (OR = 
3.74, p < .001), tended not to live in the Northeastern United States (OR = 4.62, p < .01) 
and were more likely to be Republican (β = 0.19, p < .001), conservative (β = 0.29, p < 
.001) and registered voters (OR = 5.08, p < .001). 
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TABLE 35.  National Interpretive Communities:  
Odds Ratios and Linear Regressions 
 Skeptics Believers Disaster
Factors and Covariates (n=37) (n=431) (n=59) 
Risk Perception 0.39 - - - 0.26 +++ 0.17 +++ 
Affect      
Holistic negative affect    0.13 ++ 
Image affect (negative) 0.12 - -     0.12 ++ 
Worldviews      
Egalitarianism 0.37 - - - 0.25 +++ 0.19 +++ 
Fatalism 0.10 - 0.13 ++     
Behavior      
Individual Actions 0.28 - - - 0.16 +++   
General Policy Preferences 0.48 - - - 0.32 +++ 0.12 ++ 
Tax Policy Preferences 0.24 - - - 0.19 +++ 0.15 +++ 
Environmentalism      
Pollution can go beyond recovery* 4.44 - - - 1.88 ++   
Protect environment over economy* 12.19 - - - 2.48 +++   
Consider environ. impact/shop* 4.24 - - -     
Membership in environ. org.* 2.92 -         
Main Source of News      
Television* 1.81 - 1.97 +++   
Radio* 3.74 +++ 1.91 - -     
Demographics      
Female* 2.73 - -     
Northeast* 4.62 - -     
Registered voter* 5.08 +++     2.04 - 
Republican 0.19 +++ 0.21 - - -   
Conservative 0.29 +++ 0.26 - - - 0.13 - - 
Education 0.12 ++     
+ means Yes/More likely; -- means No/Less likely    
+/- = p < .05;    ++/- - = p < .01;    +++/- - - = p < .001    
*odds ratios – all other values are standardized regression coefficients.   
Total n = 558      
 
 
 
 
 
144
 
 By contrast, “Believers” tended to have higher risk perceptions of global 
warming (β = 0.26, p < .001) and were more likely to be egalitarian (β = 0.25, p < .001).  
They tended to believe that pollution levels can get too high for environmental recovery 
(OR = 1.88, p < .01) and were more likely to prefer protection of the environment over 
economic growth (OR = 2.48, p < .001).  For specific global warming-related behaviors, 
Believers tended to have taken individual actions to mitigate global warming (β = 0.16, p 
< .001) and were more likely to support both general climate policies (β = 0.32, p < .001) 
and increased taxes on gasoline, business energy use and gas guzzlers (β = 0.19, p < 
.001).  Finally, Believers were more likely to get their news from television (OR = 1.97, p 
< .001), tended to be Democrats (β = 0.21, p < .001) and politically liberal (β = 0.26, p < 
.001). Within the composite Believers category, respondents who provided images of 
Disaster also tended to have higher risk perceptions and were more likely to be 
egalitarian.  They were more likely to support both general climate policies and increased 
taxes on gasoline, business energy use and gas guzzlers.  Finally, they tended to be 
liberals, but not registered voters. 
 
 These results demonstrate that affective imagery can be used to identify groups of 
individuals who share common interpretations, attitudes, behaviors and 
sociodemographic characteristics.  This type of analysis may be helpful to scientists, 
environmental advocates and risk communicators in their design of risk messages and 
education campaigns. 
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Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that affective images of global warming would influence 
a) global warming risk perceptions, b) individual support for climate policies, and          
c) individual behaviors to mitigate global warming. 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that worldviews would have a separate, but related 
influence on risk perceptions of a) global warming risk perceptions, b) individual support 
for climate policies, and c) individual behaviors to mitigate global warming. 
 
 To test these hypotheses multiple regression models10 were constructed to 
examine the separate and combined influence of affect, imagery, cultural worldviews, 
and sociodemographics (independent variables) on several dependent variables: 1) global 
warming risk perception (Risk Perception Index); 2) climate change policy preferences 
(General Policy Preferences Index); 3) climate tax policy preferences (Tax Policy Index); 
and 4) individual mitigation behaviors (Individual Actions Index). 
                                                 
10 A multiple regression analysis shows the influence of two or more independent variables on a designated 
dependent variable. 
TABLE 36.  Multiple Regressions on National Risk Perception 
Independent Variables Model 1 2 3 4 5 
  Affect Images Worldviews Sociodems Full 
Holistic Negative Affect 0.41 ***       0.32 *** 
Image Affect 0.26 ***       0.19 *** 
Skeptics   -0.32 ***    -0.21 *** 
Disaster   0.14 ***    0.06  
Politics   -0.17 ***    -0.09 * 
Don't Know   -0.11 **    -0.07  
Dry/Desert   0.18 ***    0.09 * 
Egalitarianism     0.45 ***   0.11 * 
The government should get out of our way. (I)     -0.11 **   -0.05  
When the risk is very small, it is OK for society to     -0.15 ***   -0.04  
impose that risk on individuals without their consent. (H)          
Female      0.22 *** 0.10 * 
White/Caucasian      -0.15 *** -0.07  
Ideology      -0.24 *** 0.00  
Registered Voter      -0.13 *** 0.04  
Member of environmental groups      0.14 *** 0.10 ** 
Newspaper      0.09 * 0.04  
F 93.95 *** 34.75 *** 65.57 *** 23.04 *** 22.76 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.32  0.24  0.26  0.20  0.47  
N 403   548   551   540   388   
Dependent variable: National Risk Perception Index           
Entries are standardized regression coefficients.           
*significant at 0.05; **significant at 0.01; ***significant at 0.001          
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 Multiple Regression Models of Global Warming Risk Perception 
 
 
 
Model 1 found that holistic negative affect and image affect were very significant 
predictors of global warming risk perception and explained 32% of the variance (F (2, 
402) = 93.95, p < .001, R2adj. = .32) (Table 36).  As negative affect increased, risk 
perception increased.  Model 2 found that several cognitive images including Skeptics, 
Disaster, Politics, Don’t Know, and Dry/Desert significantly predicted global warming 
risk perception and together explained 24% of the variance (F (5, 542) = 34.75, p < .001, 
R2adj. = .24).  Skeptics, Politics and Don’t Know were associated with decreased levels of 
risk perception.  Disaster and Dry/Desert, however, were associated with increased levels 
of risk perception.  Together, the results of Models 1 and 2 supported Hypothesis 1(a): 
affective imagery influences risk perception. 
 
Model 3 found that three cultural worldview measures were significant predictors 
of global warming risk perception, including the Egalitarian Index, an individualism 
variable and a hierarchism variable.  As described in Chapter 3, individualism and 
hierarchism indexes were attempted, but could not be satisfactorily constructed.  Instead, 
each individualism and hierarchism question was regressed on risk perception to identify 
potential predictors in line with Cultural Theory.  Two measures were identified: the 
individualism statement, “The government should get out of our way” and the 
hierarchism statement, “When the risk is very small, it is OK for society to impose that 
risk on individuals without their consent.”  Egalitarianism was correlated with increased 
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risk perception, while individualism and hierarchism were correlated with decreased risk 
perception.  The full worldview regression model significantly predicted global warming 
risk perception and explained 26% of the variance (F (3, 547) = 65.57, p < .001, R2adj. = 
.26).  Thus, this model supported Hypothesis 2(a): worldviews influence risk perception. 
 
Model 4 found six sociodemographic variables that were significant predictors of 
global warming risk perception.  Females, minorities, liberals, members of environmental 
groups and newspaper readers all tended to perceive global warming as a greater risk.  
Whites, males, conservatives and registered voters, however, all tended to perceive global 
warming as a smaller risk.   The full sociodemographic model significantly predicted 
global warming risk perception and explained 20% of the variance (F (6, 533) = 23.04, p 
< .001, R2adj. = .20).   
 
Finally in Model 5, the  four models were combined to determine which variables 
were the strongest predictors of global warming risk perception, controlling for the 
others.  Holistic affect was the single most powerful predictor (β = 0.32, p < .001).  The 
image “Skeptics” was the second-most powerful predictor (β = -0.21, p < .001), again 
demonstrating that skeptics tended not to perceive global warming as a risk.  The third-
largest predictor was Negative Image Affect (β = 0.19, p < .001).  The fourth-largest 
predictor was Egalitarianism (β = 0.11, p < .05), showing that egalitarians tended to 
perceive global warming as a greater risk.  Thus, the full multiple regression model 
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demonstrated that affect, imagery and cultural worldviews were stronger predictors than 
the sociodemographic variables.  Furthermore, the full model significantly predicted 
global warming risk perception and explained 47% of the variance (F (16, 371) = 22.76, 
p < .001, R2adj. = .47). 
 
 
Multiple Regression Models of Global Warming Policy Preferences 
 
 
 
 A similar analysis (Table 37) was performed on the National Policy Preferences 
Index, comprised of measures of support and opposition to six proposed national and 
international policies (see Chapter 3). 
 
Model 1 found that holistic negative affect significantly predicted support for 
national policies to address global warming, explaining 12% of the variance (F (1, 417) = 
60.38, p < .001, R2adj. = .12).  As holistic negative affect increased, so did support for 
these national policies.  Model 2 found that several images also significantly predicted 
national policy support.  Skeptics, Politics, and Don’t Know were all more likely to 
oppose national policies, while Dry/Desert was more likely to support them.  The full 
model was very significant and explained 29% of the variance (F (4, 551) = 57.84, p < 
.001, R2adj. = .29).  Together, these two model results provided support for Hypothesis 
1(b): affective imagery influences support for national climate policies.
 
TABLE 37.  Multiple Regressions on National Policy Preferences 
Independent Variables Model 1 2 3 4 5 
  Affect Images Worldviews Sociodems Full 
Holistic Negative Affect 0.36 ***      0.26 ***
Skeptics  -0.43 ***     -0.31 ***
Politics  -0.18 ***     -0.06  
Don't Know  -0.14 ***     0.01  
Dry/Desert  0.11 **     0.02  
Egalitarianism    0.48 ***   0.23 ***
When the risk is very small, it is OK for society to    -0.18 ***   -0.10 ** 
impose that risk on individuals without their consent. (H)          
The government should get out of our way. (I)    -0.16 ***   -0.06  
Making money is the main reason for hard work. (I)    0.11 **   0.08 * 
Government and industry can be trusted to make    -0.10 **   -0.04  
the right decisions about technological risks. (H)          
Ideology      -0.33 *** -0.13 ** 
Female      0.11 ** -0.09 * 
Member of environmental groups      0.14 *** 0.03  
Radio      -0.09 * 0.01  
Registered Voter      -0.12 ** -0.06  
F 60.38 *** 57.84 *** 60.59 *** 27.61 *** 22.11 ***
Adjusted R2 0.12  0.29  0.35  0.19  0.44  
N 419   556   562   553   398   
Dependent variable: General Policy Preferences Index           
Entries are standardized regression coefficients.           
*significant at 0.05; **significant at 0.01; ***significant at 0.001          
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 Model 3 found that the Egalitarianism Index and two individualism and two 
hierarchism measures significantly predicted national policy preferences.  Egalitarianism 
correlated with increased support for national policies, while hierarchism correlated with 
increased opposition.  The two individualism measures were split: those who agreed with 
the statement, “The government should get out of our way” tended to oppose national 
policies to address global warming, while those who agreed with the statement, “Making 
money is the main reason for hard work” tended to support national policies.  The full 
model was very significant, explained 35% of the variance (F (5, 556) = 60.59, p < .001, 
R2adj. = .35), and supported Hypothesis 2(b): worldviews influence support for national 
climate policies. 
 
Model 4 found that five sociodemographic variables significantly predicted 
national policy support.  Liberals, females, and members of environmental groups were 
more likely to support national policies to address global warming, whereas 
conservatives, males, radio-listeners and registered voters were more likely to oppose 
these policies.  The full model was very significant and explained 19% of the variance (F 
(5, 547) = 27.61, p < .001, R2adj. = .19).   
 
Finally, in Model 5, the  four models were combined into a single multiple 
regression model, which significantly predicted national policy preferences and explained 
44% of the total variance.  “Skeptics” was the single most powerful predictor (β = -0.31, 
p < .001) of support or opposition to national policies on global warming.  The second-
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most powerful predictor was holistic negative affect (β = 0.26, p < .001), followed by 
egalitarianism (β = 0.23, p < .001).  Thus, the full multiple regression model 
demonstrated that affect, imagery and cultural worldviews were better predictors of 
support for global warming policies than all sociodemographic variables, including 
political identification and ideology. 
 
 
Multiple Regression Models of Global Warming Tax Policy Preferences 
 
 
 
Another multiple regression model tested predictors of support for an index of 
three national tax policies to mitigate climate change (Table 38).  Model 1 found that 
holistic negative affect significantly predicted support for national tax policies, with 
increased negative affect associated with increased support.  The model, however, while 
highly significant, explained only 5% of the variance (F (1, 411) = 21.07, p < .001, R2adj. 
= .05).  Model 2 found that five cognitive images (Skeptics, Chg. Climate, Politics, 
Disaster, and Don’t Know) significantly predicted tax policy support.  These images 
correlated with opposition to higher taxes, with the exception of Disaster: respondents in 
this category were more likely to support higher taxes.  The full model was highly 
significant and explained 13% of the variance (F (5, 539) = 16.57, p < .001, R2adj. = .13). 
 
 
 
   
 
TABLE 38.  Multiple Regressions on National Tax Policy Preferences 
Independent Variables Model 1 2 3 4 5 
  Affect Images Worldviews Sociodems Full 
Holistic Negative Affect 0.22 ***      0.16 ***
Skeptics   -0.21 ***     -0.10 * 
Chg. Climate   -0.19 ***     -0.06  
Politics   -0.14 ***     -0.04  
Disaster   0.11 **     0.06  
Don't Know   -0.11 **     -0.01  
Egalitarianism    0.46 ***   0.22 ***
Families need a strong authority figure. (H)    -0.12 **   -0.03  
Fatalism    -0.18 ***   -0.07  
If a person has the get-up-and-go to acquire wealth,    -0.14 ***   -0.13 ** 
that person should have the right to enjoy it. (I)          
People with less talent or ability should earn less. (I)    0.15 ***   0.08  
Organizations need a strict line of command to be successful. (H)    -0.10 **   -0.11 * 
Ideology      -0.28 *** -0.16 ** 
Education      0.19 *** 0.13 ** 
Member of environmental groups      0.17 *** 0.09  
White      -0.14 *** -0.11 * 
Female      0.10 ** -0.03  
F 21.07 *** 16.57 *** 36.55 *** 24.86 *** 10.50 ***
Adjusted R2 0.05  0.13  0.28  0.18  0.29  
N 413   545   552   540   392   
Dependent variable: Tax Policy Preferences Index           
Entries are standardized regression coefficients.           
*significant at 0.05; **significant at 0.01; ***significant at 0.001           
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The results supported Hypothesis 1(b): affective images influence support for higher 
taxes to mitigate climate change. 
 
Model 3 found that the Egalitarianism Index, the Fatalism Index, two hierarchism 
and two individualism measures significantly predicted tax policy support.  Egalitarians 
were more likely to support higher taxes.  Fatalists and hierarchists were more likely to 
oppose them.  The two individualism questions were split, with those who agreed with 
the statement, “If a person has the get-up-and-go to acquire wealth, that person should 
have the right to enjoy it” more likely to oppose higher taxes.  Respondents who agreed 
with the statement, “People with less talent or ability should earn less” were more likely 
to support higher taxes.  Only the results of the first individualism question are consistent 
with Cultural Theory.  The full model was very significant and explained 28% of the 
variance (F (6, 545) = 36.55, p < .001, R2adj. = .28).  These results supported Hypothesis 
2(b): worldviews influence support for tax policies to mitigate climate change. 
 
Model 4 found that five sociodemographic variables significantly predicted tax 
policy support.  Conservatives, whites, and males were more likely to oppose higher 
taxes to mitigate climate change, while liberals, females, minorities, individuals with 
increased education levels, and members of environmental groups were more likely to 
support higher taxes to mitigate climate change.  The full model was very significant and 
explained 18% of the variance (F (5, 534) = 24.86, p < .001, R2adj. = .18). 
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Model 5 combined the  four models, significantly predicted support for higher 
taxes to mitigate climate change and explained 29% of the total variance.  Egalitarianism 
was the single most powerful predictor (β = 0.22, p < .001) of support.  The second-most 
powerful predictor was holistic negative affect (β = 0.16, p < .001), followed by political 
ideology (β = 0.16, p < .01).  Skeptics, individualism, hierarchism, education, and whites 
remained significant, though weaker predictors in the full model.  Thus, cultural 
worldviews and affect were stronger predictors of support for tax policies than the 
sociodemographic variables, with the exception of political ideology. 
 
 
Multiple Regression Models of Global Warming Mitigation Behaviors 
 
 
 
A final multiple regression model (Table 39) tested the ability of affect, imagery, 
worldviews and sociodemographics to predict individual behaviors using the National 
Individual Actions Index, comprised of nine climate change mitigation behaviors (see 
Chapter 3).   
 
 
TABLE 39.  Multiple Regressions on National Individual Actions 
Independent Variables Model 1 2 3 4 5 
  Affect Images Worldviews Sociodems Full 
Holistic Negative Affect 0.41 ***      0.31 ***
Skeptics  -0.28 ***     -0.13 ** 
Chg. Climate  -0.13 ***     -0.05  
Food/Agriculture  -0.11 **     -0.02  
Dry/Desert  0.12 **     0.06  
Flood/Sea Level  0.11 **     0.10 * 
Egalitarianism    0.34 ***   0.06  
Government and industry can be trusted to make    -0.13 ***   0.01  
the right decisions about technological risks. (H)          
When the risk is very small, it is OK for society to    -0.12 **   -0.02  
impose that risk on individuals without their consent. (H)          
Member of environmental groups      0.34 *** 0.27 ***
Ideology      -0.21 *** -0.11 * 
Newspaper      0.17 *** 0.13 ** 
WWW      0.13 *** 0.10 * 
White/Caucasian      -0.14 *** -0.09 * 
Income      -0.10 * -0.12 ** 
F 85.23 *** 16.97 *** 35.72 *** 27.93 *** 14.78 ***
Adjusted R2 0.17  0.13  0.16  0.24  0.36  
N 415   549   553   501   368   
Dependent variable: National Individual Actions Index           
Entries are standardized regression coefficients.           
*significant at 0.05; **significant at 0.01; ***significant at 0.001          
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Model 1 found that holistic negative affect significantly predicted individual 
behaviors, with increased negative affect associated with a greater number of actions.  
The model was highly significant and explained 17% of the variance (F (1, 413) = 85.23, 
p < .001, R2adj. = .17). 
 
Model 2 found that five cognitive images significantly predicted individual 
behaviors.  Skeptics, Chg. Climate and Food/Agriculture correlated with fewer actions, 
while Dry/Desert and Flood/Sea Level correlated with more.  The model was highly 
significant and explained 13% of the variance (F (5, 543) = 16.97, p < .001, R2adj. = .13).  
The results supported Hypothesis 1(c): affective images influence individual behaviors to 
address climate change. 
 
Model 3 found that the Egalitarianism Index and two hierarchism measures 
significantly predicted individual behavior.  Increased egalitarianism correlated with a 
greater number of actions, while increased hierarchism correlated with fewer.  The model 
was very significant and explained 16% of the variance (F (3, 549) = 35.72, p < .001, 
R2adj. = .16).  These results supported Hypothesis 2(c): worldviews influence individual 
behaviors to address global warming. 
 
Model 4 found that six sociodemographic variables significantly predicted 
individual behavior.  Members of environmental groups, liberals, newspaper readers, 
world wide web users, minorities and lower income individuals were more likely to have 
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taken individual actions to address global warming.  Conservatives, whites and higher 
income individuals were less likely to have taken individual actions.  The full model was 
very significant and explained 24% of the variance (F (6, 494) = 27.93, p < .001, R2adj. = 
.24). 
 
Model 5 combined the  four models, significantly predicted individual behaviors 
to address climate change, and explained 36% of the total variance.  Holistic negative 
affect was the single most powerful predictor (β = 0.31, p < .001) of behavior.  The 
second-most powerful predictor was membership in an environmental group (β = 0.27, p 
< .001), followed by Skeptics (β = -0.13, p < .01) and newspaper readers (β = 0.13, p < 
.01).  Flood/Sea Level, ideology, world-wide-web users, race and income all remained 
significant, though weaker predictors in the full model.  Thus, the full model 
demonstrated that affect and imagery strongly predicted individual behaviors to address 
global warming, although membership in environmental groups was a stronger predictor 
than imagery.  Egalitarianism, however, ceased to be a significant predictor in the full 
model. 
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Hypothesis 4 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that climate change activists would be significantly more 
egalitarian than the American public.  This hypothesis was tested with a series of 
independent means t-tests, comparing American and activist mean responses to the same 
egalitarianism, individualism, fatalism and hierarchism questions (Table 40).  On 
average, activists were significantly more likely to agree with egalitarian principles than 
the American public: they were much more likely to support government efforts to get rid 
of poverty, t(717) = 6.31, p < .001; agree that the world needs a more equal distribution 
of wealth, t(717) = 12.47, p < .001;  say that if people were treated more equally there 
would be fewer problems, t(717) = 12.70, p < .001; and agree that the world would be 
more peaceful if its wealth was divided more equally among nations, t(714) = 13.63, p < 
.001. 
 
 Activists, however, were significantly more likely to disagree with individualism 
principles than the American public.  Activists strongly disagreed that making money is 
the main reason for hard work, t(718) = -12.86, p < .001; or that life tends to sort out 
those who try hard from those who don’t, t(713) = -7.99, p < .001.  Finally, they sharply 
disagreed with the American public that those who acquire wealth should have the right 
to enjoy it, t(716) = -12.05, p < .001. 
 Mean p
Mean SD N Mean SD N Difference
Egalitarianism
I support government efforts to get rid of poverty. 2.99 0.89 612 3.56 0.76 107 0.57 ***
What this world needs is a more equal distribution of wealth. 2.51 0.98 612 3.52 0.73 107 1.01 ***
If people were treated more equally we would have fewer problems. 2.76 0.88 612 3.64 0.62 107 0.88 ***
The world would be a more peaceful place 2.21 0.93 612 3.51 0.74 104 1.30 ***
if its wealth were divided more equally among nations.
Individualism
Making money is the main reason for hard work. 2.53 0.95 612 1.45 0.78 108 -1.08 ***
It is just as well that life tends to sort out those 2.56 0.90 612 1.80 0.83 103 -0.76 ***
who try harder from those who don't.
If a person has the get-up-and-go to acquire wealth, 3.41 0.67 612 2.28 0.92 106 -1.13 ***
 that person should have the right to enjoy it.
Hierarchism
We have gone too far in pushing equal rights. 2.33 1.01 612 1.22 0.53 111 -1.11 ***
People should be rewarded according to their position in society. 1.78 0.84 612 1.52 0.84 108 -0.26 **
When the risk is very small, it is OK for society to impose that 1.57 0.75 612 1.50 0.73 103 -0.07
risk on individuals without their consent.
Government and industry can be trusted to make the right 1.94 0.79 612 1.24 0.55 108 -0.70 ***
decisions about technological risks.
Fatalism
The future is too uncertain for a person to make serious plans. 1.90 0.90 612 1.80 0.81 110 -0.10
It doesn't make much difference if people elect one 2.25 0.98 612 1.58 0.83 109 -0.67 ***
or another political candidate, for nothing will change.
I feel that life is like a lottery. 2.05 0.91 612 2.10 0.97 106 0.05
I have very little control over my life. 1.55 0.75 612 1.52 0.76 108 -0.03
It's no use worrying about public affairs; 1.97 0.87 612 1.14 0.42 110 -0.83 ***
I can't do anything about them anyway.
(1 = Strongly Disagree; 4 = Strongly Agree)
** = p  < .01    *** = p  < .001
Americans Activists
TABLE 40.  Worldviews: American Public vs. Activists 
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 Activists were also significantly more likely to disagree with hierarchism 
principles than the American public.  They strongly disagreed with the statement that “we 
have gone too far in pushing equal rights,” t(721) = -17.21, p < .001.  They also disagreed 
that people should be rewarded according to their position in society, t(718) = -2.97, p < 
.01 or that government and industry can be trusted to make decisions about technological 
risks, t(718) = -11.43, p < .001. 
 
 Activists were not significantly different than the American public on three 
fatalism measures, but were significantly different on two others.  Both activists and the 
American public disagreed with the fatalist principles that “the future is too uncertain to 
make serious plans,” that “life is like a lottery,” or that “I have little control over my life.”  
Activists, however, exhibited much stronger disagreement with the principles that 
elections don’t matter because nothing will change, t(719) = -7.50, p < .001 or that “it’s 
no use worrying about public affairs because I can’t do anything about them anyway,” 
t(720) = -15.76, p < .001. 
 
 Taken as a whole, these results strongly supported the hypothesis that climate 
change activists would be more egalitarian than the American public.  They also validate 
a central finding and prediction of Cultural Theory – that environmental activists tend to 
be strongly egalitarian. 
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Summary of the Hypotheses 
 
 
 
 These findings provide evidence that affect is a critical component of risk 
perception.  Perceived risk is not merely the analytical calculation of probabilities and 
severity of consequences; it is imbued with affective evaluations.  Affect was consistently 
the strongest predictor of global warming risk perceptions, policy preferences and 
individual behaviors.  Furthermore, cognitive images or associations to global warming 
were also significant predictors of these dependent variables.  Importantly, however, the 
affect and imagery measures were domain-specific; respondents were specifically asked 
their affective evaluations and first associations to “global warming.”  In this sense, the 
strong correlations between these measures and risk perceptions, policy preferences and 
individual behaviors, although highly significant, were less surprising.   
 
Perhaps more surprising, however, were the significant contributions of 
worldview in the final models.  The worldview measures were explicitly non-domain 
specific.  None of the worldview questions were about either global warming or the 
environment.  They were statements reflecting abstract, general principles and values or 
preferred organizational structures for society.  Yet, these seemingly unrelated worldview 
variables correlated strongly with global warming risk perceptions, policy preferences 
and individual behaviors, and in the case of tax policy preferences, were the single 
strongest predictor.  In particular, those individuals committed to egalitarian principles 
were much more likely to perceive global warming as a serious threat, support national, 
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international and tax policies to address it, and undertake individual actions to reduce 
their own contributions to climate change.   
 
One might assume that egalitarianism and political liberalism were synonymous.  
A linear regression between the two variables does show that they were related (β = 0.46, 
p < .001), with increased egalitarianism associated with increased liberalism.  Yet each 
variable remained an independent predictor of the variance in three of the four full-model 
multiple regressions (general policy preferences, tax policy preferences and individual 
behavior).  Thus, egalitarianism and political liberalism do not appear to be the same 
thing.  Further, egalitarianism was a stronger predictor of global warming risk perception, 
policy preferences and individual behavior than political ideology, suggesting that 
egalitarianism is a different, yet highly predictive variable. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Discussion 
 
Natural scientists warn that global climate change is a very serious risk with 
potentially devastating consequences for human societies and natural ecosystems around 
the world.   Meeting this challenge will require concerted local, national and global 
efforts to dramatically reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.  These efforts 
will require committed action by individual citizens and public support for political 
leaders and government mitigation policies.  The United States, as the world’s single 
largest emitter of greenhouse gases, will play a pivotal role.  As part of a democratic and 
free market system, the American public will have a decisive influence on the future 
direction and severity of global climate change, with myriad consequences for people and 
places around the world. 
 
A growing body of social science research has demonstrated that individuals and 
groups respond to threats based on their perception of the risks.  Further, risk perception 
researchers have identified a number of social and psychological dimensions of risk, 
including affect, imagery and cultural worldviews, that are often more salient for the lay 
public than the quantitative assessments of probability and severity of consequences 
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preferred by technical experts.  This dissertation examined whether the American public 
perceives global warming as a real threat, supports public mitigation policies, or has 
taken individual actions to mitigate climate change.  This research also analyzed the roles 
of affect, imagery and cultural worldviews in public global warming risk perceptions, 
policy preferences and individual behaviors among three populations: the American 
public, the Oregon public and student climate change activists attending the 2000 World 
Climate Conference (COP6) at The Hague, Netherlands.  Finally, it explored whether 
affective image analysis could identify distinct “interpretive communities” within the 
American public. 
 
Risk Perceptions of Global Warming 
 
 This research found that a clear majority of Americans (75%) expressed concern 
about global warming.  Although there were clear partisan differences, with Democrats 
and Liberals showing significantly more concern than Republicans and Conservatives, 
strong majorities of Americans across the political spectrum voiced concern about the 
issue.  Respondents were asked to evaluate the likelihood of a variety of local to global 
impact scenarios, including decreased standards of living, water shortages, and increased 
rates of serious disease.  On average, Americans viewed the global scenarios as 
somewhat likely.  By contrast, they believed that the local scenarios were somewhat 
unlikely.  This suggests that Americans view global warming as a spatially distant threat.  
Respondents were also asked to estimate the number of people worldwide annually 
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killed, injured or made ill by global warming currently and fifty years from today.  On 
average, Americans estimated that only hundreds are currently affected each year, while 
thousands will be in the future.  This suggests that Americans believe global warming 
will be relatively more serious in the future.  Further, the seriousness of the threat global 
warming poses to non-human nature received the single highest mean score of all the risk 
perception questions.  In sum, these results suggest that the American public as a whole, 
while concerned about global warming, view it primarily as a temporally and spatially 
distant threat to people and places far away or to non-human nature. 
 
These conclusions were supported by the results of a separate question which 
asked respondents to indicate the geographic scale of climate change impacts that was of 
greatest concern to them.  By a very large majority, 50% of Americans were most 
concerned about the impacts on people all over the world, followed by 18% who were 
most concerned about the impacts on non-human nature.  Only 13% were most concerned 
about the impacts on themselves, their family or their local community. 
 
Another important measure of current levels of concern was the question, “How 
often do you discuss global warming with your family and friends?”  Nearly 70% of 
Americans reported that they rarely discuss global warming within their immediate social 
networks.  This is another important indicator that global warming is not currently a 
highly salient issue for the American public.  In a related vein, the psychologist Neil 
Weinstein has identified “preoccupation” as a highly significant factor in risk perception 
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and behavior.  He defines preoccupation as the frequency and availability of thoughts 
regarding a hazard; the more often individuals think about the hazard and the more vivid 
and easily brought to mind these thoughts are, the more likely they are to take protective 
action (Weinstein, et al., 2000).  “Preoccupation,” however, is not merely an individual, 
psychological phenomenon – it is also fundamentally social and cultural.  One’s 
individual thoughts, images and affect about a risk are further amplified or attenuated by 
one’s immediate social network (Kasperson, et al. 1988).  We often discuss our 
preoccupations with our closest friends, family and colleagues – and talking about an 
issue like global warming increases the frequency and availability of thoughts about it, as 
well as increasing the number of associations to it as one “learns” more (regardless of 
whether these associations are scientifically accurate or not).  Further, beyond immediate 
social networks, individuals are also linked to broader social networks of media, 
economic and political relations.  Americans currently receive relatively few “amplifying 
signals” regarding global warming from any of these broader networks.  For example, a 
recent media analysis conducted by the Center for Media and Public Affairs found that, 
since 1990, television network coverage of global warming declined by 50%, while 
national newspaper coverage dropped by 25% (FrameWorks Institute 2001).  Meanwhile, 
the relative focus of national news shifted dramatically over the decade: 
 
In 1990, the amount of environmental coverage on evening news was more 
than triple that devoted to the entertainment industry (377 v. 134).  By 
1993, there were more stories on popular culture (239) than there were on 
the environment (140).  By 1998 news of the entertainment industry 
accounted for twice as many stories as the environment (211 v. 106) 
(FrameWorks Institute 2001). 
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The fact that most Americans rarely talk about global warming indicates that the issue is 
not highly salient – we are not preoccupied with this risk – either as individuals or as a 
society.   
 
Taken together, these findings help to explain the risk perception paradox 
identified by public opinion polls.  Opinion surveys have consistently found that 
Americans say they are quite concerned about global warming, yet when asked to rank 
global warming in relation to other environmental concerns, Americans place global 
warming 12th out of 13 environmental issues (Dunlap and Saad 2001).  This dissertation 
found that Americans currently view climate change as a temporally and spatially distant 
threat to people and places far away, or to non-human nature.  Furthermore, they rarely 
talk about the issue with their friends or family, while media coverage has declined since 
1990.   It is highly unlikely that global warming will become a national priority until 
these trends are reversed. 
 
By contrast, student climate change activists exhibited extreme levels of risk 
perception across nearly all the measures.  Activists believed that decreased standards of 
living and rates of disease were very likely, both globally and locally.  They further 
believed that food shortages and starvation were very likely globally and somewhat likely 
locally.  Activists estimated that the number of people worldwide annually killed, injured 
or sickened by global warming currently ranges in the thousands and 30 years from now 
will range in the millions.  Activists were also very concerned (95%) about the future 
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impacts of global warming on non-human nature.  And significantly, 98% of activists 
reported discussing global warming with their friends and family.  Clearly, global 
warming was a highly salient issue among climate activists, who believed that there are 
already large impacts on human health and that serious local impacts are very likely. 
 
This research also operationalized four hypothesized predictors of risk perception 
among the American public, including negative affect, imagery, cultural worldview and 
sociodemographics.  A series of five multiple regression models were constructed to test 
these predictors of risk perception (see Table 36).  This analysis found that negative 
affect, imagery, cultural worldviews, and sociodemographics were each significant 
predictors of global warming risk perception.  When all four sets of predictors were 
combined in a single model, however, the analysis found that negative affect and imagery 
(Skeptics) were the strongest predictors of risk perception, followed by cultural 
worldview (Egalitarianism);  as negative affect or egalitarianism increased, risk 
perception increased.  By contrast, the “Skeptic” interpretive community perceived global 
warming as a much lower risk.  These hypothesized predictors were stronger than any 
sociodemographic variable, providing evidence that affect, imagery and worldview are 
indeed significant determinants of risk perception.  Further research and analysis is 
needed to compare these factors with other commonly used explanatory variables, such 
as knowledge, trust and general environmental attitudes. 
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Global Warming Policy Preferences 
 
 Does the American public support public policies to mitigate climate change?  
The answer to this question has important implications for the global effort to address 
global warming, as the United States remains the world’s single largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases.  Without strong public support for policy action, it is highly unlikely 
that political leaders will take the requisite steps to dramatically reduce U.S. emissions.  
This research measured American public support for a variety of policy proposals to 
mitigate global warming at the national and international levels.  It found that of those 
Americans who had heard of global warming (92%): 
 
• Over 90% thought the United States should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
• A strong majority (77%) supported government regulation of carbon dioxide as a 
pollutant and a shift in subsidies from the fossil fuel industry to the renewable 
energy industry (71%). 
 
• A strong majority (88%) supported the Kyoto Protocol and (76%) wanted the 
United States to reduce greenhouse gas emissions regardless of what other 
countries do. 
 
• While a majority favored a tax on "gas guzzlers" (54%), strong majorities 
opposed a gasoline tax (78%) or a business energy tax (60%) to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
• Americans divided evenly (40%) regarding a market-based emissions trading 
system, while 18% were uncertain. 
 
• Majorities of Republicans and Conservatives supported most climate change 
policies. 
 
• Democrats and Liberals expressed stronger support for climate change policies 
than Republicans and Conservatives. 
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• Independents and Moderates showed levels of support more similar to Democrats 
and Liberals than to Republicans and Conservatives. 
 
These results demonstrated strong, bipartisan support among the American public 
for action at the national and international levels to reduce emissions of greenhouse 
gases.  Significantly, strong majorities of the public approved of the regulation of carbon 
dioxide as a pollutant, supported the Kyoto Protocol, and wanted U.S. action regardless 
of what other countries do – all contrary to the current policies of the Bush administration 
and the U.S. Congress.   
 
On the other hand, a contradiction in American policy attitudes was identified in 
these results.  While Americans demonstrated high awareness and concern for global 
warming and strongly supported  a variety of government actions, they were not willing 
to accept higher fossil fuel-based energy or gasoline prices to achieve this goal – one of 
the most powerful and direct economic incentives to reduce fossil fuel use and encourage 
more energy efficiency (e.g., improved vehicle fuel economy, high efficiency appliances 
and machinery, etc.).   
 
It thus appears that Americans have not fully confronted the contradiction 
between their strong support for greenhouse gas emission reductions and opposition to 
policies that would directly discourage fossil fuel use by consumers.  This suggests that, 
as a whole, the American public is currently in a “wishful thinking” stage of opinion 
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formation (Yankelovich 1991, 2002), in which they hope the problem can be solved by 
someone else (government, industry, etc.), without changes in their own priorities, 
decision making or behavior.   
 
Global Warming Behaviors 
 
 Stabilization of the Earth’s climate will require more than large-scale government 
programs and international treaties.  All levels of American society are complicit in the 
production and emission of the world’s highest per capita rate of greenhouse gases.  
Greenhouse gas emissions like carbon dioxide are partly the byproduct of the countless 
decisions made by individual Americans every day.  Almost everything we do in modern 
American society involves the burning of fossil fuels, whether directly by driving our 
cars, heating our homes, turning on a light, or indirectly through the products we buy and 
use.  Thus, individual behavior will be a critical component of the overall strategy to 
reduce American emissions of greenhouse gases.   
 
This dissertation reports the results of a series of questions intended to identify 
what kinds of individual actions Americans have already taken to mitigate global 
warming and to determine how common these behaviors are.  It found that approximately 
half of Americans said they had used energy-efficiency as a selection criterion when 
buying a light bulb, a household appliance or a motor vehicle (51%) or installed 
insulation or weatherized their home (45%).  These results indicate that energy efficiency 
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and conservation have become important decision making factors for many Americans.  
Unfortunately, 46% said they had chosen not to buy an aerosol spray can because of their 
concern about global warming, which provides further evidence that many Americans 
continue to confuse or conflate global warming with stratospheric ozone depletion.  Thus, 
many Americans hold inaccurate beliefs about the causes of global warming, which leads 
them to support inappropriate solutions.  These “solutions” can range from choosing not 
to buy an aerosol spray can, despite the fact that “sprays containing CFC’s have been 
banned in the US for [three] decades (Cutter, 1993:53), to the solution proposed by one 
survey respondent: 
 
The problem of global warming is the hole in the ozone layer over 
Antarctica, right?  Scientists can produce ozone in labs, right?  The 
solution is simple.  A huge amount of ozone should be created, then a team 
should fly it to Antarctica.  Once there, a plane should fly at a high 
altitude, meanwhile releasing the ozone into the torn ozone layer.  Then, 
the pollution worldwide should TRY to be regulated.  Hey, I’m not saying 
it’ll work, but it’s worth a try. 
 
Another preferred individual action reported by Americans was tree planting. 
Forty-nine percent (49%) of Americans claimed to have planted a tree because of their 
concern about global warming – perhaps the quintessential, symbolic “environmental 
act.”  Planting trees to mitigate global warming, however, is highly controversial.  
Planting trees has even become a major issue of debate at the world climate conferences.  
Trees absorb carbon dioxide from the air and store it in cellulose as part of the process of 
photosynthesis.  This carbon sequestration by living trees and forests is part of an 
enormous biological carbon sink responsible for removing millions of tons of carbon 
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dioxide from the atmosphere each year.  Some industrialized nations (e.g., the United 
States, Canada, Russia, etc.) have demanded credit for the carbon absorbed by the trees 
and forests in their territories.  Others have further argued that a massive, global, tree-
planting program should be undertaken to absorb additional carbon dioxide.  This 
approach has come under enormous criticism from scientists, environmental advocates 
and indigenous peoples for a host of reasons well beyond the scope of this dissertation 
(e.g., Meyer, et al. 1998; Englin and Callaway 1995; Scholes 1999).  It is significant, 
however, that planting a tree is one of the most common mitigation behaviors reported by 
the American public, because it suggests that they are strongly predisposed to support 
tree planting programs as a (partial) solution to global warming. 
 
Only 4% of Americans, however, had purchased energy from an alternative 
source, such as wind or solar power and only 26% reported using alternative 
transportation instead of driving.  Finally, Americans demonstrated very low levels of 
political or social behavior regarding global warming.  Only 27% reported talking to 
family friends or colleagues about the issue, while nearly 70% of Americans said they 
rarely discuss global warming within their immediate social networks.  Only 15% 
reported joining or donating money to organizations working on issues related to global 
warming and only 9% had made their views on global warming clear to politicians.  
Overall, these results indicate that while nearly 50% Americans have taken actions like 
energy efficiency and conservation (both national priorities years before global warming 
became a public issue), relatively few have engaged the issue either socially or 
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politically.  Until global climate change becomes a high public priority, democratically-
elected political leaders are unlikely to take the concerted actions necessary to stabilize 
the global climate system, especially in the face of powerful special interests that seek to 
maintain the status quo. 
 
American Affective Images of Global Warming 
 
 Recent research has found that public risk perceptions involve more than 
the analytical calculation of probabilities and consequences or the mere accumulation of 
scientific facts and knowledge; rather they are constructed from multiple evaluative 
dimensions, including affect and imagery (associations).  This dissertation further 
developed affective image analysis to investigate the role of connotative meaning in risk 
perception, decision making and behavior and to identify distinct “interpretive 
communities” among the American public.  It found that the term “global warming” had 
negative connotations for both the American public and climate change activists.  On a 
five-point scale ranging from “slightly negative” (-1) to “very negative,” (-5) activists 
overwhelming rated global warming as very negative (M = -4.68), while the American 
public rated global warming as moderately negative (M = -3.31).  In subsequent multiple 
regression models constructed to predict global warming risk perceptions, policy 
preferences and individual behaviors, holistic negative affect was consistently the single 
most powerful predictor – more powerful than cognitive imagery, cultural worldviews or 
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sociodemographic variables.  These results provided further evidence that affect is a 
critical component of risk perception, decision making and behavior. 
 
 This research also explored the role of imagery, or the cognitive component of 
connotative meaning, in global warming risk perceptions, policy preferences and 
behaviors.  Respondents from the American, Oregon and activist samples were asked to 
free associate the first thought or image that came to mind when they heard the word 
“global warming.”  This produced a rich dataset of responses, which were used to 
identify and describe the dominant connotative meanings held by each group.  It was 
found that “global warming” was a richly evocative concept for all three groups, with a 
great diversity of associations.  The dominant image in the American public mind was 
melting polar or glacier ice in the Arctic or Antarctica.  This was followed by images of 
heat, non-human nature, and the ozone hole.  Thus, two of the four dominant images 
(melting ice and non-human nature), representing 34% of all respondents, referred to 
impacts on places or natural ecosystems distant from the everyday experience of most 
Americans.  Most Americans do not live near glaciers, the Arctic Circle or Antarctica.  
To the extent that melting ice remains the most salient association to global warming, 
climate change will probably remain a low-priority issue for most people.  Likewise, 
impacts on non-human nature are probably perceived within the larger cultural context of 
anthropocentrism, whereby animals, plants and insects are viewed as having less moral 
value or importance (if any) than human beings.  To the extent that global warming 
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continues to be primarily associated with impacts on non-human nature, it also is likely to 
remain a low-priority issue. 
 
Most of the references to “heat” were relatively generic in nature and likely 
indicated associations with the “warming” in “global warming.”  Finally, 11% of 
Americans provided associations to the separate environmental issue of stratospheric 
ozone depletion, again indicating that a substantial proportion of Americans continue to 
confuse and conflate these two issues.  Thus, 61% of Americans provided associations to 
impacts geographically and psychologically distant, generic increases in temperature, or 
to a completely different environmental problem. 
 
 This technique also identified two extreme interpretations of global warming.  
First, 11% of Americans provided associations of disaster and catastrophe to the stimulus 
term “global warming.”  Many of these respondents associated global warming with 
social and environmental collapse, mass extinctions, and the end of the world.  By 
contrast, 7% of Americans provided associations of profound skepticism and even 
cynicism about global warming and the scientists, activists and political leaders that 
claim global climate change is a real and significant threat.  Combined with the results 
from the Oregon survey, six different types of skeptics were identified: those who flatly 
deny that global warming exists; those who believe that global warming is just part of a 
normal, natural phenomenon; those that believe the scientific case is still unproven; those 
who doubt based on personal experience of extreme cold weather; those who believe that 
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global warming is real, but overly hyped by the media or environmentalists; and finally 
conspiracy theorists who believe global warming is a hoax perpetrated on the public by 
scientists, politicians or environmental groups. 
 
 One of the most important findings was what was not found in these results.  
There were no associations to the impacts of climate change on human health.  There 
were no references to temperature-related morbidity and mortality (e.g., heat stroke), 
health effects of extreme weather events (tornadoes, hurricanes or precipitation 
extremes), air-pollution health effects (e.g., asthma and allergies), water and food-borne 
disease (e.g., cholera, E-coli, giardia, etc.), or vector and rodent-borne disease (e.g., 
malaria, West Nile Virus, Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome, etc.) all of which are likely 
to be impacted by global climate change (Patz et al. 2000; Epstein 2000).  Scientists 
project that the human health impacts of climate change are likely to be some of the most 
threatening consequences for human societies, especially for the poor and children in 
developing countries who lack access to adequate nutrition, clean water or medical care.  
A recent study by the World Health Organization and the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine estimated that 160,000 people (primarily children in developing 
countries) currently die every year due to the side-effects of global warming.  This 
number is projected to nearly double by 2020 (Doyle 2003).   
 
Americans are unlikely to perceive climate change as a highly salient risk until it 
is understood as a serious threat to human health.  Again, there are probably geographical 
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and historical dimensions to this lack of concern, in that Americans have relatively little 
recent experience with infectious diseases like malaria, dengue fever, cholera, etc. which 
continue to plague much of the developing world.  To a great extent, Americans are 
insulated and protected from many of these diseases due to the great sophistication and 
resiliency of the American medical system.  Nonetheless, Americans do not currently 
associate global warming with any impacts on human health, whether in the United States 
or in the less-developed world.  This finding (or the lack thereof) identifies a critically 
important gap in current public understandings of global warming and its consequences. 
 
Another important pattern in the affective image results was the relative lack of 
associations to either the causes of or solutions to climate change.  Only 5% of the total 
number of images referred to any of the causes of climate change (e.g., fossil-fuel 
burning, automobiles, industrial emissions, etc.), while none referred to potential 
mitigations (e.g., renewable energy, fuel efficiency standards, geo-engineering, etc.).  
First associations to global warming occurred almost exclusively within an impact or 
problem frame of reference, not a causal nor a solution frame.  This suggests that the 
causes and solutions to climate change did not come “readily to mind” and were not 
among the most salient features of Americans’ conceptions of global warming. 
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National Interpretive Communities 
 
An important application of affective imagery is its use as a tool to identify 
distinct “interpretive communities.”  An interpretive community is defined here as a 
group of individuals who share a relatively coherent and consistent set of associative and 
connotative meanings regarding a particular risk.  Further, members of such communities 
tend to share a common worldview and interpret risks in a similar way.  Two distinct 
communities were identified: Skeptics and Believers.   Each of these groups correlated 
strongly with a wide range of covariates in highly significant and predictable ways.  For 
example, Skeptics were much more likely to be conservative, better educated, Republican 
males, who preferred to get their news from the radio, and who were much more likely to 
be registered voters.  These skeptics had lower global warming risk perceptions, strongly 
opposed climate change policies and were less likely to have taken mitigation actions.  
They also tended to have an anti-egalitarian worldview and to hold anti-environmental 
attitudes.  In particular, they were much more likely to prefer protection of the economy 
over protection of the environment.  Thus, a distinct interpretive community of 
“skeptics,” was identified, who share common interpretations of global warming and 
common attitudinal and sociodemographic characteristics. 
 
These findings also provided convergent evidence for the existence of a “white 
male effect” in risk perception, similar to the findings of Flynn et al. (1994).  In a national 
study of risk perceptions across 25 hazards, they found that politically conservative and 
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better educated white males with higher incomes exhibited significantly lower risk 
perceptions than all other combinations of race and sex.  Further, this subgroup was also 
much more likely to trust institutions and authorities, and to exhibit anti-egalitarian 
attitudes.  Affective image analysis is an entirely different methodological technique, yet 
identified a very similar subgroup of respondents who exhibited many of the same 
sociodemographic, attitudinal, worldview and risk perception characteristics.  Further 
research is needed to corroborate these findings, which imply that risk perception goes 
well beyond issues of scientific literacy, analytical reasoning and knowledge.  These and 
other findings reported in this dissertation suggest that risk perceptions, policy 
preferences and individual behaviors are strongly influenced by sociopolitical factors 
(Finucane, et al. 2000b; Slovic 1997). 
 
Activist Affective Images of Global Warming and Hypothesis 3 
 
As expected, student climate change activists exhibited stronger negative affective 
reactions to global warming than either the Oregon or American publics.  It had been 
hypothesized (Hypothesis 3), however, that activists would produce a greater diversity of 
associations to global warming than the general public, reflecting their greater knowledge 
and understanding of the issue.  Surprisingly, the opposite was found: activists coalesced 
strongly around three images (Disaster, Nature, and Flooding/Sea Level Rise), while the 
Oregon and American publics varied much more evenly across a wider range of images. 
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Interpreting these results, there appears to be an important difference between the 
number of associations and the diversity of associations.  All of the above analyses were 
conducted with the set of first thoughts or images provided by all three samples.  If the 
surveys had asked for the second, third, fourth, fifth, etc. images, activists may have 
compiled a much larger number of associations overall, reflecting their greater 
knowledge and interest in the subject.  In this sense, “global warming” should be more 
meaningful for activists than the general public.   
 
The lower diversity of activists’ associations may partially reflect their relative 
homogeneity as a sample and interpretive community.  They were predominantly 
American, young, college-educated, environmental activists who had all flown to The 
Hague, Netherlands to take part in the 2000 World Climate Conference.  The results of 
the risk perception and other measures described above demonstrate that they were often 
nearly unanimous in their evaluations of climate change risks.  As highly motivated 
political actors, it is perhaps not surprising that they predominantly shared an image of 
“Disaster” (40%) when associating to the term “global warming.”  Associations to 
“Nature” perhaps reflect a more ecocentric set of values one might expect among an 
environmental activist sample.   
 
The third category “Flooding and Sea Level Rise,” however, is harder to interpret.  
Fully 23% of activists provided an association in this third-largest category – a higher 
percentage than either of the number one categories among the American (IceMelt = 
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21%) or Oregon publics (Disaster = 15%).  One possible interpretation was the location 
of the climate conference.  The Hague, Netherlands is below sea level and there were 
numerous references throughout the conference and surrounding activities to the dangers 
that flooding and sea level rise pose to the Netherlands, which has a long cultural history 
connected to these issues (e.g., the dike and polder system).  The most powerful symbolic 
action of the many protests that swirled around the meeting was the construction, early in 
the week, of an enormous symbolic sea wall that surrounded the conference center.  Built 
with thousands of sandbags and standing over 4 feet high, the sea wall confronted 
conference delegates and this student activist sample with a daily reminder of this 
particular climate change impact.  In fact, many of the student activists participated in its 
construction.  I surmise that this sample was primed by the social and political context to 
associate global warming with flooding and sea level rise.  If this is correct, it would be 
an example of how particular associations or connotations can be amplified through 
political action, repetition, and social discourse to influence the interpretation of an issue, 
person or event.  Although the original hypothesis was found to be incorrect, the results 
provide tantalizing clues for future research. 
 
Global Warming vs. Climate Change 
 
 This research also identified a very large disparity between American and activist 
affective evaluations of the terms “global warming” and “climate change.”  The mean 
value of American evaluations of the term “global warming” was –3.31 on a five point 
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scale.  The sub-sample of the public who provided the association “climate change,” 
however, rated this term at only –1.26 on a five point scale.  By contrast, activists rated 
both “global warming” (-4.68) and the association “climate change” (-4.71) as extremely 
negative.  One would expect that activists would exhibit stronger negative affect for these 
terms than the American public and this is in fact what was found.  More importantly, 
however, activists rated both terms as equally negative, while Americans rated the two 
terms quite differently.  This suggests, within the limitations of these studies, that the two 
terms carry very different affective connotations. 
 
The apparent disparity in the connotative meaning between the two terms “global 
warming” and “climate change” has already been exploited for political gain.  Prior to the 
2002 elections, Frank Luntz, a leading Republican pollster and strategist, gave the Bush 
administration the following advice in a secret memo on how to win the “environmental 
communications battle” on a number of issues, including global warming.  The memo 
was obtained by the Environmental Working Group and released to the public: 
 
It’s time for us to start talking about ‘climate change’ instead of ‘global 
warming’…‘Climate change’ is less frightening than ‘global warming.’  
As one focus group participant noted, climate change ‘sounds like you’re 
going from Pittsburgh to Fort Lauderdale.’  While global warming has 
catastrophic connotations attached to it, climate change suggests a more 
controllable and less emotional challenge (Luntz 2002). 
 
 
In a similar vein, Luntz recommended that Republicans stop identifying 
themselves as “environmentalists” or “preservationists” and instead call themselves 
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“conservationists.”  He argued that, “The term ‘conservationist’ has far more positive 
connotations than either of the other two terms.  It conveys a moderate, reasoned, 
common sense position…[while]… ‘Environmentalist’ can have the connotation of 
extremism to many Americans, particularly those outside the Northeast.” 
 
His advice was apparently heeded at the highest levels.  The New York Times 
reported that the terms “global warming” and “environmentalist” appeared in a number of  
President Bush’s environmental speeches in 2001, but after Luntz’s memo, the White 
House shifted to consistently use “climate change” and “conservationist” instead (Lee 
2003). 
 
This suggests that the specific terms used to describe and communicate scientific 
findings, news and policy about this environmental issue – and more broadly all risk 
issues – may have significant impacts on public risk perception and behavior.  The use of 
the scientific term “climate change” does not carry strong negative connotations for the 
American public; this emotional neutrality is one of the reasons for its popularity among 
the scientific community1.  Nonetheless, when scientists communicate their findings to 
non-specialists, the terms they use enter complex political and social systems of meaning, 
 
1Additionally,  the term ‘climate change’ allows for spatially heterogeneous impacts.  Some areas are 
projected to get warmer, while others will get colder; some areas will get more precipitation, while others 
will get less.  From this perspective, ‘global warming’ is a misnomer, because it wrongly suggests a 
homogenous warming trend worldwide – which is true only in an average, statistical sense.  The term 
‘climate change,’ however, can also be critiqued because it is abstract and does not distinguish between 
anthropogenic and natural climate change.  Unfortunately, both ‘global warming’ and ‘climate change’ are 
less than ideal terms on cognitive and affective grounds. 
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where the terms used can have significant impacts on the risk perceptions and behaviors 
of political and cultural elites and ordinary citizens.  As Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Paul 
Waldman argue in their analysis of media coverage of political affairs, 
 
Language choices not only reflect individual disposition but influence the 
course of policy as well.  Tax cuts or tax relief?  Religious or faith-based?  
Death penalty or execution?  Estate tax or death tax?  Civilian deaths or 
collateral damage?  In the early stages of almost any policy debate, one 
can find a battle over which terms will be chosen.  Because the terms we 
use to describe the world determine the ways we see it, those who control 
the language control the argument, and those who control the argument 
are more likely to successfully translate belief into policy (Jamieson and 
Waldman 2003:xiv). 
 
 
Thus, the decision by many scientists to exclusively use the relatively neutral term 
“climate change” constitutes a political act, however inadvertent or unintended.  As 
Luntz’s memo to the White House demonstrates, the seemingly innocuous decision to use 
the term “climate change” may provide tacit support for the political aims of one group 
over another.  On the other hand, it is clear that connotative meanings are dynamic and 
can change, sometimes quite rapidly.  “Climate change” has already become a highly 
stigmatized term among the activist community and perhaps much of the scientific 
community as well.  With repeated use, it could be argued that over time it will also 
acquire strong negative connotations among the general public as well.  In the short term, 
however, it appears that the relative neutrality of the term “climate change” is being 
exploited to advance a particular political agenda. 
 
 
 
187
 
Implications for Risk Communication 
 
For scientists, policymakers and risk communicators concerned about global 
climate change, the findings from the American and Oregon publics may be troubling 
news.  They suggest, however, that multiple strategies are needed to communicate about 
climate change.  First and most importantly, this research identified the complete absence 
of associations to the projected human health impacts of global climate change among the 
American public.  Risk communicators need to articulate and emphasize these health 
impacts, which are among the most serious consequences of projected climate change.  
Human health impacts are also more likely to elevate public concerns about global 
warming, especially compared to the associations currently dominant (melting ice, 
generalized heat, and impacts on non-human nature). 
 
A different strategy would be needed, however, for those people who confuse 
global warming with the ozone hole.  Risk communicators should probably target the 
source of the confusion – the inappropriate application of knowledge about the ozone 
hole to the problem of global warming – by explicitly attempting to disassociate these 
two environmental problems.  This research found that these respondents were already 
inclined to believe government and media sources and exhibit pro-environmental 
attitudes and behaviors; thus they should be relatively open to risk communications about 
global climate change.  As many already have negative affect associated with ozone 
 
 
188
 
depletion, risk communicators could try to link this negative affect to a more accurate 
image and elaborated mental model of global climate change.   
 
An entirely different set of  strategies would be needed to convince “Skeptics” 
that global warming is a serious concern.  These people will be difficult to reach, as they 
appear to distrust both government and the media.  This may help to explain why 
increased amounts of scientific information and media exposure have not successfully 
persuaded this vocal segment of the public (who are also more likely to vote).  In fact 
increased science and media coverage may serve only to strengthen some skeptics' 
disbelief, to the point of conspiracy theory.  Further research is needed on this 
subpopulation to identify the arguments, values and information sources that they do 
trust. 
 
"Disaster" respondents already exhibit grave concern regarding the issue.  They 
strongly support policies to mitigate climate change and are already predisposed to be 
attentive to and believe scientific, government and environmentalist messages regarding 
climate change risks.  On the other hand, in contrast with climate change “Skeptics,”  
“Disaster” respondents were significantly less likely to be registered voters.  In addition, 
some of these respondents provided extremely negative affective images  that went well 
beyond scientific assessments of climate change risks.  These extreme responses were 
often apocalyptic, predicting "the end of the world" or the "death of the planet."  These 
are overreactions to an otherwise very serious problem and represent individuals with 
 
 
189
 
extreme risk perceptions.  Future research will attempt to describe the prevalence of this 
type among the public and environmental activists. 
 
Finally, scientists and risk communicators need to do a better job reaching those 
people who have never heard of the issue ("Don't Knows").  Fortunately, these people do 
not already confuse global warming with the ozone hole.  On the other hand, they also 
tend to have non-environmental attitudes and behaviors.  This may indicate a lack of 
salience for most environmental issues; making these respondents relatively unresponsive 
to risk messages about climate change or other environmental problems.  Further research 
is needed to characterize this group. 
 
In short, the technique of affective image analysis demonstrates great potential to 
disaggregate "the public" and identify interpretive communities sharing subjective, 
affective meanings regarding various environmental risks, and to identify dominant 
associations, common misconceptions, and critical gaps in understanding.   
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Worldviews and Global Warming 
 
This dissertation operationalized Cultural Theory as an independent set of 
variables to test the theorized relationship between worldviews and global warming risk 
perceptions, policy preferences and individual behaviors.  Each worldview 
(egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchism and fatalism) was operationalized with a set 
of 6 questions adapted from previous research or constructed for these surveys.  Indexes 
were successfully constructed for egalitarianism and fatalism.  Indexes for individualism 
and hierarchism were attempted, but could not be satisfactorily constructed, therefore 
each individualism and hierarchism question was tested as a possible predictor in line 
with Cultural Theory. 
 
Egalitarianism proved to be a very significant predictor of American risk 
perceptions, general policy preferences, and tax policy preferences, even when 
controlling for affect, imagery, and sociodemographics, including sex, race, education, 
and income.  Egalitarianism was strongly correlated with increased global warming risk 
perception, increased support for government policies, and increased levels of individual 
mitigation behavior.  These results are all the more remarkable because the egalitarianism 
measures were not related to global warming, the risk under study, in any direct way.  By 
contrast, both the affect and imagery measures explicitly asked respondents to either rate 
their feelings or provide associations to global warming.  The egalitarianism measures, 
however, asked respondents how much they agreed or disagreed with statements like, 
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“What this world needs is a more equal distribution of wealth” or “Firms and institutions 
should be organized so everybody can influence important decisions.”  Despite these 
non-domain-specific nature of these measures, they nonetheless proved to be highly 
significant predictors.  These results support the predictions of Cultural Theory – that 
egalitarians are generally more concerned about environmental risks like global warming. 
 
Fatalism, however, was not a significant predictor of American risk perception, 
general policy preferences or individual actions.  It was slightly correlated with tax policy 
preferences, but this association disappeared in the full multiple regression model, which 
also included affect, imagery and sociodemographic variables.  Cultural theory predicts 
that fatalists are typically apolitical, resigned to merely endure the binding proscriptions 
of more powerful groups and external forces, and do not work to change economic, 
political or cultural systems.  As Tim O’Riordan and Andrew Jordan argue, 
 
[Fatalists] are resigned to their fate and see no benefit from trying to re-
shape it.  Consequently they do not join pressure groups, do not get 
involved in societal debate and see no sense in society trying to “learn” 
about how to mitigate and/or adapt to climate change because, ultimately, 
it is hopeless (O’Riordan and Jordan 1999:87). 
 
These research results provide evidence that these predictions are correct.  
Fatalists did not express significantly higher or lower risk perception, support or oppose 
global warming policies, or report more or fewer mitigation actions.  Instead, they agreed 
with the statement, “It’s no use worrying about public affairs; I can’t do anything about 
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them anyway.”  Thus, we would not expect fatalist risk perceptions, policy preferences or 
individual behaviors to vary significantly from the mean. 
 
 The inability to construct adequate indexes of individualism and hierarchism 
suggests that the measures used in this research did not adequately distinguish 
individualists or hierarchists among the American public.  Other researchers (e.g., Marris, 
et al., 1998; Peters and Slovic 1996; Rippl 2002; Steg and Sievers 2000) have reported 
similar methodological difficulties with the original questionnaire items developed by 
Karl Dake (Dake 1990, 1991, 1992), adapted and used in many subsequent studies, 
including this one.  The research reported here supports these earlier findings and 
provides further evidence that methodological research is needed to find more valid and 
reliable measures of these worldview dimensions. 
 
 Finally, it was hypothesized that climate change activists would be significantly 
more egalitarian than the American public.  This hypothesis was derived from Cultural 
Theory and the many empirical studies that have found strong correlations between 
egalitarianism and pro-environmental attitudes and membership in environmental 
organizations (e.g., Marris, et al., 1998; Peters and Slovic 1996; Rippl 2002; Steg and 
Sievers 2000).  This dissertation research found that activists were significantly more 
likely to agree with egalitarian principles than the American public.  Furthermore, it was 
found that activists were significantly more likely to disagree with individualism, 
hierarchism and two fatalism principles than the American public, indicating that climate 
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activists indeed tended to be prototypical egalitarians.  Thus egalitarian values appear to 
be a significant component of pro-environmental attitudes and activism. 
 
Summary 
 
Overall, these research results suggest that American public global warming risk 
perceptions and support for mitigation policies are currently broad, but shallow.  Strong 
majorities exhibited holistic concern, negative affect, and assessments that global 
warming is somewhat likely to have serious impacts.  They further displayed strong 
support for national and international policies to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.  
Yet most produced imagery of impacts on places spatially distant, as well as on non-
human nature, and reported that they rarely discuss the issue with their immediate social 
networks.  Finally, they also displayed strong opposition to higher energy or gasoline 
prices that would impact their pocketbook directly and report relatively few mitigation 
behaviors.  Thus, these research results suggest that the American public is currently in a 
“wishful thinking” stage of opinion formation, and has not yet fully considered the trade-
offs required to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. 
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Conclusion 
 
Global climate change is perhaps the preeminent environmental risk confronting 
the world in the 21st century.  The anthropogenic emission of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases from the developed world is the primary cause, followed by land use 
change and increasing industrial emissions in the developing world.  As one survey 
respondent commented: 
 
We can’t know where global warming is going, how far it will go, or 
whether we will be able to arrest it if it progresses past a certain point.  
All we know with reasonable certainty is that it’s happening, it’s big, and 
we’re contributing to it.  My impression, which I think is shared by most 
scientists (I’m not a scientist) concerned with the subject, is that there’s a 
non-trivial risk of widespread death and destruction if we continue doing 
what we’re doing… 
 
 
The consequences will be global and especially severe for the poor, children, 
future generations and countless plant and animal species.  Thus climate change raises 
deep questions of global justice, as those who will suffer the greatest impacts are not the 
ones who have obtained the greatest benefits from the exploitation of fossil fuels.  With 
only 4% of the world’s population, the United States alone produces over 20% of the 
world’s greenhouse gas emissions.  The reduction of American emissions in the effort to 
limit global climate change will require significant social, political and economic changes 
at all levels of society, including the individual.  There will be costs and benefits, winners 
and losers, and consumers will have to make different choices in service of the local, 
national and global effort to shift modern civilization from dependence on fossil fuels to 
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non-carbon energy sources.  The American public, in their collective actions as voters 
and consumers, will therefore play a decisive role in the future trajectory of global 
warming. 
 
This dissertation suggests that the American public is now potentially at a critical 
turning point.  Americans are aware and concerned about global climate change and 
predisposed to support political leaders and mitigation policies across party lines.  Global 
warming is not a national priority, however, and Americans have not yet confronted the 
tradeoffs and sacrifices that will ultimately be required to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.   
 
Fortunately, however, many measures to slow and reverse the upward curve of 
greenhouse gas emissions, can be achieved at relatively low cost or even a profit.  As just 
a few examples, the Union of Concerned Scientists reported that using existing, off-the-
shelf technology, the Ford Explorer (the most popular SUV sold) could increase its gas 
mileage from 19.3 to 34.1 mpg., reducing its lifetime emissions of greenhouse gases from 
117 tons to 67 tons, without sacrificing comfort, safety or power for approximately $935 
per vehicle (UCS 1999).  
 
The cost of electricity produced from non-polluting wind (3 to 4 ¢/kWh) is 
already economically competitive with coal (3.5 to 4 ¢/kWh), the primary fossil fuel used 
in electric power plants.  If the currently externalized health and environmental costs of 
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burning coal are included (e.g., asthma, respiratory and cardiovascular disease, acid 
deposition, smog, etc.), the cost of coal increases to 5.5 to 8.3 ¢/kWh (Jacobson and 
Masters 2001:1438).  The wind energy industry has grown approximately 30% a year 
since 1994 (Mazza 2000:6).  Federal government researchers concluded in the early 
1990s that “12 central states had wind potential to produce four times the amount of 
electricity consumed nationwide.  North Dakota alone could then have met 36 percent of 
U.S. energy needs” (Lavelle 2001:36).  Yet wind currently generates less than 1% of the 
nation’s energy.  Shifting from fossil fuel-based electricity production to wind and other 
renewable energy sources will clearly be an enormous task, but could be done with 
concerted effort.  In a recent article in Science, Mark Jacobson and Gilbert Masters 
calculated that the United States could displace 10% of U.S. coal burning by building 
36,000 to 40,000 wind turbines using existing technology at a cost of $61 to $80 billion, 
but at no net federal cost by investing 3 to 4% of one year’s $2.02 trillion dollar budget 
and selling the electricity over 20 years (Jacobson and Masters 2001:1438). 
 
Projects such as these, however, will require political leadership and political will.  
In the past, Americans have been willing to “bear any burden and make any sacrifice” in 
the service of other national goals, such as winning World War II, the Cold War or 
implementing the Marshall Plan.  This research shows that Americans – across political 
party and ideological lines – are already predisposed to support government action, even 
though global warming is not currently a national priority.   
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A national dialogue is urgently needed to facilitate this process and move the 
debate past sterile arguments over the reality of global climate change, blanket calls to 
just “do something,” and wishful thinking that there are easy answers to this global 
problem.  Importantly, this effort should not be a unidirectional attempt to merely 
“educate” the lay public and policy-makers about the technical details of global warming 
science.  A dialogue is needed between diverse stakeholders at multiple scales that 
includes not only discussions of the causes, consequences and solutions to global 
warming, but also an explicit articulation of divergent underlying emotions, values and 
ethical concerns.  These are essential components of a process to publicly articulate, 
weigh and choose among policy alternatives and begin serious efforts to mitigate global 
warming. 
 
Affect and cultural worldviews are each important dimensions of public risk 
perceptions, policy preferences and behaviors, yet affect and divergent ethical values are 
seldom explicitly considered by political leaders or regulators making climate change 
policy decisions based on technocratic assessments of scientific probabilities and 
consequences, or economic costs and benefits.  Technical solutions crafted and 
implemented in the absence of such considerations are likely to instigate strong resistance 
from the public and other interested stakeholders who use other “yardsticks” to assess 
risks and policies (e.g., affect, equity, public participation, etc.) and feel ignored or left 
out of the decision making process.  This is not to suggest that a seat at the decision-
making table and an airing of divergent feelings and values will magically produce 
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consensus; on the contrary, this kind of open dialogue is very hard work.  Yet the 
alternative breeds distrust, resentment and polarizing conflict that can easily degenerate 
into raw power politics.   
 
Structured dialogue that works to articulate underlying and unstated value 
commitments and assumptions is an emerging medium of public policy decision-making 
that has already achieved some success in a variety of local environmental conflicts over 
estuaries, old-growth forests and mining (e.g., Gregory 2002, 2000; Gregory and Keeney 
1994) and may hold some promise as a means to encourage a public conversation about 
global climate change risks and mitigation strategies.  Governments across Europe are 
now taking significant steps to increase public participation in decisions about social and 
technological risks (Nature 2003).  The U.S. National Research Council has recently 
advocated replacement of the “translation” model of risk characterization and decision 
making (in which experts merely attempt to translate technical risk analyses into lay 
terms) with a more inclusive, deliberative and participatory process of public assessment 
and decision making about risks (NRC 1996).  Further research is needed to examine 
when and how these emerging deliberative approaches can improve decision making 
about global climate change mitigation and adaptation at different and interlocking 
scales. 
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